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Zusammenfassung 
In vielen Regionen der Erde ist Wasser eine knappe Ressource die einer zunehmenden 
Nutzungskonkurrenz unterliegt. Es wird erwartet, dass sich dieses Problem aufgrund des 
Klimawandels sowie des Bevölkerungs- und Wirtschaftswachstums in Zukunft noch verschärfen 
wird. 
Um diesem Trend entgegenzuwirken und die begrenzten Wasserressourcen ganzheitlicher, 
gerechter und nachhaltiger zu nutzen, sind politische Maßnahmen nötig, die die Versorgung mit, 
wie auch die Nachfrage nach, Wasser regeln. Wasser ist essentiell für das menschliche Überleben, 
wird aber überdies auch in vielen Produktionsprozessen benötigt, daher haben 
wassermanagementbezogene Entscheidungen zumeist sehr komplexe Auswirkungen. Ökonomische 
Simulationsmodelle haben sich allgemein als geeignet erwiesen, um Konsequenzen von 
Politikänderungen vorab abzuschätzen. Insbesondere Allgemeine Gleichgewichtsmodelle 
ermöglichen es, die Verknüpfungen zwischen unterschiedlichen Wirtschaftssektoren 
und -subjekten innerhalb eines Wirtschaftsraumes zu berücksichtigen. Daher eignet sich diese 
Klasse von Modellen sehr gut, um die Konsequenzen von Wassernutzungsentscheidungen zu 
analysieren. Obwohl besonders seit den 1990er Jahren mehrere Allgemeine Gleichgewichtsmodelle 
speziell zur Analyse von Wassernutzungsfragen entwickelt wurden, gibt es bisher kein Modell, das 
den Wassersektor ganzheitlich darstellt und alle Aspekte der Wasserversorgung, der Nachfrage und 
der Bewirtschaftung berücksichtigt sind. 
Vor diesem Hintergrund wird in der vorliegenden Dissertation ein auf den Wassersektor 
fokussiertes Allgemeines Gleichgewichtsmodell (STAGE_W) entwickelt, welches eine allgemeine, 
ganzheitliche und flexible Grundstruktur bietet. Diese ermöglicht es, unterschiedliche 
Wasserbezugsquellen, aus denen mittels verschiedener Wasseraufbereitungsprozesse Wassergüter 
von unterschiedlicher Qualität hergestellt werden, abzubilden. Diese Wassergüter werden entweder 
in der Produktion von anderen Wirtschaftsgütern als Vorleistungen oder von Haushalten als 
Endverbrauchern verwendet.  
Die dieser Dissertation zugrunde liegenden Fallstudien sind nach bestem Wissen des Autors die 
ersten Allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsansätze, die die Wiederaufbereitung von Abwasser und die 
Versorgung mit brackigem Grundwasser als unabhängige Produktionsprozesse mit spezifischen 
Kostenstrukturen darstellen. Eine weitere Neuheit des in dieser Dissertation entwickelten Ansatzes 
ist die Darstellung von mehrstufiger Wassernutzung. Die Menge des zur Wiederverwertung 
verfügbaren Abwassers ist dabei an den Wasserverbrauch von an ein Abwasserentsorgungssystem 
angeschlossenen Verbrauchern gekoppelt. Die Einführung von mehreren impliziten 
wasserspezifischen Steuern ermöglicht darüber hinaus die Simulation einer großen Spanne von 
Wasserpolitik-Szenarien, darunter beispielsweise auch die Simulation von Preisdiskriminierung. 
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Um die Funktionalität von STAGE_W und sein Potential zu demonstrieren, wird das Modell in 
dieser Dissertation auf eine Social Accounting Matrix von Israel angewandt. Basierend auf dieser 
Datengrundlage werden mehrere Fallstudien durchgeführt, die im Rahmen von drei 
wissenschaftlichen Artikeln präsentiert werden. Israel ist dabei ein ideales Beispiel, da das Land 
einerseits stark von Wasserknappheit betroffen ist und andererseits zu den weltweit führenden 
Nationen im Bereich der Erschließung von unkonventionellen Wasserquellen und der Entwicklung 
von Wassertechnologien, wie der Meerwasserentsalzung und der Nutzung von wiederaufbereitetem 
Abwasser gehört. 
Der erste Artikel bietet eine Literaturübersicht über die bisher existierenden Ansätze der 
Darstellung von Wasser in Allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodellen und beschreibt STAGE_W und 
dessen wasserspezifische Erweiterungen im Detail. Das Modell wird angewandt um eine 50%ige 
Reduktion der für die Israelische Wirtschaft verfügbaren Frischwasserressourcen zu simulieren. 
Die Auswirkungen dieses Schocks werden mit und ohne die Möglichkeit, in zusätzliche 
Entsalzungskapazitäten zu investieren, analysiert. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die ökonomischen 
Auswirkungen in beiden Fällen leicht negativ sind. Anders als erwartet, verbessert die 
Bereitstellung von Trinkwasser aus zusätzlichen Entsalzungsanlagen die Situation nicht wesentlich. 
Dies liegt hauptsächlich an den hohen Entsalzungskosten, die gegenwärtig in Israel subventioniert 
werden. Dabei beeinflusst die Finanzierung dieser Subventionen die Verteilungswirkung des 
negativen Wohlfahrtseffekts auf die unterschiedlichen Haushaltsgruppen. 
Im zweiten Artikel wird eine Abschaffung des derzeit in Israel existierenden diskriminierenden 
Preissystems für Trinkwasser simuliert, bei dem Trinkwasser an Gemeinden zu Preisen, die über 
den Bereitstellungskosten liegen, abgegeben wird, während der Landwirtschaftssektor und 
industrielle Verbraucher das Wasser zu subventionierten Preisen erhalten. Zwei alternative, in 
Israel diskutierte, Preissysteme werden stattdessen eingeführt: Einerseits die Preisliberalisierung, 
bei der die Trinkwasserpreise für alle Verbraucher an die Bereitstellungskosten angeglichen 
werden, und andererseits die Bepreisung zu Grenzkosten, die den Trinkwasserpreis für alle 
Verbraucher auf das Kostenniveau von Meerwasserentsalzung anhebt. Beide Preissysteme bringen 
eine doppelte Dividende durch gleichzeitige Reduktion des Wasserverbrauchs und 
Wirtschaftswachstum. Dabei erlaubt die Bepreisung zu Grenzkosten größere Wassereinsparungen, 
während die Preisliberalisierung ein größeres Wirtschaftswachstum bewirkt. 
Im dritten Artikel wird das Modell bezüglich der Nutzung von aufbereitetem Abwasser erweitert. 
Dabei wird die Menge des zur Wiederaufbereitung zur Verfügung stehenden Abwassers vom 
Wasserverbrauch der an ein Abwassersystem angeschlossenen Konsumenten abhängig gemacht. 
Dies erlaubt die Darstellung gekoppelter Wassernutzung. Außerdem kann mit Hilfe dieses 
Ansatzes der Schattenpreis von Abwasser endogen bestimmt werden; dies kann zur Schaffung 
eines effizienteren Wasserpreissystems dienen. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Berücksichtigung dieser 
Koppelung in Ländern wie in Israel, in denen ein hoher Anteil des zur Verfügung stehenden 
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Abwassers wiederaufbereitet und genutzt wird, äußerst wichtig ist. In solchen Fällen führt die 
Verminderung des kommunalen Wasserverbrauchs zu einer Reduktion des zur Verfügung 
stehenden aufbereiteten Wassers, was dessen Potential als Substitut für Trinkwasser reduziert. 
Die beschriebenen Fallstudien zeigen die Nützlichkeit des Modells und belegen die Aussagekraft 
der mit Hilfe von STAGE_W getroffenen Schlussfolgerungen. Die Modellergebnisse können nicht 
unbedingt antizipiert werden, da sie das Resultat komplexer Interaktionen innerhalb des Modells 
sind. Zudem ist keines der bisher entwickelten Modelle in der Lage in ähnlichem Umfang alle 
relevanten Aspekte die diese Ergebnisse beeinflussen, darzustellen. Daher wird gefolgert, dass 
STAGE_W ein geeignetes Instrument ist um Optionen für eine nachhaltige Nutzung von 
Wasserressourcen zu analysieren. Auch Politikern in anderen Ländern ermöglicht es, vorab die 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Folgen von Wassernutzungsentscheidungen abzuschätzen, falls eine 
geeignete Datengrundlage zur Verfügung steht. Einer der größten Vorteile von STAGE_W ist 
dabei die Möglichkeit, eine unbeschränkte Anzahl unterschiedlicher Wasserqualitäten sowie - mit 
Hilfe der integrierten Wassernebenkonten - maximale jährliche Entnahmemengen aus 
verschiedenen Quellen zu berücksichtigen. Die Wassernebenkonten vereinfachen auch die 
Interpretation der Ergebnisse, da sie ermöglichen, dass die Modellresultate direkt in Mengen und 
Preisen dargestellt werden, was weitere ex-post Berechnungen unnötig macht.  
Zusammengefasst ist festzustellen, dass das entwickelte Modell zur Analyse vieler verschiedener 
Szenarien genutzt werden kann, die auf Wasserpolitik, aber auch auf Ressourcenverfügbarkeit und 
neuen Technologien im Wassersektor basieren. Da STAGE_W die Gesamtökonomie abbildet, kann 
dabei - anders als bei Einzelsektormodellen und Kosten-Nutzenanalysen - ein ganzheitliches Bild 
der Auswirkungen von Änderungen im Wassersektor gezeichnet werden.  
Summary 
xiii 
Summary 
Water is a scarce resource in many regions of the world and competition for water is an increasing 
problem. With climate change and population as well as economic growth, water scarcity is 
expected to increase even further in the future. 
To countervail this trend and to achieve a more integrated, equitable and sustainable management 
of water resources, policies are needed to regulate the supply of as well as the demand for water. 
Besides being essential for human survival, water is used in many economic activities, thus, water 
related management decisions usually have complex implications. Economic simulation models in 
general have been proven useful to ex-ante assess the consequences of policy changes. Specifically, 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are capable to consider the interlinkages between 
different sectors and economic agents within an economy. Therefore, this class of models is very 
suitable to analyze the consequences of water-related management decisions. Although especially 
since the 1990s several CGE models have been developed for the analysis of water-related 
questions, so far no model provides a holistic picture of the water sector including all aspects of 
water provision, demand and management. 
Against this background, in this thesis a CGE model (STAGE_W) is developed which is especially 
focused on the water sector and provides a generic, integrated and flexible framework to 
incorporate various water sources from which several water activities produce water commodities 
of differing quality. These are consumed by other activities as intermediate inputs or by households 
as final users.  
The applications presented in this thesis are to the best knowledge of the author the first CGE 
approaches to depict the recycling of wastewater and the provision of brackish groundwater as 
independent activities with specific cost structures. Another novelty of the model is that it allows 
for the depiction of cascading water use, whereby the quantity of sewage available for reclamation 
is linked to the water consumption of economic agents connected to a sewer system. Furthermore, 
the inclusion of several water specific taxation instruments allows for a wide range of water policy 
simulations including price discrimination. 
To demonstrate the functionality of the model and its capabilities, STAGE_W is applied to a Social 
Accounting Matrix for Israel. Based on this database several case studies are conducted which are 
presented in three scientific articles. Israel provides an ideal example as the country is strongly 
affected by water scarcity on one side, and also among the world leaders when it comes to the 
development of new water sources and technologies such as desalination of seawater and recycling 
of wastewater on the other side. 
In the first article, a literature review on previously existing approaches of water depiction in CGE 
models is provided along with a detailed description of STAGE_W and its water-related 
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extensions. The model is applied to simulate a reduction of freshwater resources available to the 
Israeli economy by 50%. The effects of this shock are analyzed with and without allowing for 
further investments to increase the desalination capacity. The results show that the economic 
effects are slightly negative under both scenarios. Counterintuitively, the provision of additional 
potable water through desalination does not substantively reduce the negative outcomes. This is 
mainly due to the high costs of desalination, which are currently subsidized in Israel. Thereby, the 
financing of these subsidies influences the distribution of the negative welfare effect over 
household groups. 
The second article simulates an abolishment of the discriminatory water pricing system currently 
established in Israel and under which potable water is provided to municipalities at fees above the 
supply costs, whereas water delivered to the agricultural and the manufacturing sectors is supplied 
at subsidized rates. Instead, two alternative pricing schemes being discussed in Israel are 
introduced: price liberalization, which unifies the prices for all potable water consumers at cost 
recovery rates, and marginal pricing, lifting the potable water price to the cost of desalination. It is 
found that both schemes yield a double dividend by simultaneously saving water and increasing 
economic growth. Thereby, marginal pricing allows for larger water savings and, in the long run 
independence from freshwater resources, while price liberalization results in higher economic 
growth. 
In the third article, the model is further refined with respect to the recycling of wastewater. The 
quantity of sewage available for reclamation is linked to the water consumption of economic 
entities connected to a sewer system, which allows for a better depiction of cascading water use 
and to endogenously estimate the marginal value of unpurified sewage which can be used to inform 
the pricing decision in this sector. It is shown that a consideration of this link is crucial, if a high 
share of potable water is reclaimed and used further, such as in Israel. In this case, reducing the 
potable water consumption of municipalities also negatively affects the availability of reclaimed 
wastewater and thereby reduces its potential as a substitute for potable water. 
These case studies provide evidence of the validity and usefulness of the model developed. The 
model results cannot necessarily be anticipated, as they are the outcome of complex interrelations 
within the model and none of the previously developed models has the capacity to capture all the 
relevant aspects of the water sector which influence these outcomes. Therefore, it is concluded that 
STAGE_W constitutes a helpful tool to implement a more sustainable management of water 
resources, allowing policy makers also in other countries, given the availability of an appropriate 
database, to ex-ante estimate the economy-wide effects of water related decisions. One of the major 
advantages of STAGE_W in this respect is its capability to include an unlimited range of different 
water qualities as well as maximal annual withdrawal quantities from various water resources, 
through the integrated water satellite accounts which also allow for a direct interpretation of results 
in terms of quantities and prices without the requirement for further ex-post calculations. 
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Summing up, the model can be applied to analyze a wide range of scenarios addressing water 
policy-related questions, but also regarding resource endowments or new technologies within the 
water sector. As the economy as a whole is depicted, a more holistic picture of effects resulting 
from changes in the water sector can be drawn in comparison to single sector models or cost-
benefit analyzes. 
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1 Introduction 
Water is the driving force of all nature. 
     Leonardo da Vinci 
According to the United Nations, water is the most precious resource in the world (UNESCO-WWP, 
2006). Yet, water scarcity is an increasing problem in many regions. Already in the year 2000, 1.6 
billion people were living under severe water-stressed conditions, a figure which is expected to reach 
3.9 billion by 2050 which would be more than 40% of the world’s population (OECD, 2012). The 
main factors contributing to this problem are a growing global population and growing wealth, leading 
to higher demand for water as well as water-intensive products. It is estimated that global freshwater 
demand will increase by 55% in the period from 2000 to 2050 (OECD, 2012). The quantity of water 
available for usage, in contrast, is mostly determined by precipitation. However, with continuing 
climate change rainfall patterns are predicted to become more erratic whereas due to rising 
temperatures, evaporation rates are expected to increase in many regions of the world, resulting in a 
reduced and more unsteady supply of freshwater predominantly in regions which already suffer from 
water scarcity today (Collins et al., 2013). By now, these factors have led to an increasing competition 
for water on the demand side, between countries as well as between sectors and users within sectors. 
Therefore, in many countries water availability already poses a limit to sustainable economic growth 
(Dinar, 2014) and extraction rates exceed replenishment rates in many watersheds and, thus, water 
resources diminish. 
To countervail this trend and to manage water resources in a more integrated, equitable and 
sustainable way, institutions and policies are needed which control the supply and demand of water. 
On the demand side, basically two economic mechanisms can be applied: Consumption of single 
water users can be restricted by allocating quotas or a pricing system can be established which ideally 
reflects the scarcity of the resource. On the supply side, the situation could be eased by fostering the 
usage of alternative water sources such as desalination of seawater or reclamation of wastewater. This, 
however, requires investments in processing facilities and usually results in higher provision costs 
compared to the supply of water from freshwater sources. 
Although the agricultural sector globally accounts for the lion’s share of water usage with 70% of the 
total water withdrawal (FAO, 2011), water is used in the production process of many different 
economic activities besides its consumption being essential for human survival. Therefore, restricting 
water supply has many implications (Dinar, 2014). In addition, improving water use efficiency and 
developing alternative water resources is costly and often requires public funding which has to be 
financed by redistributing money from other areas. All this contributes to the complexity of water 
management decisions. 
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Economic models have been proven useful as decision support tools for policy makers, as they provide 
estimates of the consequences of management decisions in complex environments. Given the fact that 
water is an important input in many economic activities as well as a final consumption good, changes 
in the water sector 1  usually have economy-wide implications. Especially Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) models are capable to incorporate these manifold direct and indirect interlinkages 
between water and economic activities and actors and, thus, can be very useful to analyze the 
economy-wide outcomes of changes in the water sector. 
CGE models which explicitly integrate water have been developed since the early 1990s; however, so 
far most of them depict only specific aspects of the water sector, rather than considering the whole 
water sector. In many models water is integrated as a resource which is often relevant for the 
agricultural sector, only (e.g. the TERM-H2O model by Dixon et al., 2010 or the CGE-W model by 
Robinson & Gueneau, 2013 as recent examples). This ignores the fact that water usually needs to be 
processed (at least pumped and transported) before it is available for usage. Thus, some models 
include a water activity which provides this service (e.g. Decaluwé et al., 1999) and might also supply 
water to other sectors (e.g. Gómez et al., 2004 or the GTAP-W model by Berrittella et al., 2007). A 
few models even consider different water activities such as Gómez et al. (2004) who added a 
desalination activity or qualities. For instance, Rivers & Groves, (2013) allow for internal recycling of 
cooling water in power plants alternative to freshwater abstraction. However, so far no model provides 
a comprehensive framework which integrates all dimensions of the water system including supply, 
consumption and management aspects. 
Against this background, the main objective of this thesis is to develop such a CGE model which is 
flexible to include a wide variety of water resources and qualities and depicts all dimensions of the 
water sector in such detail as to allow for a wide range of water-related simulations. The model 
presented in this thesis (STAGE_W) is based on the STAGE model (McDonald, 2007) which is 
extended to include more detail regarding the water sector: Several water activities with different cost 
structures are introduced, which exploit water resources, process water and produce water 
commodities, which are delivered to and consumed by other activities as intermediate inputs or 
households as final users. In this context, this thesis provides to the best knowledge of the author the 
first approaches to depict the recycling of wastewater and the provision of brackish groundwater as 
independent activities with specific cost structures. The same applies to the depiction of cascading 
water use, whereby wastewater available for reclamation is linked to the water consumption of 
economic agents connected to a sewer system. 
In addition, several water-related tax instruments are introduced to STAGE_W, allowing for a wide 
range of policy scenarios, including price discrimination. The inclusion of water satellite accounts 
allows for quantity restrictions and a direct interpretation of model results in price and quantity terms 
                                                     
1 Water sector in this thesis refers to all water-related activities, commodities and resources. 
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without further ex-post calculations. A detailed description of STAGE_W with all its extensions and 
including all the equations and the relevant model code can be found in Luckmann & McDonald 
(2014) which is added to this thesis in the annex. 
STAGE_W is a single country model, flexible to be applied to any country or region of interest. To 
demonstrate its capabilities, it is calibrated to a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of Israel which 
constitutes the database for the analyses. Israel provides a good example to demonstrate the 
capabilities of the model, as the Israeli economy is strongly affected by water scarcity, which is why a 
complex water management system has been put in place and Israel is among the world leaders in the 
utilization of alternative water sources (OECD, 2011). All this is complemented by good availability 
of water-related data, as by law all water resources are public property governed by the state and, 
therefore, consumption is generally recorded (Kislev, 2011). 
The employed SAM has been compiled by the author in collaboration with colleagues in the 
framework of the trilateral project on ‘The Economic Integration of Agriculture in Israel and 
Palestine’ funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). The compilation process of the 
original SAM is described elaborately in Siddig et al. (2011) and has been further extended by the 
author to capture the water sector more detailed. Specifically four water resources have been included 
(freshwater, seawater, brackish groundwater and wastewater) from which four activities (freshwater 
purification, desalination, pumping of brackish groundwater and wastewater reclamation) with specific 
cost structures produce three different water qualities (potable water, brackish water and reclaimed 
wastewater). These water commodities are used as intermediate inputs in activities and are consumed 
by households. Moreover, two specific water-related tax accounts have been added to the SAM. An 
aggregated version of the final SAM can be found in Luckmann & McDonald (2014) in the annex. 
This thesis is based on three articles which form a cumulative dissertation and which constitute the 
following three chapters: The first article “An Integrated Economic Model of Multiple Types and Uses 
of Water” (chapter 2), which has been published in Water Resources Research, gives an overview of 
previously existing water-focused CGE approaches and describes STAGE_W as well as its extensions 
in detail. A case study of Israel is presented, showing the economic effects of a reduced availability of 
freshwater resources, with and without an increase in desalination capacity. 
The third chapter, which consists of the article “Modelling sectorally differentiated water prices: An 
application to the Israeli water economy” submitted to Water Resources Management, provides an 
application in which STAGE_W is used to assess the impacts of changes in water policies. Two 
alternative water pricing schemes are introduced and the effects of this policy change on the Israeli 
economy and the welfare of households are examined in detail. 
In the fourth chapter, “When water saving limits recycling: modeling economy-wide linkages of 
wastewater use” submitted to Water Research, a further refinement of the model is presented 
regarding the reclamation of wastewater: the quantity of wastewater available for reclamation is linked 
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to the potable water consumption of municipalities, to better depict the cascading water use. It is 
shown, that a consideration of this link is crucial, if a high share of potable water is reclaimed and 
used further, such as in Israel. In this case, reducing the potable water consumption of municipalities 
affects the availability of reclaimed wastewater negatively and, thereby, reduces the potential for using 
it as a substitute for potable water. 
Finally, chapter five draws some general conclusions on the modeling approach presented in this 
thesis and gives an outlook on how STAGE_W could be further extended. Also, some suggestions are 
provided for additional simulations which could be conducted with the help of this model, but would 
go beyond the scope of this PhD thesis. 
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2 An Integrated Economic Model of Multiple Types and Uses of 
Water 
This chapter consists of the correspondent article, published 2014 in Water Resources Research Vol. 
50, Issue 2, pp. 3875-3892, doi: 10.1002/2013WR014750 
 
Authors: Jonas Luckmann a, Harald Grethe a, Scott McDonald b, Anton Orlov c, Khalid Siddig a 
a Agricultural and Food Policy Group, University of Hohenheim, Germany 
b Oxford Brookes University, UK 
c CICERO - Center for International Climate and Environmental Research Oslo, Norway 
Key Points: 1. Various water types and uses are integrated in a general equilibrium model 
2. A complex water policy and pricing structure is developed  
3. Water scarcity causes low welfare loss in Israel due to substitution 
Abstract: Water scarcity is an increasing problem in many parts of the world and the management of 
water has become an important issue on the political economy agenda in many countries. As water is 
used in most economic activities and the allocation of water is often a complex problem involving 
different economic agents and sectors, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have been 
proven useful to analyze water allocation problems, although their adaptation to include water is still 
relatively undeveloped. This paper provides a description of an integrated water-focused CGE model 
(STAGE_W) that includes multiple types and uses of water, and for the first time, the reclamation of 
wastewater as well as the provision of brackish groundwater as separate, independent activities with 
specific cost structures. The insights provided by the model are illustrated with an application to the 
Israeli water sector assuming that fresh water resources available to the economy are cut by 50%. We 
analyze how the Israeli economy copes with this shock if it reduces potable water supply compared 
with further investments in the desalination sector. The results demonstrate that the effects on the 
economy are slightly negative under both scenarios. Counter intuitively, the provision of additional 
potable water to the economy through desalination does not substantively reduce the negative 
outcomes. This is mainly due to the high costs of desalination, which are currently subsidized, with the 
distribution of the negative welfare effect over household groups dependent on how these subsidies are 
financed. 
Index Terms: 1880 Hydrology: Water management; 1884 Hydrology: Water supply; 6304 Policy 
Sciences: Benefit-cost analysis; 6339 Policy Sciences: System design; 6344 Policy Sciences: System 
operation and management;  
Keywords: CES-nesting, wastewater reclamation, brackish water, desalination, Israel, CGE
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2.1 Introduction 
Water scarcity is an increasing problem in many parts of the world and, since the Dublin Statement of 
1992 (WMO, 1992), water has been internationally recognized as a scarce resource. Globally 
agriculture accounts for about 70% of total fresh water withdrawals, mainly for irrigation. The 
industrial and energy sectors use about 19%, which is mostly cooling water, and 11% are used within 
municipalities, including domestic usage (FAO, 2013). Considering that irrigated agriculture accounts 
for about 40% of global crop production (WWAP, 2012), it is evident that the availability of irrigation 
water is a key determinant of food security. Thus changes in the water sector affect peoples’ welfare 
directly but also indirectly through food supply. With a growing global population, climate change and 
increasing competition from other economic sectors, water scarcity problems are expected to worsen 
in the future. Consequently, the management of water has become an important issue on the political 
agenda in many countries (Dinar, 2012) and thus there has been an increase in water related economic 
models and research.  
Analysis of the economic implications of water allocation choices is needed to support the political 
decision making process. Since water is used in most economic activities and the allocation of water 
resources involves many economic agents and sectors with complex interactions, Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) models have proven useful to analyze the economic effects of water policies 
(Dinar, 2012). However, the adaptation of these models to include the utilization of water resources is 
still relatively undeveloped. A major reason for this is the limited availability of databases that include 
the economic flows related to water and thereby provide the basis for calibrating a CGE model. The 
UN system of environmental-economic accounting for water (SEEA-Water) provides a well-
articulated method for embedding water accounts within national accounts data as satellite accounts to 
a social accounting matrix (SAM): while it was adopted as an interim international statistical standard 
in 2007, it awaits revaluation after revision (UNSTATS, 2013).  
This paper reports on the development of an integrated water focused CGE model that includes 
multiple types and uses of water, and illustrates the insights from such a model. A brief review of the 
development of the behavioral relationships used in water focused CGE models, in section 2.2, 
provides the context within which this model has been developed. The model incorporates different 
aspects of previously developed models and extends them to form an integrated model capable of 
analyzing a wide range of scenarios within the water sector (section 2.3). In the fourth section, an 
application of the model to the Israeli water economy is presented and the results are evaluated. The 
fifth section discusses the features of our modeling approach as well as the possible extensions and 
further applications.  
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2.2 Water in General Equilibrium Models 
Water has regularly been included as an input to production in CGE models, and since the 1990s 
successive studies have introduced new approaches to water focused CGE models. However, while 
these studies, and their associated CGE models, have emphasized specific aspects of water use, they 
have not addressed the water system as an integrated system that includes different types of water and 
consideres all dimensions of water supply and demand in an economy. The model reported in this 
paper addresses this gap in the literature. This section reviews the range of features included in 
different water-focused CGE models, and specifies the features required in an integrated model. The 
empirical literature is not reviewed. A recent review can be found in Fadali et al. (2012). 
Early water-focused CGE models concentrated on the economic effects of curtailing water use in the 
agricultural sector, either transferring it to other economic sectors or the environment. Since water 
rights in agriculture are mostly attached to land titles, such that land owners also own a certain 
quantity of water, water was either only indirectly included in the model equations as a fixed share of 
the value of land, e.g., Seung et al. (1997) or as a factor of production that is used in a fixed ratio 
together with land in irrigated agriculture, e.g., Berck et al. (1991); Seung et al. (1998). These early 
studies treated the water sector as a passive rather than active agent responsible for the provision of 
usable water. A very recent extension taking up this approach is to integrate such a CGE model, in 
which water consumption is included indirectly by linking it to GDP, household income, and crop 
productivity, with a water-management model, which allows for a finer depiction of the water 
distribution within irrigated agriculture and within one season (Robinson & Gueneau, 2013). 
An active water sector can be represented as an activity which builds dams and pumps groundwater to 
supply irrigation water to the agricultural sector (Decaluwé et al., 1999), in contrast to an irrigated 
agricultural sector supplying itself by pumping untreated raw-water. Such water related activities can 
also produce potable water that is delivered for use by other activities as an intermediate input 
commodity and for consumption by households (Gómez et al., 2004). The integration of a water 
related activity transforming a raw water resource into a water commodity has subsequently been used 
in other models, e.g., Tirado et al. (2006); Juana et al. (2011); Watson & Davies (2011), and it has 
become standard to treat the water sector as a productive activity that produces inputs. 
Water focused CGE models typically assume that water can be substituted, to a greater or lesser 
extent, by other inputs, usually in a nested CES production system. A range of different substitution 
possibilities have been explored: in arable farming water has been a substitute for fertilizer (Decaluwé 
et al., 1999); pumped water has been a substitute for a capital-land aggregate (Gómez et al., 2004); and 
farmers have been able to substitute water with capital to simulate a more efficient irrigation system, 
and thereby decrease water intensity, in response to the imposition of a tax on irrigation water (van 
Heerden et al., 2008). Substitution possibilities between irrigated, irrigable and dry land have also 
been modeled: irrigable land can become irrigated land, using fixed amounts of water per unit area, or 
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be substituted with dry land or irrigable land without water (Dixon et al., 2010), alternatively the 
quantity of irrigation water applied can be varied (not fully irrigated land) (Calzadilla et al., 2011). In 
models that include water consumption of non-agricultural sectors, water can often be substituted by 
capital, e.g., Gómez et al. (2004), or a capital and labor aggregate, e.g., Qin et al. (2012). 
Other models include alternative water sources or different water qualities. Seawater can be an input to 
a desalination activity that produces potable water, comparable to the traditional water treatment 
activity, but with a different cost structure, e.g., Gómez et al. (2004). Recycling of water can be 
introduced by differentiating between consumptive and non-consumptive uses of water, whereby the 
latter returns back to the system and can be used by other activities (Watson & Davies, 2011). This 
increases total water supply, if water is transferred from activities with high consumptive usage, e.g., 
irrigated agriculture, to activities with lower consumptive usage, e.g., municipalities. Similarly, the 
electricity generation sector can internally recycle used (cooling) water and thereby save on 
abstraction and discharge fees (Rivers & Groves, 2013). 
Water is not only important as an input but also as an environmental resource. For instance, specifying 
an ecological sector that absorbs the difference between total water endowment and water use by 
consumers and producers enables an evaluation of the environmental implications of different supply 
and demand side water policies, e.g., Llop & Ponce-Alifonso (2012). 
In many countries water prices charged differ between consumers. This has produced a number of 
models that assess the impact of different pricing policies. Differences in (potable) water prices paid 
by different user groups, e.g., agriculture versus municipalities, can be captured by a water price 
distortion factor, (Watson & Davies, 2011), or by applying different water tax rates to different sectors 
(Qin et al., 2012). Differences in water prices inevitably have welfare and distributional implications. 
In most water focused CGE models the welfare effects are not immediately evident because they have 
a single household; multi household CGE models can be used to provide more information on the 
distributional effects and investigate poverty issues, e.g., Boccanfuso et al. (2005) and Letsoalo et al. 
(2007). 
While most water focused CGE-models are applied at the country scale or even at the watershed level 
some have used augmented data from GTAP to calibrate global models. Water can be introduced as a 
factor used for agricultural production or delivered by the service sector to the rest of the economy, 
e.g., Berrittella et al. (2007), and crop water demand is calculated based on evapotranspirational needs, 
assuming no losses due to irrigation inefficiencies. Moreover, rainfed- and irrigated agriculture can be 
differentiated, e.g., Calzadilla et al. (2011). In these studies, the water-factor is introduced with a value 
of zero, assuming that supply exceeds demand globally in the base situation; only after a water supply 
shock is introduced does water get a value. To date these studies have not been extended to non-
agricultural activities owing to a lack of data. 
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While water focused CGE models have been developed to address specific aspects of water, none 
provided an integrated framework to depict the production and use of different water qualities that 
allows for substitution and price differentiation at different levels. The model developed for this study 
permits the inclusion of multiple (active) water related production activities that supply water to other 
activities and consumers, using a range of user defined production technologies and different types of 
water resources. These activities can be subjected to various constraints, including quotas. As far as is 
known, this is the first model to include the recycling of wastewater and the provision of brackish 
groundwater as independent activities with specific cost structures. The model also includes a range of 
tax instruments that can be easily extended to match the characteristics of individual economies. These 
developments enable the model to simulate a wide range of water, related policy options. By 
embedding the modeling of water within a CGE model that has a rich specification of domestic 
institutions – multiple households, incorporated business enterprises and government – as well as a 
wide spectrum of tax instruments the analyses of the results can provide insights relating to income 
distribution and welfare as well as fiscal policy options.  
2.3 An Integrated Approach to Modeling the Provision and Use of 
Multiple Water Qualities 
The STAGE_W model (Luckmann & McDonald, 2014) presented here encompasses multiple water 
related activities and allows for the production of water of the same quality (homogenous) by multiple 
activities. The various qualities of water are included as inputs in the production functions of the other 
sectors and can be consumed by households. Typically, only potable water is consumed as a final 
product by households. Several water-related tax elements are included. Water quotas can be imposed 
on the total (economy wide) quantity of water used or on the quantities of water used in production or 
consumption. This allows for a wide range of water policy simulations. 
 Model Structure 
The STAGE_W model is an extension of the STAGE CGE model described in McDonald (2007), 
which is a descendant of the USDA ERS model of the early 90s (Robinson et al., 1990). The STAGE 
model is coded in General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). The code for the basic STAGE 
model is available from www.cgemod.org.uk. It is a SAM based CGE model that has a mix of non-
linear and linear relationships governing the behavior of the model’s agents. The model can be 
implemented in either comparative static or recursive dynamic mode.  
Domestic agents – activities, households, (incorporated business) enterprises, government and 
investment – consume composite aggregates of domestic and imported commodities that exhibit 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES), following Armington (1969). The distribution of 
domestically produced commodities among domestic demand and exports is governed by relative 
prices on these markets, using constant elasticity of transformation (CET) functions, which reflects 
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imperfect product transformation. In the base version, domestic production is modeled as a two stage 
production process with either constant elasticity of substitution (CES) or Leontief technologies 
applied. At the first stage, intermediate input and value added generate the output of each activity 
based on CES technology. At the second stage, the use of intermediate inputs is in fixed proportions 
applying Leontief technology, while the CES technology is used to form value added by primary 
production factors where the optimal ratio of factors is determined by relative prices. Households 
maximize utility subject to Stone-Geary utility functions over disposable incomes, while enterprises, 
government and investment demand commodities in fixed proportions. The base version also includes 
multiple tax instruments and allows for a wide range of factor market clearing conditions and 
macroeconomic closures.  
The extension of the model to encompass multiple water qualities and production activities requires 
developing the production system to accommodate differences in the production technologies used to 
produce and use different types of water. The chosen production system involves a series of nested 
CES and/or Leontief technologies. The production system must also be modified to allow for the 
production of homogeneous commodities by multiple activities that have different cost structures. To 
implement this in a CGE model some constraints and/or policy instruments have to be imposed on the 
model; STAGE_W contains policy instruments – taxes/subsidies – in addition to resource/input 
constraints, which allow for more than one activity producing the same homogenous good. The 
generic production system in the model is illustrated in Figure 2.1. In this example seven types of 
water are included. Three of these are natural resources: fresh water, which is comprised ideally of 
surface water and groundwater, (Diao et al., 2008), seawater and brackish groundwater, which usually 
stems from deep aquifers and has a lower salinity level compared to seawater. Additionally there is 
wastewater from sewage or other wastewater systems, which is a by-product of potable water 
consumption. On the right, three water commodities are depicted, which are produced from the natural 
resources and by-products on the left. Potable water is produced from either fresh water or seawater, 
brackish water is brackish groundwater pumped up from aquifers and delivered to users, and reclaimed 
water is treated wastewater.  
The production system illustrated in Figure 2.1 requires the development of a database that gives 
empirical content to the model. Depending on the database the model can easily be adjusted to include 
further water qualities, e.g., different purity levels of reclaimed water or exclude irrelevant ones for the 
country of interest. 
The SAM (transactions) defines the inputs and outputs used in the base period while water satellite 
accounts provide data on the physical quantities of water used by each activity and by domestic 
institutions, e.g., households. The user specifies the substitution possibilities at each level of the 
production nest by defining the substitution elasticities (σi) where i defines the level of the nest at 
which the elasticity operates; for any elasticity set to zero the technology at that level of the nest is 
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Leontief. Given this information, the selection of the precise production system by each activity is 
automatically defined by the model code. 
Figure 2.1. Production system for activities in STAGE_W. σ1-4: substitution elasticities. 
Consider first water production activities. There is one activity for each water resource or by-product. 
Utilizing additional production factors (capital, labor) and intermediate inputs (such as energy and 
consumables), it converts the resource or by-product to a water commodity, which is then used as an 
input in other activities or, in case of potable water, is consumed by households. On the other hand, 
one water commodity can be produced by several activities. In the example depicted in Figure 2.1, 
there are four natural resources and by-products from which three water commodities are produced, as 
the fresh water activity and the desalination activity both produce potable water. The fresh water 
activity produces potable water from fresh water without using any other water resources, by-products 
or commodities or land. Hence the value added/water aggregate collapses to an aggregation of labor, 
capital and fresh water. Applying Leontief production technology on all levels ensures that the 
quantity of potable water produced is equal to the quantity of fresh water entering the process. 
Desalination, by definition, requires the use of seawater as an input and, given the high cost of 
desalination, only produces potable water. Thus two activities with, typically, different cost structures 
produce a homogenous product. The basic STAGE model assumes that if the “same” commodity is 
produced by different activities it is heterogeneous – a CES aggregate. This variant is adjusted so that 
An Integrated Economic Model of Multiple Types and Uses of Water 
14 
the option exists to define such commodities as homogenous. Given differences in cost structures it is 
necessary for the model to include instruments that ensure the supply price for the homogeneous 
commodities is the same from each activity; this is described in section 2.3.2.  
In case potable water is lost before it reaches consumers, due to leakage, potable water would be an 
input to its own production. If (aggregate) water is produced with Leontief technologies the implied 
rates of the loss of potable water in production and losses in transmission are fixed, while if potable 
water is produced with CES technologies, it implies the rate of leakage is a function of the price of 
potable water. Thus CES technologies imply a long run scenario where the water authorities respond 
to changes in prices by “adjusting” the rate of losses; this differs from the approach suggested by Faust 
et al. (2012). 
Similarly the production of brackish and reclaimed water depend on the use of brackish groundwater 
and wastewater, respectively, plus other inputs that may or may not include other types of water. By 
defining policy inspired (exogenous) extraction rates for the different water resources it is possible to 
condition the model so that the outputs of water producing activities are limited to output levels 
determined by the extraction rates. This can be used to calibrate the model to the current situation. 
For water consuming activities, the various types of water commodities are used according to the input 
structure contained in the database. Irrigated agricultural activities use (agricultural) land and one, or 
more, types of water commodities. It is useful to segment these activities and commodities so as to 
distinguish between activities that can use the different types of water, e.g., to single out crops that are 
salt resistant and thus can use either brackish or potable water for irrigation or non-food crops that can 
be irrigated with reclaimed water. Generally, non-agricultural activities do not use agricultural land but 
do use water of different types. In such cases the Land/Water aggregate collapses to the Water 
aggregate. 
The model is flexible and adjusts to the usage of different water commodities and factors, e.g., land, 
by different activities. For example, service activities, e.g., trade, transport and communication, 
typically do not use marginal water (reclaimed water and brackish water) or land. Thus, their 
production structure collapses to two stages, such that potable water is combined with labor and 
capital in one value added nest. 
Finally stocks of water resources that are reserved for environmental or other reasons, e.g., to 
guarantee a certain level of river flow, are not usually accorded a monetary value and are not given 
monetary values in this model. If decisions are made to preserve stocks of water resources, these 
decisions will reduce the flow of water resources available to the economy. 
 Water Costs and Pricing 
The price system in the STAGE model is also adjusted by introducing new tax instruments in the 
water sector. In the model tax instruments are taxes if their values are positive and subsidies if their 
An Integrated Economic Model of Multiple Types and Uses of Water 
15 
values are negative; the terms taxes and subsidies are therefore interchangeable and the choice of term 
is context specific. Potable water, irrespective of how it is produced, is usually supplied via only one 
water network and therefore is functionally homogenous. However, if water-producing activities face 
different production structures and costs then multiple activities can only produce the same type of 
water simultaneously if there are instruments in the price system that equalize the production costs. To 
allow for the simultaneous production of potable water by multiple activities, we introduce a (implicit) 
production subsidy (TX(a)) for the desalination activity, which allows the production of potable water 
for the same supply price (PQS(c)) despite different costs (Figure 2.2). This reflects the fact that most 
desalination plants are either operated by governmental organizations or the government guarantees 
prices to the private operators so they recover the costs of desalination. Typically desalinated water is 
supplied to the final user at a price below its production costs, and hence subsidized. Nevertheless, the 
model allows for equalizing prices through a mix of taxes and/or subsidies.  
Furthermore, we introduce two water tax instruments to provide additional flexibility in terms of water 
price policies, such as differential pricing. First, we introduce an implicit commodity tax on water 
commodities (TWAT(c)) that is added on top of the existing sales tax (TS(c)) and increases the price of 
water commodities to the highest water tariff charged in the country under consideration (PQD(c)). 
This is usually the price charged to municipalities (households and service sector). Second, all water 
consumers, which pay a lower tariff (e.g. the agricultural sector), receive an implicit subsidy 
(TWATA(c,a)) that can be adjusted individually to the a water using activities, allowing for many 
different final price levels (Figure 2.2).  
Figure 2.2. Differentiation of potable water prices. 
Desalination 
Activity
Freshwater 
Activity
Prices of Value Added (PVA) 
and Intermediates (PINT)
PVA(a) PINT(a)
PX(a)
TX(a)
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TWATA(c,a)
Activity Output Price
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Consumer Price
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to Consumer
Water User Subsidy
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The model allows for the use of satellite accounts for water that record physical quantities. 
Consequently the model can be calibrated with real quantities and prices and hence the model can 
isolate price and quantity results for the water commodities without further post simulation 
calculations. Where water satellite accounts are absent, the model can be calibrated using implied 
relative prices and (value based) quantities. In this case the model is calibrated using normalised 
prices, typically calculated as one plus any price wedge, and the quantity units are defined as the value 
of water divided by this price. In such cases shocks to the model need to be adjusted in line with the 
quantity units in the model; typically these are expressed as percentage changes in the base quantity 
units. 
2.4 A Case Study 
The model is applied to the water sector in Israel because of its complex water management and price 
system. Water management is a crucial issue in Israel due to its location in the dry-summer subtropical 
zone, its few inland water bodies and its relatively large population and level of water demand. 
Therefore, a managed water sector, with metered water supplies to all consumers including agriculture 
and a distinct pricing scheme for potable water have been put in place, whereby potable water prices 
charged are highest for municipalities (including households and the service sector), lower for the 
manufacturing sector and the lowest in the agricultural sector. In addition, Israel is among the world 
leaders in the use of alternative water sources (seawater, brackish groundwater and wastewater).  
Therefore, in this implementation of the model there are four water production activities that produce 
three water commodities. The four activities are fresh water, desalination, wastewater reclamation and 
pumping of brackish water activities, which produce three qualities of water – potable, brackish and 
reclaimed water. As described above, potable water can be produced either by the fresh water activity 
or by the seawater desalination activity. As potable water prices are distinct between municipalities, 
manufacturing and agriculture in Israel, manufacturing and agricultural activities receive different 
levels of water user subsidies, while the price charged to municipalities is adjusted with the help of the 
water tax only. The two marginal water commodities, brackish water and reclaimed water, are 
produced by respective activities and are used solely for irrigation.  
The time path over which Israel implements changes in water policies is not deemed critical in this 
analysis since the time sequence of the establishment of new desalination plants does not substantively 
impact on the long term results. Hence for this case study the model is operated using its comparative 
static mode. 
 Database and Parameters 
The starting database for our application is a SAM for Israel in 2004 (Siddig et al., 2011). The year 
2004 can be considered a normal year for the Israeli economy, in a period of growth after a recession 
in 2000 and 2001 due to the Second Intifada and before the worldwide economic crisis in 2009 (CBS, 
An Integrated Economic Model of Multiple Types and Uses of Water 
17 
2013). Therefore the results obtained by simulations based on this SAM can be considered 
representative and allow for extrapolation to more recent years. 
The SAM provides data on 45 commodities and activities, 38 production factor accounts, and 18 tax 
categories. The SAM furthermore includes 10 household types, first grouped according to ethnic 
background (Jewish and Non-jewish) and second according to income (5 quintiles), which allows for 
the analysis of distributional effects. 
Water in the original SAM is represented by one sector. We use additional data on the Israeli water 
sector in 2004 provided by the National Water Authority (NWA) (in Zaide, 2009), FAO (2009) and 
the Israeli Statistical Office (CBS) (2009) to provide the technology data needed to disaggregate this 
account. Costs of water supply and fees charged are calculated based on the Satellite Account of Water 
in Israel 2006 (CBS, 2011). Although the Israeli Water Authority has raised water prices between 
2004 and 2006 by more than the inflation rate due to the severe water shortage in Israel, the policy of 
differentiating prices did not change. Thus, water prices used in this study are already closer to cost 
recovery rates than they were in 2004 and therefore the magnitude of simulated changes is smaller 
than if 2004 data were used. Therefore, using updated prices depicts the current situation more 
realistically. 
After introducing additional production factors, activities, commodities and tax instruments, the 
adjusted SAM is subjected to a balancing procedure that assures that if the (transaction) values for 
water in the SAM are divided by the appropriate prices they are consistent with the water quantities 
produced and consumed as reported by the NWA and CBS. 
Furthermore, desalination of seawater has been introduced in Israel on a considerable scale only in 
2007. Therefore, to be able to run simulations considering this important source of potable water, a 
presimulation is required. The presimulation adjusts the structure of the SAM, and its water accounts, 
to represent the situation in 2007 when 123 million m³ of potable water were derived from desalination 
and the production of potable water by purifying fresh water decreased by about the same amount 
(CBS, 2010). The new SAM accounts for these changes and forms the database for this case study.  
All water producing activities use different shares of inputs and thus have different cost structures. 
Table 2.1 reports these cost structures for the case of Israel. The lowest row of the table shows the 
total production costs for each activity. For all activities, energy is the most important input since all 
activities require pumping water either from the ground at depths up to 1000 m in case of brackish 
water (Brimberg et al., 1994) or through micro-membranes for desalination, which is a very energy-
intensive process (Garb, 2010). Capital shares are the highest for wastewater reclamation and 
desalination due to high investment requirements. The same holds true for consumables, which are 
mainly chemicals for wastewater reclamation and materials, such as membrane replacements, for 
desalination. Only the purification of fresh water relies on fresh water resources and thus has to pay an 
extraction levy that reflects the scarcity of the resource (Kislev, 2001). Finally, other inputs mainly 
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include construction and other services, which are consumed by all water producing activities to a 
minor extent.  
Table 2.1. Cost structure and total production cost of water producing activities in 2006. 
Inputs [%] Fresh water 
Wastewater 
reclamation 
Pumping of 
brackish water Desalination 
Energy 30.2 30.0 34.8 40.0 
Labor 30.1 22.8 34.2 10.0 
Capital 14.6 20.0 17.2 20.0 
Consumables 8.3 20.0 5.0 14.5 
Fresh water 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Machinery 6.2 4.6 5.0 10.0 
Taxes 1.1 0.9 1.3 1.8 
Other 2.3 1.7 2.6 3.7 
Total production cost [2006 USD/m³] 0.56 0.16 0.08 0.91 
Source: own compilation based on Feinerman & Rosenthal (2002), Beltran & Koo-Oshima (2006), Stevens et al. 
(2008), CBS (2011) and Siddig et al. (2011). 
In this analysis the effects of further increasing the desalination capacity are investigated. New 
desalination plants are built according to current technologies. After that no major changes in 
production technology are possible, while the plants might produce potable water for decades. The 
same holds true for other infrastructure in the water sector, e.g., reclamation plants. Therefore, we 
decide to exclude technological progress in this simulation and hence keep the cost structure for the 
activities that produce water commodities fixed by setting the substitution elasticities on all levels to 
zero; thus Leontief-technology is applied. 
In non-water activities, the following elasticities of substitution are applied. For the combination of the 
three water commodities we use a medium to low substitution elasticity (σ4 in Figure 2.1) of 0.8 
(Sadoulet & de Janvry, 1995). This is mainly because the SAM used for this analysis includes 
aggregated activities of which not all components can use marginal water qualities. Also, although 
there is an extensive supply network for reclaimed water in Israel the option to use marginal water 
does not exist in all localities. Lastly, farmers might decide not to switch to marginal water usage 
because of fears with respect to soil degradation caused by soil contamination or salinization. For the 
combination of land and water, the substitution is governed by an elasticity (σ3 in Figure 2.1) of 0.3 in 
accordance with Faust et al. (2012). For the value added-water nest we apply an elasticity (σ2 in Figure 
2.1) of 0.8, which is slightly lower than the elasticity used by Berck et al. (1991) for a high elasticity 
scenario. At the top-level we choose an elasticity (σ1 in Figure 2.1) of 0.5.  
Figure 2.3 depicts the water use in the Israeli agricultural sector according to the agricultural activities 
identified in the SAM. Agriculture is the biggest user of water in Israel, whereby, based on total 
consumption, vegetable and fruit plantations are by far the largest water users, followed by the 
production of other crops, which include cotton, sunflowers, and other field crops. Also the usage of 
marginal water is restricted to some of the irrigated agricultural activities only.  
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Figure 2.3. Water use in the Israeli agricultural sector in 2004 in million m³ and share of water in total 
production costs.  
Source: own compilation based on FAO (2009), Zaide (2009) and Siddig et al. (2011). 
The usage of brackish water is limited to two activities (“vegetables and fruit” and “other crops”), 
since only these activities include some plants that are tolerant toward increased salinity levels, e.g., 
tomatoes, melons, and cotton. Because of sanitary restrictions, the usage of reclaimed water is limited 
to these two, above mentioned activities as well as the “mixed farming and forestry” activity. Only 
these activities either produce some non-food outputs, e.g., cotton and timber products or crops for 
which lower sanitary restrictions apply, since they can be irrigated without the water being in direct 
contact with the harvested parts, e.g., olive and citrus trees. Due to data limitations however, these 
aggregates also include crops which do not allow for the usage of marginal water. This is considered 
by adjusting the water commodity substitution elasticities of these activities. No data on the use of 
marginal water in the different agricultural sectors is available. Therefore, brackish and reclaimed 
water commodities are split between activities which allow for their usage according to the total water 
consumption of their respective activities in the SAM. 
 Closures and Market Clearing 
Given the small share of the Israeli economy in the world market we assume world market prices to be 
fixed (small country assumption). The other closure rules are selected so that adjustments are all 
achieved within the solution period, e.g., there are no changes in future capital stocks or investment 
unfunded in the current period. The external balance also remains fixed, whereas the exchange rate is 
flexible. Moreover, we assume that savings are investment-driven. Regarding the government, we 
assume consumption of fixed quantities of all commodities and no changes in the savings rate as well 
as government transfers. A constant balance of the government account is achieved by adjusting the 
income tax rate households pay in a multiplicative way, whereas all other tax rates remain constant 
with the exception of water related taxes described in the scenario section hereafter. In addition, the 
volumes of enterprise demand and enterprise transfers to households remain unchanged.  
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Factor markets are cleared under the assumption that all factors of production are fully employed and 
mobile between activities, such that the model results reflect the long-term perspective after 
adjustments have taken place. The only exception to this is the fresh water resource, which has a fixed 
unit value whereas the quantity used is flexible. This allows for reduced usage of renewable water 
resources in the simulations.  
 Scenarios 
We examine two scenarios to show different aspects of our model. Current water policy debates in 
Israel are concerned with the practicality of further increasing desalination capacity in spite of its high 
production costs and whether it would be more efficient to invest in water saving technology or 
improve water recycling. We investigate the implications of expanding desalination capacity in case of 
a strong decrease of available fresh water resources, which could be caused by political negotiations 
giving more water rights to the Palestinian Authorities or a potential Palestinian state that would most 
likely overlay Israel’s most important ground water aquifer. Moreover, there is pressure to reduce the 
off take of water from the Jordan River to prevent the sea level of the Dead Sea from further falling. In 
addition to this, Israel is facing a lasting drought for almost a decade. This has led to a decrease in 
replenishment rates of fresh water aquifers to 63% of the multiannual average by 2008 (Shachar, 
2009). All these factors reduce the quantity of fresh water resources which will be available to the 
Israeli economy in the long run. This reduction of fresh water supply is examined under two different 
scenarios regarding the development of the desalination activity: a fixed desalination capacity 
(Scenario Fix-dsal) and an expansion of the desalination capacity (Scenario Exp-dsal). Results of both 
scenarios are compared with the current situation (Base). For both scenarios a range of reductions in 
the output of the fresh water activity were analyzed: output was reduced in 10% steps between 10% 
and 80%, after which the model came up against binding constraints. Between 10% and 70% 
reductions in the output of the fresh water activity the patterns and signs on the results were consistent. 
Therefore only the results for 50% reduction output are reported in detail. The choice of a 50% 
reduction in output was also influenced by estimates that this is the level of reduction required to 
achieve sustainable replenishment rates considering the above described causes of pressure on the 
Israeli fresh water resources. The full set of results is available upon request from the corresponding 
author. 
2.4.3.1 Fixed Desalination Capacity (Fix-dsal) 
In the first scenario (Fix-dsal) we fix the output of the desalination activity to its current level. This 
means that total supply of potable water is strongly reduced, as the output reduction of the fresh water 
activity cannot be compensated by the desalination activity. To manage demand, the water authority 
therefore will be required to either allocate quotas to water users or increase prices. We opt here for 
the second option and therefore let the implicit water tax (TWAT) adjust so that the consumer price 
(PQD) for potable water adjusts to clear the market. We keep the implicit water consumer subsidy 
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rates (TWATA) unchanged, such that prices change at the same rate for all water users. The implicit 
subsidy to the desalination activity (TX) is left flexible, such that its activity price received by the 
desalination activity (PX) is the same as the price of the freshwater purification activity, even if price 
changes resulting from this simulation might affect the two potable water producing activities 
differently. 
2.4.3.2 Increased Investment in Desalination Capacity (Exp-dsal) 
In the second scenario (Exp-dsal) we let the desalination sector expand and keep the rest of the settings 
as in the Fix-dsal scenario. Only the subsidy to the desalination sector is kept constant, as in this case 
the model can adjust production quantities of the desalination sector by taking up production factors 
from the fresh water activity. We compare the results of this simulation to the Fix-dsal scenario to see 
whether water saving and substitution of potable water with marginal water commodities only, or the 
additional substitution possibility with desalinated water is more beneficial in terms of welfare and 
other economic indicators. 
 Results 
2.4.4.1 Water Quantities 
Due to the shock in fresh water resources of the two simulations, the output of the fresh water 
purification activity is halved (Table 2.2). In the first scenario (Fix-dsal) this leads to large reductions 
of potable water volumes available to the economy. For the three different economic sectors 
(agriculture, manufacturing and services) the cuts in potable water supply occur at almost the same 
rate, as the price ratio between sectors does not change and we assume similar elasticities of 
substitution. However, reduction rates in the manufacturing and service sectors are slightly higher 
compared to agriculture. This is due to the relatively low shares of water in total production costs of 
these activities (below 0.6%), and hence potable water can be substituted more easily with capital and 
other inputs, compared to agriculture, where the share of water can be more than 7% (Figure 2.3). 
In the initial situation half of the water requirements of the agricultural sector are fulfilled by marginal 
water commodities. In the Fix-dsal scenario, the supply of marginal water to the agricultural sector 
increases by a further 6%. Therefore, although in this sector the highest absolute reduction in potable 
water consumption occurs (-332 million m³), total water consumption only drops by about 27%. 
Households, on the other hand, cut potable water consumption only by about 19% on average, with 
poorer households cutting their consumption by less. This reflects the properties of the utility function 
(Stone-Geary) where poorer households are characterized by a lower own price elasticity of demand 
for water and a higher share of subsistence consumption. In the Exp-dsal scenario the reduced 
utilization of the fresh water resource is almost entirely balanced by an increase in desalination 
(Table 2.2). Therefore, only minor reductions of potable water usage occur in the different economic 
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activities and with households. In addition, there is less need for substitution with marginal water 
qualities and thus the use of these water types only increases by 0.2%. 
Table 2.2. Changes in water demand and supply. 
  
 
Water quantity  Change compared to base 
    [million m³]  [%] 
Sector Water quality Base Fix-dsal Exp-dsal Fix-dsal Exp-dsal 
Agriculture Potable 565 233 553  -58.7 -2.1 
  Reclaimed 379 401 380  5.7 0.2 
  Brackish 185 195 185  5.6 0.2 
 
Sum 1129 829 1118  -26.6 -1.0 
Manufacturing Potable 113 44 111  -61.5 -2.2 
Services Potable 228 89 223  -61.2 -2.3 
Households Potable 483 391 479  -19.1 -0.9 
Total 
 
1954 1352 1931  -30.8 -1.2 
  thereof Fresh water 1267 633 633  -50.0 -50.0 
  Desalinated  123 123 732  0.0 495.4 
Source: model results. 
2.4.4.2 Prices and Taxes 
The curbing of the fresh water activity results in less demand for inputs by this activity. The same 
holds true for all other activities, which reduce production owing to the reduced availability of potable 
water. This reduces demand for production factors and hence their prices (Table 2.3), which means 
that the production costs of potable water decline by about 5% in the Fix-dsal scenario. The reduction 
in costs is slightly smaller for the desalination activity compared to the fresh water activity, which 
means that the subsidy to the desalination activity needs to increase slightly (1.8%). 
Table 2.3. Changes of factor prices (in %) 
 
Fix-dsal Exp-dsal 
Labor (weighted average) -6.0 -0.1 
Capital -5.9 0.0 
Land  -60.1 -1.8 
Source: model results. 
As the total available quantity of potable water is reduced in the Fix-dsal scenario, the government 
needs to also reduce the demand for this commodity. As described above, we therefore allow for 
adjustments in the consumer price of water. In this case, the government would need to raise the 
implicit tax on potable water (TWAT) from 0.35 USD/m³ to 2.39 USD/m³ to achieve the consumer 
prices shown in Figure 2.4, such that all water users experience the same percentage increase in water 
prices. For a sectorally differentiated price policy, additional adjustments in the implicit water 
consumer subsidy (TWATA) would be necessary. These changes in water taxes together with declining 
production prices result in government revenue from the water sector increasing from 10 million USD 
in the base to 1230 million USD under the Fix-dsal scenario, which is 2.7% of total government 
income. This is recycled to households through a reduction of income tax rates by 2.6%. 
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Figure 2.4. Changes in consumer prices of water commodities.  
Source: model results. 
Because of the fall in factor prices, the production of marginal water commodities also becomes 
cheaper in this scenario. As TWAT is kept constant for these water commodities, this directly translates 
into a reduction of consumer prices by about 6% (Figure 2.4). 
In the Exp-dsal scenario the expansion of the desalination activity absorbs many of the production 
factors released by the fresh water activity. Also, as the total water quantity available does not change 
much in this scenario, the production by other activities only changes marginally, releasing very few 
additional production factors. Thus production prices of potable water as well as for marginal water 
commodities remain quite stable in this scenario (-0.1%). As the total volume of potable water 
supplied is reduced by 1.7%, only minor adjustments in consumer prices are required (Figure 2.4); 
these are achieved by increasing TWAT by less than 0.03 USD/m³. For marginal water, the prices 
remain almost constant. 
However, the expansion of the desalination capacity requires 216 million USD of additional subsidies, 
which is equivalent to 0.4% of total government expenditure and turns the government balance from 
the water sector to become negative (-180 million USD). To balance the government budget, 
household income tax rates are increased by 1.8% in this scenario. 
2.4.4.3 Production 
The output of most commodities is only slightly altered in both scenarios and total production is even 
slightly increasing in the Exp-dsal scenario. Especially in the manufacturing and service sectors, water 
represents only a very small share of input costs and hence the increased cost of water has only a small 
impact on total costs. Moreover, some of the activities in these sectors do not use water at all. 
However, in some agricultural activities, such as the production of non-wheat cereals, water 
constitutes to up to 7.5% of total production costs (Figure 2.3). Therefore, in the Fix-dsal scenario in 
which potable water prices increase drastically, domestic cereal production decreases by 17%, which 
is largely compensated by increased imports. Water intensive activities, which allow for the 
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substitution with marginal water commodities such as the production of vegetables and fruit 
experience a smaller drop in production (3.2%). However, the production of other crops including 
cotton, sunflowers, and other field crops, shrinks by 14% in the Fix-dsal scenario, although potable 
water can be substituted with marginal water in this activity as well. This is due to the high world 
market dependency of this activity, as about half of the domestic output is exported and about the 
same quantity is imported, too. As the Israeli currency is appreciating in the Fix-dsal scenario by about 
5.6%, imports become cheaper relative to domestic production and exports are less profitable. 
Therefore activities that export large shares of their output and activities producing goods with high 
import shares become less profitable. 
2.4.4.4 Welfare and Macroeconomic Results 
The share of the water sector in the total economy and the share of households’ expenditures on water 
are small. Therefore, the effect of the two simulations on households’ welfare, measured in terms of 
equivalent variation (EV), which identifies the changes in economic welfare for a household due to 
changes in both incomes and prices, are also small (Figure 2.5). Nevertheless, the increasing price of 
potable water affects households in several ways. Directly, due to the higher prices of potable water 
households have less dispensable income available to spend on other commodities and indirectly 
household income is further reduced as wages fall in both scenarios (Table 2.4).  
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Figure 2.5. Household welfare measured in absolute equivalent variation (EV) and as percentage share of 
household income. hj: Jewish households; hao: Arab and other households; 1-5: Income-quintiles.  
Source: model results. 
In the Fix-dsal scenario this leads to a reduction in household income at rates between 4.4% and 5.2%, 
whereby poor household groups are less affected as, they receive up to 26% of their income from 
government transfers, which remain constant. On the other hand, households’ factor income from 
which especially rich households derive more than 80% of their income, fall by around 6.0%. 
However, also consumer prices of non-water commodities fall by up to 5.9%, with the lowest 
reductions occurring in agricultural and food products. Additionally the direct household tax rate is 
reduced by 2.6%, as the government receives more income from the increased water taxes. However, 
this is not enough to offset the income losses, and welfare declines. Poor households are more 
negatively affected than rich ones, as they have a higher share of water and food in total expenses, and 
benefit less from the tax reduction. Therefore, the equivalent variation (EV) as a percentage share of 
total household income in the base becomes negative especially for poorer household groups 
(Figure 2.5). Only the richest non-Jewish households can profit very slightly from the new situation, as 
they spend the lowest income share on water and food (8.5% of their income, compared to more than 
25% for poor households of both ethnic groups). 
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Table 2.4. Household income, from factors and total.a 
 
Average gross 
monthly income Change compared to base 
 
[2006 USD] [%] 
 
Base 
 
Fix-dsal 
 
Exp-dsal 
  
Factor 
Income Total   
Factor 
Income Total   
Factor 
Income Total 
Jewish households, 1. quintile 1400 2021 
 
-6.0 -4.4 
 
-0.2 -0.1 
Jewish households, 2. quintile 1999 2735 
 
-6.0 -4.7 
 
-0.1 -0.1 
Jewish households, 3. quintile 2975 3722 
 
-6.0 -5.0 
 
-0.1 -0.1 
Jewish households, 4. quintile 3907 4677 
 
-6.0 -5.2 
 
-0.1 -0.1 
Jewish households, 5. quintile 6267 7405 
 
-5.9 -5.2 
 
-0.2 -0.1 
Arab & other households, 1. quintile 1403 2025 
 
-6.1 -4.4 
 
-0.1 -0.1 
Arab & other households, 2. quintile 2007 2747 
 
-6.0 -4.7 
 
-0.1 -0.1 
Arab & other households, 3. quintile 3091 3847 
 
-6.0 -5.0 
 
-0.1 -0.1 
Arab & other households, 4. quintile 3948 4731 
 
-6.0 -5.1 
 
-0.1 -0.1 
Arab & other households, 5. quintile 6393 7571   -5.9 -5.1   -0.2 -0.2 
a Other incomes are derived from transfers from government, other households and remittances from abroad. 
Source: model results. 
In the Exp-dsal scenario, the total negative welfare effects on households are slightly smaller but 
richer households are more affected. This is due to the fact that households’ incomes only decline 
marginally (Table 2.4). The main negative effect in this scenario comes from the increase in the direct 
tax on households by 1.8%, which is required to finance the increased subsidies due to the expansion 
of the desalination activity. This results in a transfer from tax payers to water users, which is positive 
for poor households. The slight drop in most non-water consumer prices (a maximum of 0.1%) is not 
enough to compensate the losses (Figure 2.5). 
Similarly the small size of the water sector means that the macroeconomic effects are marginal. Real 
GDP, measured by expenditure, and total absorption drops by only 0.2% in both scenarios. 
We also tested different ways to compensate gains or losses in water taxes in the simulations reported 
in this paper, e.g., through government transfers, additive adjustments of the household tax or 
adjustments of other tax instruments, and found that the macro results and the scale of welfare effects 
were quite similar. There were only small changes in the way the welfare reduction is distributed over 
different household groups. 
 Conclusions 
The simulation results suggest that although the reduction of water resources is drastic, the extent to 
which it affects the national economy after adjustments is relatively minor. If the desalination capacity 
can expand, total potable water consumption is reduced by less than 2%, as fresh water resources, 
which are less available, are substituted by desalinated water, which is a perfect substitute. 
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However, even if we do not allow the desalination capacity to increase, the possibilities for 
substitution of potable water by other factors of production and intermediate inputs mean that the 
output of several industrial and service activities drops by no more than 1%, even though their water 
consumption declines by more than 60%. Therefore the final macroeconomic effect in this scenario is 
small, too. It might be argued that the substitution elasticities, selected from the literature for this 
analysis, are too high for the large shock presented in this paper. In fact, sensitivity analyses in which 
substitution elasticities in the production structure are reduced by 50% yields more significant results: 
output of irrigated agricultural is reduced by up to 14%, real GDP falls by 0.8% and the EV would be 
up to -2.3% of base household income (Table 2.A1 in the Appendix). However, the literature suggests 
that by investing in internal wastewater reclamation, industries can reduce their fresh water intake by 
up to 95% without reducing production (Levine & Asano, 2002). As this model reflects a medium to 
long term perspective it can be argued that the applied elasticities reflect such a shift of production 
technology by substituting potable water with capital and other inputs required for internal wastewater 
reclamation.  
When comparing the two scenarios, we observe that the welfare and macroeconomic outcomes are 
quite similar, although one might expect that the expansion of the desalination capacity might have a 
more beneficial effect, as this activity produces a perfect substitute for potable water derived from 
fresh water resources. However, as desalination is far more costly than the provision of potable water 
from natural fresh water (Table 2.1), the Israeli water authority is subsidizing these additional costs. 
An expansion of the desalination sector therefore causes additional distortions. Poorer households are 
less negatively affected, compared to richer household groups, if desalination capacity is increased; 
this reflects the fact that these subsidies are financed by a multiplicative increase of the household 
income tax. To mitigate these effects and reduce distortions in the water sector, additional adjustments 
in the water pricing scheme would be required such that the water price paid by consumers covers the 
costs of provision. 
Possible further simulations include technical change aspects in the desalination sector, as desalination 
costs have decreased substantially in recent decades, mainly due to energy saving technologies 
(Karagiannis & Soldatos, 2008). For the next decade it is even expected that desalination will become 
an energy producing process through forward osmosis (Spiritos & Lipchin, 2013). Additionally, a 
stricter standard for the quality of reclaimed water has been introduced in Israel in recent years, such 
that the enhanced quality of reclaimed water means it can be used for irrigation with fewer restrictions 
(Lavee & Ash, 2013). Reclaimed water of this quality may be suitable for many industrial purposes 
and thus it would be interesting to analyze the positive economic effects of the increased substitution 
possibilities versus the higher cost of upgrading reclaimed water.  
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2.5 Concluding Comments 
Over and above being essential for life water enters physical, economic and social relationships in 
myriad ways that are deeply interconnected. This makes the evaluation of decisions about water use, 
water provision and water resource based investment projects highly complex. The standard methods 
for evaluating such decisions are all variants of cost benefit analyses that require detailed data on each 
decision’s costs and benefits. In the case of water resource based decisions the interconnectedness of 
the water system makes it especially difficult to evaluate both, the opportunity costs of investments 
and the benefits. In such complex systems, CGE models have the potential to aid the evaluation of 
costs and benefits and hence improve the evaluation of competing projects. Of particular importance in 
this context are insights into how decisions on water use by human agents may be influenced by water 
pricing and quota policies and how the economic costs associated with different water management 
schemes and environmental decisions may change the patterns of water use and affect the economy as 
a whole. 
At the same time simulation exercises using water-focused CGE models can be used to explore the 
economic costs of environmental policies and the economic implications of different technology 
choices. Furthermore, this type of model can be used to help in the identification of those 
improvements in water supply systems, which are likely to yield the greatest economic benefits and 
hence can influence the direction of applied water research. 
The case study for Israel demonstrates that even quite radical restrictions on the use of water resources 
may have relatively limited impacts on welfare, although it is important to recognize that the results 
for Israel reflect the specific economic context. Israel is a relatively wealthy economy for whom water, 
although scarce, represents a relatively small share of economic activity and costs. In other economies 
the relative importance of agriculture and water may be appreciably different and hence the 
implications of changes in water supply may be orders of magnitude different. Moreover the results 
indicate the extent to which water policies may have non trivial impacts on households with differing 
levels of income. For instance while in the case of Israel the choice of direct/income taxes instrument 
to fund the policy shock ensure the poor were less adversely affected than the rich, other tax 
instruments have different implications. 
In recent years, water has increasingly gained attention in CGE modeling. However, so far water 
related CGE models have been focused mostly on specific aspects of water, e.g., water in the 
agricultural sector, potable water, etc. The model presented in this paper depicts water in a more 
integrated way, which allows simulating a wide range of scenarios and detailed analyses. This 
approach shows that substitution and adjustment processes at various levels may significantly mitigate 
the effects of water scarcity. These include, among others, the substitution of water by other 
production factors (land, labor, capital), options to increase the share of reclaimed water, water saving 
technologies in private households as well as enterprises, changes in the composition of production, 
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especially in agriculture, and investments in the desalination of water or upgrading of marginal water 
sources. Furthermore, the model presented in this paper allows investigating complex changes in the 
pricing policy as a tool to influence water consumption, as with the help of the implicit water user tax 
instrument (TWATA), prices for water using agents (activities and households) can be adjusted 
individually. Most importantly it is evident that not considering these options in water related CGE 
applications is likely to substantially affect simulation results. 
There are manifold opportunities for enriching the insights provided by this model. As currently 
specified the model relies heavily on economic data and less heavily of engineering and scientific 
knowledge, which could be introduced into modelling exercises in at least four different ways. First, 
engineering and scientific information about the abilities of existing systems to substitute between 
different inputs could be incorporated into the model to provide more robust information about 
substitution possibilities across different time horizons. Second, engineering and scientific knowledge 
could be used to define the input requirements of new production technologies so that new 
investments were introduced in a more satisfactory manner. Third, environmental sciences could 
provide evidence about the environmental impacts of different water resource decisions and how these 
might feedback into the system, e.g., the implications of discharging and recharging aquifers for water 
quality. And fourth, hydrological science and models can be used to understand the physical 
interconnectedness of water systems and thereby ensure that the economic evaluations are consistent 
with scientific evidence, e.g., Robinson & Gueneau (2013). These opportunities represent a substantial 
and long term research agenda. 
The STAGE_W model can be easily adapted to different situations and other countries or databases, 
although it is necessary to review carefully the substitution elasticities. Also, when applying the 
suggested approach to other countries, a careful evaluation of the water system is required to ensure 
that the model adequately represents the water system in that country. If there are features of the water 
system not adequately encompassed by the model then the model needs revising rather than perturbing 
the data so it conforms to the model structure. 
There are a number studies using the model, and developments to the model, envisaged in the short 
term. While Israel is among the world leaders in the use of reclaimed water (Lavee & Ash, 2013), the 
availability of adequate quantities and qualities of wastewater is potentially critical if recycling of 
water is to expand. One option is to include behavioral relationships that ensure that the supply of the 
wastewater is consistent with other water types in the model, e.g., reductions in the domestic use of 
potable water are highly likely to result in reductions in the availability of wastewater. This will also 
provide an opportunity to seek engineering and scientific information about wastewater treatment and 
to incorporate such information into the model. On the other hand many poorer countries do not have 
adequate wastewater reclamation facilities, e.g., Weldesilassie et al. (2009), let alone the infrastructure 
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to supply reclaimed water to farms. In such cases it is of interest to evaluate the potential benefits from 
wastewater reclamation in such economies, e.g., Egypt. 
It is also planned to extend the model to evaluate the implications of different irrigation systems. 
There is increasing pressure on water for irrigation and hence less efficient irrigation systems, e.g., 
flood irrigation, are increasingly being challenged and users are being encouraged to adopt more 
efficient practices, e.g., drip irrigation. This analysis would provide an opportunity to incorporate 
hydrological information into the model.  
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2.6 Appendix 
Table 2.A1. Changes in economic indicators, with halved production elasticities. 
  
Change compared to base  
  
[%] 
    Fix-dsal Exp-dsal 
O
u
tp
u
t 
Agriculture -9.86 -0.13 
    irrigated -13.48 -0.15 
Manufacturing -0.46 0.14 
Services 0.00 -0.01 
E
q
u
iv
al
en
t 
v
ar
ia
ti
o
n
 
Jewish households, 1. quintile -1.84 -0.13 
Jewish households, 2. quintile -1.31 -0.15 
Jewish households, 3. quintile -1.22 -0.19 
Jewish households, 4. quintile -0.67 -0.27 
Jewish households, 5. quintile 0.34 -0.42 
Arab & other households, 1. quintile -2.31 -0.06 
Arab & other households, 2. quintile -1.58 -0.11 
Arab & other households, 3. quintile -1.46 -0.18 
Arab & other households, 4. quintile -0.78 -0.27 
Arab & other households, 5. quintile 0.38 -0.42 
Real GDP -0.06 -0.08 
Source: model results. 
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Abstract: This study simulates the economy-wide effects of introducing new water pricing systems in 
Israel. A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, STAGE_W, is used, that includes multiple 
water commodities produced from different water resources. The current water pricing scheme 
supplies potable water to municipalities at fees above the supply costs and subsidizes water delivered 
to the agricultural and the manufacturing sectors. Due to limited freshwater resources, climate change 
and population growth, water scarcity is an increasing problem in Israel. Therefore, pricing systems 
which lead to a more efficient allocation of water are intensely debated. This study analyzes two 
alternative pricing schemes under discussion in Israel: price liberalization, which unifies the prices for 
all potable water consumers at cost recovery rates, and marginal pricing that lifts the potable water 
price to the cost of desalination. Both schemes reduce water demand with limited economic costs. 
Price liberalization is the more favourable option from a national welfare perspective, while marginal 
pricing allows for larger water savings and, in the long run, independence from fresh water resources. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Water in Israel is a very scarce resource (Fleischer et al. 2008): the annual supply of less than 250 m³ 
per capita is 50% below the threshold of severe water scarcity according to the Falkenmark indicator 
(Tal 2006). The long-term sustainable average annual renewable supply of freshwater from natural 
sources is estimated at about 1,800 million m3 including aquifers shared with the Palestinian 
Territories (Weinberger et al. 2012), which matches only about 80% of the total Israeli water 
consumption. However, the actual supply is highly variable (Fleischer et al. 2008). In recent years, 
Israel faced almost seven consecutive years of drought (Lavee and Ash 2013) and replenishment rates 
of aquifers have been as low as 1,091 million m³ in 2008 (Weinberger et al. 2012). This, together with 
an increasing demand for potable water, due to economic growth and immigration, has led to a 
situation of overexploitation of renewable water resources in the country.  
To mitigate this problem and meet the annual demand of about 2,130 million m3, alternative water 
sources have been explored in recent years. In 2010, about 450 million m3 of reclaimed wastewater 
and 300 million m3 of desalinated water were supplied in addition to natural sources. At the same time, 
174 million m³ of brackish groundwater were extracted. Agriculture is the main user of water at 1,044 
million m3 per year (more than 50% is recycled wastewater and brackish water), followed by 
municipalities2 at 764 million m3 and industry at 120 million m3. 143 million m3 are diverted to 
Jordan, as agreed in the 1994 peace treaty, and to the Palestinian Water Authority, while 60 million m3 
is reserved for the rehabilitation of natural habitats (IWA 2012). 
The problem of water scarcity is expected to become more severe in the future (Kislev 2011): 
domestic water demand in Israel is predicted to rise with population growth, increases in temperature 
and changes in the amount and distribution of rainfall (Fleischer et al. 2008). Moreover, the supply of 
water to the Palestinian National Authorities is expected to increase in the future (Kislev 2011). 
Water prices are set by a governmental agency, the Israeli Water Authority (IWA), which established 
an agreement with farmers in 2007 stipulating a gradual shift to cost recovery prices. However, in 
2010 the agricultural sector still received potable water at subsidized prices (Kislev 2011). The same 
holds true for the manufacturing sector, though to a lesser extent, which contradicts the declared aim 
to restrain water consumption (NIC 2010). This situation continues till today: the IWA suggests that 
potable water prices in the agricultural sector still would need to be raised by close to 40% to achieve 
cost recovery rates (Reznik et al. 2015). 
Because the current pricing system is heavily debated domestically, this study estimates the 
implications that different pricing regimes might have on water use, welfare and economic 
performance in Israel. As changes in the water policy have economy-wide effects, a water focussed 
                                                     
2 Municipalities include the service sector and households. 
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Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, such as STAGE_W (Luckmann and McDonald 
2014), which is used in this study is well suited to evaluate these effects. While CGE-models have 
been applied to analyse water policies in different contexts before (e.g. Briand 2006; Letsoalo et al. 
2007; Solís and Zhu 2015), the novelty of our approach is that it considers different water qualities 
produced with different cost-structures linked to different water-resources and for which a 
differentiated pricing system applies.  
3.2 The Israeli Water Economy 
According to the Israeli law, all domestic water resources are state property. The IWA was established 
to implement the water law, govern water resources and determine water prices (Kislev 2011). 
The exploration of new water sources has been encouraged by the effects of a lasting drought: by 2010 
about 75% of all wastewater produced in Israel was reclaimed and used. Due to the growing municipal 
potable water consumption, the IWA aims to provide about 600 million m³ of reclaimed wastewater 
mainly to the agricultural sector by 2020 (IWA 2012; Lavee and Ash 2013). Further, several reverse 
osmosis seawater desalination plants have been constructed on the basis of Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) contracts by private companies. The installed capacity is expected to reach 750 million m³ per 
year by 2020 (IWA 2012), to cover most of the municipal demand. 
The IWA is also seeking to reduce potable water consumption, particularly in the agricultural sector, 
where it aims at a higher usage of reclaimed wastewater, which is made more attractive by a lower 
price (Kislev 2011). However, sanitary restrictions limit its irrigation use to non-food and tree crops. 
In addition, the use of brackish water, mainly for the irrigation of salt tolerant crops (e.g. cotton and 
tomatoes) has been fostered and reached 174 million m³ in 2010 (IWA 2012). These supplies are from 
fossil aquifers in the Negev in the south of Israel.  
The IWA operates a pricing regime whereby prices are differentiated according to user-group 
(municipalities, industry, and agriculture) and water qualities (brackish, reclaimed, and fresh) 
(Figure 3.1). The taxes and subsidies in the water sector are not explicitly identified but can be 
calculated as the difference between the costs of water provision and the fee charged to each consumer 
group. The IWA guarantees prices to the operators of the desalination plants, but the costs of provision 
of potable water by seawater desalination are far higher than the costs of fresh water purification. 
Therefore, there is an implicit production subsidy for desalination. However, the IWA sets the final 
consumer price independent of the costs of supply. This results in an implicit consumer subsidy for 
potable water consumption in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, and an additional tax levied 
on wastewater and brackish water consumption, as well as on potable water consumption of the 
municipal sector. 
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The National Investigation Committee report on the water economy in Israel recommended 
introducing a water pricing scheme, which reflects total average water supply costs including 
extraction, transportation, and environmental costs, to limit water extraction to a level below the 
average annual recharge (NIC 2010). Alternatively it has been argued that the water price should equal 
the marginal cost of potable water, i.e., the cost-level of desalination, since at this price, all water 
demands could be supplied (Kislev 2011). Marginal cost can be considered the benchmark price on 
efficiency grounds. These water pricing strategies are the basis for the analyses reported in this paper. 
 
Figure 3.1. Israeli water pricing scheme (2006), prices and tax rates.  
Source: own compilation based on CBS 2011 and Siddig et al. 2011. 
3.3 Methodical Background 
CGE models are often applied to study the economy-wide effects of changes in exogenous factors 
such as policy. The advantage of this class of models lies in their ability to capture feedbacks within 
the economy and thus allow for the assessment of second round effects (Logar and van den Bergh 
2013). Especially for analyses regarding the water sector, CGE models are suitable because water is 
used across the economy in production and by households while the sector is often managed by the 
government and subject to complex policies. Thus, changes in the water sector affect many economic 
agents directly (e.g. if water prices increase) and indirectly (e.g. increasing prices of agricultural 
products if water prices increase). Therefore, this model class is well suited to analyse the potential 
effects of a change in water-related policies (Logar and van den Bergh 2013). CGE models require a 
large data-base, usually compiled in a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), which captures all economic 
interactions within an economy, together with a set of assumptions regarding the behaviour of the 
different economic actors. A recent overview on water related CGE approaches is provided by Dinar 
(2014). 
Resource
Commodity
Cost of provision
Production subsidy (-)
Sales tax (+)
+0.07 USD/m³
+12%
+0.02 USD/m³
+21%
+0.01 USD/m³
+9%
Water tax (+)/ 
subsidy (-)
+0.13 USD/m³
+163%
+0.04 USD/m³
+23%
Final price charged 
to consumer
0.48 USD/m³0.24 USD/m³ 0.23 USD/m³0.21 USD/m³0.97 USD/m³
Sector ManufacturingAgriculture AgricultureAgricultureMunicipalities
SeawaterFresh Water Wastewater
Brackish  
Groundwater
Potable 
Water
Potable 
Water
Reclaimed 
Water
Brackish  
Water
-0.0 USD/m³
-0%
0.56 USD/m³
-0.35 USD/m³
-38%
0.91 USD/m³
-0.0 USD/m³
-0%
0.16 USD/m³
-0.0 USD/m³
-0%
0.08 USD/m³
-0.15 USD/m³
-27%
-0.39 USD/m³
-70%
+0.34 USD/m³
-62%
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With respect to Israel, limited water related CGE studies have been conducted. Yerushalmi (2012) 
investigated the efficiency of the administrative water allocation in Israel. The database was highly 
aggregated and included three productive sectors, two factor accounts (labour and capital), and one 
representative household-government account. While analysing social welfare effects of the 
introduction of a water market, Yerushalmi (2012) did not consider distributional effects and 
consequences for different household groups or limited domestic water resources and the use of 
desalination to preserve those resources. The STAGE_W model has been used by Luckmann et al. 
(2014) to investigate effects of increasing the desalination capacity to alleviate water scarcity and to 
demonstrate the importance of considering the freshwater and reclaimed wastewater supply as an 
interlinked system They concluded that the social benefits of water supplied from additional 
desalination facilities may be negative due to the current pricing policy, which involves large 
subsidies. Their finding motivates further analysis of the current pricing system and provision of 
possible alternatives, which is addressed in the present study. 
3.4 Data and Model 
This study is based on a 2004 SAM by Siddig et al. (2011), which is the most recent and detailed 
available SAM for Israel. This SAM is further updated and expanded it to depict details of the Israeli 
water sector. Accounts for four water resources (groundwater, seawater, wastewater, and brackish 
groundwater), four related activities and three water commodities (potable water, reclaimed 
wastewater and brackish water) have been included using data from the IWA (in Zaide 2009), FAO 
(2009) and CBS (2009; 2011). Additional satellite accounts record the use of physical water quantities. 
Detailed information on costs of water supply and fees is sourced from the 2006 Satellite Account of 
Water in Israel (CBS 2011) and summarized in Figure 3.1. Moreover, a pre-simulation is implemented 
to update the water accounts of the SAM to the situation in 2007, such as to capture the increasing 
contribution of desalination after the opening of the Ashkelon desalination plant in 2005. 
The final SAM has 46 activity accounts, 45 commodity accounts, 40 factor accounts, and 11 tax 
instruments. Distributional issues are addressed by 10 representative household groups, categorised by 
ethnic background (Jewish and non-Jewish) and income (5 quintiles).  
Agriculture is the largest user of water in Israel; the use of water by the different agricultural activities 
identified in the SAM is reported in Figure 3.2. Within the cropping sector, vegetable and fruit 
plantations are by far the largest water users followed by “other crops”, including cotton, sunflowers, 
and other field crops. The usage of brackish water is limited to these two classes of crops as only these 
two groups include plants that are tolerant of elevated salinity levels. Similarly, recycled wastewater 
can only be used by these crops in addition to “mixed farming and forestry” due to sanitary 
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regulations. Data on the use of marginal water3 by different agricultural activities is limited and hence 
the use of brackish and reclaimed water is split between activities that allow their use according to 
their shares in total water consumption. Moreover Figure 3.2 reports the cost shares of water in total 
production costs. 
The model, STAGE_W (Luckmann and McDonald 2014), is a water focused CGE model 
development of the STAGE model (McDonald 2009). Changes in the behavioural relationships are 
concentrated on production and consumption relations and water specific tax instruments. For this 
study the model is adapted to capture the particular structure of the water sectors in Israel, described 
above. The model encompasses four water (re-)sources which are linked to four related activities, each 
with different cost structures that produce three water commodities (Figure 3.1). Freshwater 
purification and desalination produce the same output: potable water that is distributed via a single 
network. Consequently a homogenous commodity is produced by two activities with different costs 
structures. Therefore, the desalination activity is implicitly subsidised, which reduces the output price 
of desalination to the one of freshwater purification. 
The seven water resources, by-products and commodities, form the lowest level of the production 
system (see Appendix, Figure 3.A1), and constitute the potential components of water-aggregates that 
are specific to the activity that uses that aggregate. The composition of this aggregate is governed by 
each activity: each water activity4 requires a specific resource, whereas for non-water activities the 
water-aggregate can be formed from up to three different water commodities. 
The four water activities employ fixed proportions of capital, labour, and intermediates. All non-water 
activities are modelled with more flexibility. Agricultural activities, which allow for the consumption 
of all three different water commodities, can substitute these water commodities with a medium to low 
substitution elasticity (σ4) of 0.8 (Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995). This rather low substitutability 
reflects the fact that not all components of the aggregated activities can use marginal water qualities 
and that the option to use marginal water does not exist in all localities, although there is an extended 
supply network for recycled wastewater in Israel. On the third level of the production function, water 
and land form a CES-aggregate, whereby the substitution elasticity (σ3) is 0.3 following estimates of 
irrigation-land substitutability by Faust et al. (2015). The land-water aggregate is then combined with 
labour and capital at the second level of the production function. Given the prevalence of drip 
irrigation systems in Israel which increase the water use efficiency at the cost of the investment 
required, the substitution elasticity (σ2) is set at 0.8 (Berck et al. 1991). The top-level combines the 
value added and water aggregate with aggregate intermediate inputs with an elasticity (σ1) of 0.5. 
                                                     
3 In this paper, the term marginal water refers to reclaimed wastewater and brackish water. 
4 This is an activity which produces a certain water commodity from a water resource or by-product with the help of labour, 
capital (value added) and intermediate inputs. 
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Two water specific tax/subsidy instruments allow differential pricing of water according to water type 
and user. The (implicit) commodity tax and a user specific subsidy result in three different prices for 
potable water according to user group: agriculture, manufacturing and municipalities. This is 
illustrated, with the applied rates for Israel, in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.2. Water use in the Israeli agricultural sector in 2004.  
Source: Luckmann et al. 2014. 
3.5 Water Policy Scenarios 
 Scenarios  
This study evaluates the implications of two alternative water pricing strategies on the Israeli economy 
with a focus on the different end users of water commodities: price liberalization for potable water and 
marginal cost pricing for potable water. These pricing regimes are depicted in three scenarios and the 
outcomes are presented against the current pricing system, which is a differentiated pricing structure 
for potable water where agricultural and manufacturing use are subsidized and municipalities are 
taxed.  
3.5.1.1  Lib: liberalization of the potable water sector  
This scenario estimates the economic costs of the current Israeli water policies relative to a free-
market scenario, i.e., all taxes and subsidies on potable water are removed, so that the final price paid 
by all consumer groups is equal to the producer price plus the value added tax which is held constant. 
Thus consumers of water cover the full costs of provision, which is a major policy objective of the 
IWA (Rejwan 2011). Taxes on marginal water commodities are not altered in this simulation, since 
they are not under debate, which allows the simulation to capture the outcomes of a policy change 
solely in the potable water sector. 
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3.5.1.2 Marg-sav: marginal price scenario without redistribution of additional government revenue 
This scenario simulates the declared objective of the IWA to reduce dependency on natural fresh water 
resources (Rejwan 2011). It imposes the marginal price for potable water in Israel on all consumers, 
which is the full cost of desalination inclusive of capital costs of building desalination plants and 
delivery (Kislev 2011). This increases all consumer prices. In the long-run, any quantity of potable 
water can be supplied at this price since it includes investment costs for further desalination plants. 
Therefore, this scenario allows for independence from natural fresh water resources in the long-run. 
Again, policies on marginal water commodities are not altered. 
3.5.1.3 Marg-trans: marginal price scenario with redistribution of additional government revenue 
The shock for this scenario is the same as in the previous scenario, but it further assumes that 
government savings are fixed and transfers to households are flexible. Due to the shock, government 
expenditures on water subsidies decline and the government’s budget surplus is redistributed to 
households as transfers that change equiproportionally, which has different distributional implications.  
Because simulation results in terms of quantity and price changes differ only very slightly between the 
two marg-scenarios, they are jointly reported, except for the welfare analysis. 
 Macroeconomic Closure and Factor Market Clearing 
Israel is a small country, therefore in the model world market prices are fixed. It is also assumed that 
the external balance is fixed, reflecting the large current account transfers received by Israel. The 
external account is cleared by variations in the exchange rate. The real value (volume) of investment is 
fixed and government savings are flexible (except for the last scenario): the saving rates of domestic 
non-government institutions (households and enterprises) adjust to clear the capital account. 
Government account transfers to enterprises and tax rates remain constant with the exception of the 
subsidy to the desalination activity, which endogenously adjusts to balance changes in production 
price differences between the two potable water producing activities. The other water tax instruments 
are exogenously adjusted in the simulations. Transfers to households are fixed in the first two reported 
scenarios but are flexible in the third. 
All factors of production are fully employed and mobile between activities, such that the model results 
reflect a long-term perspective. Exceptions are the water resources and by-products, which have fixed 
values per unit while the quantities used are flexible to allow for changes in water consumption. 
The potable water price shifts in the simulations cause a reduction in demand. It is a political decision 
whether supply from natural fresh water or from desalination should be reduced. It was decided here 
to reduce primarily the desalination supply, due to the higher provision costs. As this is not sufficient, 
also the supply from natural fresh water resources is reduced. This approach has the additional 
advantage, that it removes the distortive subsidy on the desalination activity. 
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3.6 Simulation Results 
 Water Prices and Production Costs 
In all simulations applied in this study, potable water prices are unified. In the lib-scenario, this results 
in a price reduction for municipalities and a price increase for agricultural and industrial users, 
whereas in the marg-scenarios this results in a price increase for all user groups. The largest changes 
occur to the agricultural sector, where the price of potable water increases by 159% in the lib-scenario 
and quadruples in the marg-scenarios (Table 3.1).  
In all scenarios, price changes are predominantly caused by the abolishment of taxes and subsidies on 
potable water. Yet, part of the price changes stem from second round effects since water price changes 
also have economy-wide effects: due to unified pricing, water is shifted to activities in which it is used 
more efficiently. As potable water becomes cheaper for the services sector in the lib-scenario, this 
sector expands and uses additional production factors coming from reduced agricultural and industrial 
activities. Due to higher demand for factors and intermediate inputs motivated by the increased overall 
production, most factors of production and intermediary inputs become more expensive and, therefore 
production costs for potable water increase by 0.7% in the lib-scenario. In the marg-scenarios, water 
becomes more expensive for all sectors, hence, slightly affecting the whole economy negatively. 
Therefore, all factors of production and most non-agricultural intermediate inputs become cheaper and 
thus production costs of potable water decrease by -0.3%. 
The production costs of both marginal water commodities are affected similarly in the different 
scenarios. Since the respective tax instruments are not altered in the simulations, these changes 
directly translate into consumer price changes (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1. Changes in consumer prices of water commodities and in water demand and supply. 
 
Scenario:  base  lib marg  lib marg 
  
 Average water price charged 
Water quality Sector  2006 USD/m³  % change compared to base 
Potable water Agriculture  0.24 
} 
   159.1 303.5 
Manufacturing  0.48 0.63 0.97  30.9 103.9 
Municipalities  0.97    -35.3 0.8 
Reclaimed wastewater Agriculture  0.21  0.21 0.21  0.8 -0.3 
Brackish water Agriculture  0.23  0.24 0.23  0.8 -0.3 
   Water quantity 
   million m³  % change compared to base 
Potable water Agriculture  565  280 198   -50.4 -65.0 
 Manufacturing  113  91 63   -19.1 -43.9 
 Municipalities  712  883 709   24.1 -0.5 
 All  1390  1255 970  -9.7 -30.2 
Reclaimed wastewater Agriculture  379  398 403   5.0 6.4 
Brackish water Agriculture  185  194 197   4.8 6.3 
All Agriculture  1129  872 798   -22.8 -29.3 
All All  1954  1846 1570   -5.5 -19.7 
Natural fresh water All  1267  1255 970   -1.0 -23.5 
Desalinated All  123  0 0   -100.0 -100.0 
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 Agricultural Sector 
In all scenarios, the agricultural sector experiences the highest potable water price increase. 
Consequently, the use of potable water in agriculture declines sharply. As marginal water commodities 
become cheaper in relation to potable water in all scenarios (Table 3.1), the usage of these water types 
slightly increases, which mitigates the reduction in the overall consumption of water in agriculture 
(Table 3.1, lower section). The increase in demand for marginal water commodities is not larger 
because its use is limited to only a few agricultural activities and therefore, the substitution-elasticities 
are low. Furthermore, prices of marginal water commodities are influenced very little in view of the 
fact that the marginal water sector is small and reacts in a relatively unresponsive manner. 
The changes in water use by the agricultural sector are shown in detail in Figure 3.3a. The 
consumption of potable water by agricultural activities declines by up to 54% in the lib-scenario and 
up to 69% in the marg-scenarios. On the other hand, the share of marginal water use increases in the 
production of “vegetables and fruits” and “other crops” by 17% and 24% in the lib- and marg-
scenarios, respectively, as well as in “mixed farming” by 19% and 27%, respectively, since marginal 
water becomes relatively cheaper. The overall water-balance is negative for all activities, and 
especially the production of water intensive commodities declines (compare Figure 3.3a and 3.3b). 
Moreover, water is substituted by land and other factors of production which become cheaper. The 
absolute quantity of marginal water used in the production of “other crops” declines because of the 
comparatively strong decrease in the production of this activity (Figure 3.3b). This decline results 
from its high export dependency and the pronounced reductions in exports due to rising production 
costs in combination with constant export prices. 
The increased prices of water inputs cause higher producer prices for all domestically produced 
agricultural commodities. The highest increase occurs for “other cereals” for which the producer price 
rises by 9% and 14% in the lib- and marg-scenarios, respectively. Due to higher production costs, it 
becomes less profitable to export agricultural commodities at fixed world prices in all scenarios, while 
imports become comparatively cheaper and thus slightly increase. Taken together, composite 
consumer prices do not increase as much as consumer prices for domestic supply of agricultural goods 
(Figure 3.3b). The magnitude by which the consumer prices for domestic supply of agricultural goods 
increase is mostly correlated with the water use intensity of the respective activity.  
Domestic demand for all agricultural commodities decreases due to increasing prices. Most strongly 
affected are “other cereals”, for which demand is reduced by 13% and 20% in the lib- and marg-
scenarios respectively. Export quantities are reduced even more than supply to the domestic market. 
The total effect on domestic production can be seen in Figure 3.3b. Since in all scenarios potable water 
becomes more expensive while export prices remain stable, the output is particularly reduced for 
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commodities which have a high share of water in their input costs (Figure 3.2) and which are to a large 
extent exported. 
(a) Changes in water consumption 
 
(b) Changes in production and prices 
 
Figure 3.3. Changes in water consumption by the agricultural sector (a) and in production and prices of 
agricultural commodities (b).  
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 Manufacturing and Municipalities 
Because of the higher price in all scenarios, potable water consumption is reduced in the 
manufacturing sector by up to 45% in the marg-scenarios. Although this seems high, such a reduction 
could be achieved through internal water recycling, which allows for saving rates of up to 95% 
(Levine and Asano 2002). The magnitude of the reduction in individual activities is correlated with the 
increase in overall production costs, which are caused by the rise of the potable water price. The same 
holds true for service activities, though at a lower magnitude (0.9% on average), as the potable water 
price for municipalities increases by 0.8% only. Households also reduce potable water consumption 
slightly (-0.3% on average) By way of contrast, the lib-scenario causes potable water prices to 
decrease for municipalities and therefore consumption increases. However, total potable water 
consumption still decreases since this is outweighed by the reduction of potable water consumption of 
the other sectors (Table 3.1).  
Producer and consumer prices of all non-agricultural commodities also rise in the lib-scenario. For the 
manufacturing sector, the price increase is mainly due to the higher potable water prices as well as the 
increase in agricultural commodity prices which raises the costs of inputs in food processing activities. 
However, because of the low share of water in the production costs and the moderate price increase of 
agricultural commodities, prices of manufactured goods increase by no more than 2%, with the largest 
increases in the output prices of food processing activities. 
The decrease in the price of potable water for municipalities in the lib-scenario has two effects: first, it 
decreases household expenditures for water and second, it reduces water costs for the service sector. 
Nevertheless, output prices in the service sector rise by about 0.7% due to the price increase of 
industrial products. As intermediary inputs, these make up for a higher share in production costs in the 
service sector compared to water. Additionally, household demand for services increases since 
household expenditures on water declines, which allows for additional consumption of other goods. 
In the marg-scenarios, on the other hand, prices of services and of most manufacturing goods drop 
slightly (by about -0.3%), only products of the food industry become more expensive (by about 0.7%) 
due to the increase in the prices of agricultural commodities. The reason for the general price decrease, 
despite even stronger price increases for potable water compared to the lib-scenario, is the reduced 
production of agricultural and most industrial goods, which frees up labour and thereby lowers the 
wage rate. The lower wage rate overcompensates for the effect of increasing water prices and thus 
results in a lower output price. Household income declines as a result of the decrease in wages, while 
consumer prices of water and foodstuff increase. The result is a lower domestic demand for these 
commodities. However, demand for other commodities increases slightly due to household 
substitution and the expanding production of marginal water which requires additional intermediary 
inputs.  
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Overall household demand increases by 0.21% in the lib-scenario and 0.07% in the marg-scenarios. 
In the marg-scenarios this additional demand is largely fulfilled by imports (+0.21%) which, due to a 
slight appreciation of the Israeli currency (0.3%) become cheaper. 
 Macro and Welfare-Effects 
The effect on the total output of the Israeli economy in the lib-scenario is positive due to the removal 
of distortions in the water sector. In the marg-scenarios a price increase for all water users is added to 
this, which has an adverse effect. The overall welfare effects of the two simulations are small since the 
share of the water sector in the Israeli economy is small (about 0.7% of total domestic production in 
the base situation) and all household groups spend less than 1% of their income on water. Therefore, 
real GDP5 increases by only 0.12% in the lib-scenario. Also, the effect of marg-scenarios on real GDP 
is still positive (+0.03%) driven by the slight increase in private consumption.  
The effects on household welfare, measured as changes in equivalent variation (EV) relative to 
household consumption expenditure, are also small for similar reasons.6 In the lib-scenario, the EV 
shows a clear trend in favour for richer households and it is negative for the two poorest quintiles of 
both ethnic groups. Changes in EV range from -0.2% for the poorest quintile of Jewish households to 
+0.8% for the richest non-Jewish households (Figure 3.4). The reasons for this are the opposing effects 
of decreasing water prices charged to municipalities. While the decreasing prices make water and 
service commodities cheaper, they also increase the price of agricultural commodities and decrease 
wages in the agricultural sector. The latter affects the poorer households disproportionately, as they 
derive a relatively high share of their income from employment in the agricultural sector and at the 
same time spend a comparatively high share of income on agricultural and food-commodities. 
In the marg-sav-scenario, when the government saves its additional income, the welfare effects are 
exaggerated, whereby additional household groups are negatively affected (Figure 3.4). This is due to 
the rising prices of water and food-commodities. Only the top Jewish and the top two non-Jewish 
household quintiles still profit from this situation, mainly because of the high share of income from 
enterprises of these household-groups, which increases by 2.7% in this scenario. Moreover, prices for 
services fall, which especially benefits the richer quintiles. In the marg-trans-scenario, where 
additional water tax revenue is transferred to households, distribution is more equal and welfare 
effects are minimized. Thus welfare losses are mostly converted to gains, which reach a maximum of 
0.2%. Only the third non-Jewish quintile still experiences a very small loss of 0.03% as the gains from 
the additional government transfers cannot completely compensate the losses caused by the price 
increases in this case. 
                                                     
5 Measured from the expenditure side. 
6 It should be noted that welfare benefits resulting from positive externalities due to lower fresh water consumption (e.g. 
positive environmental effects or economic benefits for future generations) are not taken into account in the EV. 
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Figure 3.4. Changes in household welfare measured in equivalent variation as percentage share of household 
expenditure. 
3.7 Discussion and Conclusions 
The non-sustainability of the current water supply scheme in Israel is widely recognised and the 
current political debate has emphasised price-based policy reforms. This analysis assesses two core 
options for a more efficient water policy: price liberalization and marginal cost pricing for potable 
water.  
Both pricing options reduce the demand for potable water to an extent that make desalination schemes 
unnecessary and at the same time relieve the pressure on aquifers. Therefore, instead of further 
extending desalination capacity, installed desalination capacity could be used flexibly as a buffer 
against shortages and droughts as suggested by Goldfarb and Kislev (2005).  
The costs of the current water pricing scheme are harmful to the Israeli economy. They result in an 
annual GDP loss of 0.12% (equivalent to about 150 million USD) compared to a market based 
approach in which prices are unified and cover the full costs of water supply. If the water pricing 
schemes were reformed as envisaged by the liberalization scenario, demand for potable water would 
reduce to a level that makes desalination unnecessary and additionally saves 12 million m³ of natural 
fresh water annually. 
The analyses show that both pricing scenarios result in substantial reductions in the demand for 
potable water. These reductions in demand are noticeable for the liberalization scenario, but even more 
for the marginal cost pricing scenarios (297 million m3). Under the marginal cost scenarios, the 
aquifers could be protected from overexploitation even at their low replenishment rates from recent 
droughts by providing some 100 million m³ of potable water through desalination.  
In both marginal pricing scenarios the economic costs are low. Caused by the reductions in taxes, real 
GDP, private consumption and welfare of many household groups actually increase. In all scenarios 
government funds increase, mainly due to the reduced expenditure, owed to the removal of the 
desalination subsidy and in the lib-scenario, because of the overall increase in economic activity 
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generating additional tax revenue. The increase in government revenue could be used to fund 
investments in the development of alternative water facilities and technologies. These investments 
could include: improving access to the reclaimed water network and upgrading the quality of 
reclaimed wastewater so as to allow for a wider use in the agricultural sector and also in some 
industrial processes. Additionally, transfer payments could be made to those households that 
experience reductions in welfare as demonstrated by the marginal cost pricing scenario with 
compensating redistribution. This would mitigate the negative effects of a potable water price increase 
and further reduce the pressure on freshwater resources. 
If the government of Israel aims at saving even more natural fresh water or providing additional 
potable water, e.g. to meet rising demand due to population growth, these requirements can be 
supplied by desalination, which would operate cost-neutral in the marginal pricing scenarios7. In the 
longer-term, the marginal cost pricing scenarios would allow the Israeli economy to be completely 
independent from natural fresh water resources. The water fee in these scenarios covers the costs of 
desalination, which include the capital costs for investing in new desalination plants. That way, any 
quantity of potable water could be provided independently from aquifer replenishment rates. This 
becomes even more feasible if technological progress is considered, which is expected to further 
reduce desalination costs (by up to 50% in the next 20 years) (Ziolkowska 2015). As a result, 
desalination in Israel would become competitive enough (compare Figure 3.1) to produce potable 
water without being subsidized. In this case economic indicators would be similar to the scenarios 
described in this paper and not be affected negatively (see footnote 7).  
In general, this analysis shows that a more market oriented/liberal water policy improves welfare, a 
finding that is in line with other research (e.g. Solis and Zhu 2015). Further, it suggests that a smart 
water policy yields a double dividend by saving water on the one side and increasing economic growth 
on the other, which coincides with findings from South Africa (Letsoalo et al. 2007). Even a triple 
dividend (reduction of poverty) would be possible, depending on the redistribution policy of budgetary 
revenue from increased water fees. Thereby the increasing use of marginal water resources contributes 
to mitigate the negative outcome for the agricultural sector. 
The substitution elasticities and market clearing conditions for this analysis are set up to report effects 
for a medium- to long-term time horizon. A sensitivity analysis shows that with halved production 
elasticities most economic indicators develop in the same direction, whereby most outcomes are more 
negative or less positive due to the lower flexibility in the short-term, which is expressed by the 
reduced substitution elasticities (Appendix, Table 3.A1).  
                                                     
7 A simulation in which desalination capacity is fixed at the current level, such that the reduction occurs to the usage of fresh 
water resources, yields very similar results in terms of water usage and production. Due to the higher costs of desalination, 
which is subsidized, the change in real GDP turns negative (-0.01%). The equivalent variation is slightly more negative, but 
income distribution more balanced. 
Modelling Sectorally Differentiated Water Prices - Water Preservation and Welfare Gains Through 
Price Reform? 
51 
For a long-term analysis, in order to consider the growth of water demand due to economic and 
population growth and to depict the time path of adjustment, future research could apply a dynamic 
CGE model similar to the approach by Briand (2006). Another potential avenue would be to evaluate 
the implications of further treating the wastewater, which would increase the costs, but at the same 
time allow it to be used by a much wider range of activities. That way shocks in the potable water 
sector could be absorbed more easily. Further, it would be an option to link STAGE_W to an agent-
based model in order to better capture the quota and block rate pricing system for potable water in 
Israel.  
The model is formulated in a generic way and therefore can be expanded or adjusted to diverging 
conditions. Presuming the availability of an appropriate database, and carefully re-evaluating the 
assumed substitution elasticities, it can be applied to other countries in which a different set of water 
qualities and resources might be used and alternative pricing schemes might be applied.  
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3.8 Appendix 
 
Figure 3.A1. Production System for Activities in STAGE_W. 
Source: modified from Luckmann et al. 2014. 
Table 3.A1. Changes in economic indicators with original (orig.) and halved (half) production elasticities. 
    % change compared to base  
   Scenario: lib-orig. lib-half marg-orig. marg-half 
Production Agriculture -3.09 -3.32 -4.81 -5.66 
     irrigated -4.23 -4.60 -6.58 -7.84 
  Manufacturing -0.21 -0.13 -0.35 -0.18 
  Services 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.26 
Real GDP   0.12 0.09 0.03 0.02 
Eqivalent Variation Jewish households         
  1. Quintile -0.20 -0.24 -0.27 -0.36 
  2. Quintile -0.04 -0.08 -0.19 -0.25 
  3. Quintile 0.14 0.12 -0.07 -0.08 
  4. Quintile 0.15 0.15 -0.04 -0.02 
  5. Quintile 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.66 
  non-Jewish households         
  1. Quintile -0.14 -0.24 -0.42 -0.65 
  2. Quintile -0.03 -0.13 -0.26 -0.44 
  3. Quintile 0.13 0.04 -0.06 -0.20 
  4. Quintile 0.26 0.18 0.16 0.11 
  5. Quintile 0.83 0.75 1.06 1.28 
Output
Intermediate InputsValue Added/Water
IntcnIntc1
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Abstract:  
The reclamation of wastewater is an increasingly important water source in parts of the world. It is 
claimed that wastewater recycling is a cheap and reliable form of water supply, which preserves water 
resources and is economically efficient. However, the quantity of reclaimed wastewater depends on 
water consumption by economic agents connected to a sewage system. This study uses a Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model to analyse such a cascading water system. A case study of Israel 
shows that failing to include this linkage can lead to an overestimation of the potential of wastewater 
recycling, especially when economic agents engage in water saving.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Water scarcity is an emerging global problem. Population and income growth are increasing demand 
appreciably. At the same time, the supply of water from traditional sources is failing to keep pace, and 
is being constrained by environmental and other concerns that are limiting the expansion of storage 
capacity and restricting extraction from aquifers. Moreover, the quality of freshwater resources is 
deteriorating as they are increasingly polluted, resulting in the spread of waterborne diseases (Jimenez 
and Asano, 2008) and limiting usefulness of the water. Consequently, societies have to recognise that 
water is an economic good that is costly. 
There are multiple approaches to address water scarcity with all of them involving increased costs. 
The rate of demand growth can be limited by increases in efficiency, e.g. drip feed irrigation systems, 
reductions in transmission losses, etc., and/or by encouraging users to conserve water, e.g. using 
showers rather than baths. Supplies can be increased by using non-traditional sources (e.g. seawater 
desalination), increased purification of traditional sources, and/or by the recycling of wastewater, 
which includes the treatment of wastewater (reclamation) and its use in economic activities. The 
balance between the different approaches depends upon country-specific circumstances. This study is 
concerned with the economic implications of recycling wastewater: how its collection, (partial) 
purification and reuse interact with other sources of water in the system. Because of the complexity of 
water systems, and the extent to which water is integrated within economic systems, the analyses 
require the use of a framework (model) that captures these interactions. 
Most wastewater, for reclamation, is collected through the sewage system. Given the origin of 
reclaimed wastewater and the costs of purification, most reclaimed wastewater is used for the 
irrigation of non-food crops and industrial processes, especially cooling, that do not require high levels 
of purification. Thus, wastewater recycling for irrigation is a potentially important as well as relatively 
low cost source of water and therefore is used in more than 40 countries (Jimenez and Asano, 2008). 
Typically, the ratio of recycled wastewater to total water extraction is low, although in countries 
facing severe water shortage it is already quite high, e.g. it is 35% in Kuwait and 18% in Israel 
(Jimenez and Asano, 2008). A major issue for water authorities contemplating recycling wastewater is 
that, as water becomes scarcer, programs are developed to increase the efficiency of water use and the 
price of water to consumers increases: both serve to lower the amount of wastewater available. For 
example, in Beijing rapidly increasing potable water prices have induced companies to invest in 
internal recycling facilities, lowering the potential for communal wastewater recycling (Yang and 
Abbaspour, 2007).  
The analyses reported in this paper derive from a water-focused Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model, STAGE_W (Luckmann and McDonald, 2014), which has been extended to encompass 
recycled wastewater by linking the supply of reclaimed wastewater to the quantity of wastewater 
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available. The advantages of using a CGE model are that this class of models can capture the complex 
interactions within water systems and the demand for water, both as an input to production as well as 
consumption by households. Equally important is the fact that prices within a CGE model are 
variables. This means that any changes in water, and other, prices have direct impact on the decisions 
of agents in the model, whether these price changes are exogenously imposed, e.g. through 
government policies, or solved endogenously within the model. Hence, the model generates shadow 
prices for wastewater to inform governments and pricing decisions. The analyses are implemented 
using data for Israel, although the framework is generic and applicable in any country for which the 
requisite data are available.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reports a review of existing approaches to 
model wastewater recycling from an economic perspective. Section 3 contains a description of the 
STAGE_W model and its extension. A description of the water system in the Israeli economy and the 
data used for the empirical application are provided in section 4. The simulations are reported and the 
results are analysed in section 5. While the final section 6 contains conclusions that are specific to the 
situation in Israel but also regarding the treatment of wastewater recycling in simulation models in 
general. 
4.2 Literature Overview 
Water models for economic policy analyses have developed greatly in the last 25 years (Booker et al., 
2012), but the economics of the recycling of wastewater remains underdeveloped (Molinos-Senante et 
al, 2011).  
A key issue is the economic viability of wastewater recycling, conditional upon different treatment 
levels and uses, e.g. irrigation vs. river disposal. Irrigation with reclaimed wastewater subject to 
secondary treatment can yield positive net economic benefits in Israel depending on the conveyance 
distance (Haruvy, 1997). Thus, there may be positive returns to increases in wastewater recycling. The 
key determinants will be the economic costs of wastewater recycling and the desalination of reclaimed 
water so that long-run chloride concentrations in the soil are stabilised (Haruvy et al., 2008). It has 
been argued that if reclaimed wastewater is treated to the highest sanitary and lowest salinity levels 
(including tertiary treatment), the net economic benefits exceed those from lower treatment levels; 
although the economically optimum levels of treatment will vary across regions (Lavee, 2013). 
The distribution of reclaimed wastewater between producers of wastewater (municipalities) and 
consumers of reclaimed water (farmers) is problematic as reclamation of wastewater is a public good 
for the wastewater producers and a private good for the farmers: therefore, market failure exists and 
optimal allocations are not realised. If the polluter pays principle is applied and municipalities pay the 
full costs of wastewater reclamation, an (economically) efficient allocation of reclaimed wastewater is 
unlikely (Feinerman et al. 2001). Hence, there is a prima facie case for government intervention. In a 
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game theoretic regional model total benefits are greatest if there is information symmetry, which 
supports cooperation and agreements between economic entities regarding the allocation and price of 
the reclaimed water (Axelrad and Feinerman, 2010).  
Increases in the prices of potable water will induce firms to invest in water recycling and thereby 
reduce outflows of wastewater (Yang and Abbaspour 2007). Thus, dependent on the relative costs of 
internal water recycling compared with fresh water supply and discharge costs, it may be 
economically viable for firms to invest in such water-conserving technologies (Rivers and Groves, 
2013). This may lead to considerable water savings, since investments in internal wastewater recycling 
by industries may reduce their freshwater intakes by up to 95% (Levine and Asano, 2002). 
Unsurprisingly CGE-based studies of water pricing conclude that if firms are charged for extracting 
water, e.g. from a river, that is returned to the source after use, then the rate of self-recycling will 
increase (Rivers and Groves, 2013). Such analyses do not encompass any users of the wastewater, 
which may make sense in countries that have abundant water supplies, e.g. Canada, but not in water 
scarce regions. 
One approach to consider a cascading water use is to allow substitution possibilities between 
reclaimed wastewater and fresh water in a dynamic optimisation model. If the marginal provision cost 
for reclaimed wastewater is constant and potable water and reclaimed wastewater are perfect 
substitutes, then the use of reclaimed wastewater for irrigation becomes a backstop technology. Thus, 
if the unit price of potable water reaches the marginal cost of reclaimed wastewater farmers will 
choose to irrigate with reclaimed wastewater (Roumasset and Wada, 2011). If the marginal provision 
costs of reclaimed wastewater are increasing then it becomes a supplemental resource (Roumasset and 
Wada, 2011). However, in all previous studies, it has been assumed that the supply of wastewater is 
unlimited, which may be a misleading assumption when considering conditions of water scarcity (Park 
et al., 2008).  
This study contributes to the literature by improving the modelling of wastewater recycling through 
endogenously connecting the provision of wastewater to the water consumption of economic entities 
in an economy-wide framework. The model presented in this paper builds on Luckmann et al. (2014), 
which is the first CGE model including a wastewater reclamation activity allowing for the transfer of 
reclaimed wastewater to other economic activities.  
4.3 Model Description 
The model used for this analysis makes the production of reclaimed wastewater dependent upon the 
endogenously determined supply of wastewater. This requires the simultaneous determination of the 
supply of sewage, which is a function of the demand for water by activities producing sewage, and the 
supply and demand for reclaimed wastewater. Consequently, the model must encompass the entire 
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water system of an economy and how the economy reacts to changes in the water system or changes in 
water policies, which is what water-focused CGE models are designed to do. 
The model is a development of the STAGE_W model, which is documented in Luckmann and 
McDonald (2014). Hence, the description of the base model here is limited. STAGE_W is a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM)-based single country CGE model, which includes non-linear and linear 
relationships governing the behaviour of the model’s agents. The model is calibrated to replicate the 
economic transactions reported for the country in the SAM. Thus, the model encompasses all 
production, consumption, trade and policy relationships recorded in a SAM that is derived from 
National Accounts data. The SAM must contain a detailed water sector with different types of water 
activities producing different water commodities from water resources or by-products. 
The demand for water in production is a nested production system (Figure 4.1). Different types of 
water, from natural or processed sources, are potential substitutes, which means, that the demand for 
each type of water is dependent upon its price and suitability for use in each activity, e.g. seawater 
cannot be used to irrigate crops but is a source of water for desalination. Similarly, the final demand 
for different types of water, e.g. by households, depends upon prices and its suitability, e.g. potable 
water can be used for all purposes by households but, in general, reclaimed water cannot. 
In this class of models the production of water is costly, which reflects the fact that the extraction, 
distribution and treatment of all types of water requires the use of resources, even if the natural 
resource, e.g. seawater, rainwater, etc., is free. Since the costs of water from different sources differ, 
e.g. potable water derived from seawater or rivers and reservoirs, the model needs instruments that 
define the available supplies of water types from different sources and the implications of different 
policies. The former are represented by constraints on the availability of the natural resources, while a 
range of government policy instruments represents the latter. If the supply of potable water from rivers 
and reservoirs is unlimited, there will be no supply of desalinated water, because of its higher cost. If 
there is a supply of desalinated water and the price of potable water is the same across all sources then 
there must be policy instruments that ensure prices are the same. The subsidy and tax instruments in 
STAGE_W are: producer-activity (a) specific production tax/subsidy rates (TXa); commodity (c) 
specific tax/subsidy rates (TWc); and consumer-activity and commodity specific user tax/subsidy rates 
(TWAc,a). 
The supply of wastewater is endogenised by making it a function of the use of potable water in the 
model, as suggested by Feinerman et al. (2001). As the demand for potable water increases/decreases, 
so the supply of wastewater increases/decreases, and hence, the maximum quantity of reclaimed 
wastewater increases/decreases. 
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Figure 4.1. Production System for Activities in STAGE_W.  
Accordingly, STAGE_W is extended by adding an equation that defines the availability of sewage 
(FSsew) as dependent upon the quantities of water consumed by households (QCDcwat,h) and activities 
connected to a sewer system (QWATcwat,asew) 
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where the coefficients shsewmun define the shares of water consumed that are realised as sewage, 
shsews defines the share of sewage collected and shsewl defines the share of the collected sewage lost. 
The supply of sewage defines the maximum quantity available for recycling but the actual quantity 
used depends upon the demand for reclaimed wastewater conditional upon the demand and supply of 
all water types in the system. Wastewater that is not recycled leaves the system. There may be 
environmental reasons for ensuring a minimum level of discharge, e.g. for natural conservation and 
the improvement of river quality: for convenience, in the model, these discharges are part of 
government consumption (QGD). The government consumption of wastewater has a lower bound 
(comgovconst), the quantity consumed in the base period, and no upper limit. Formally, this is a mixed 
complementary problem (2), with a lower bound being the base quantity (3). The government can 
adjust the lower bounds for different types of water individually or multiplicatively (QGDWADJ), e.g. 
in response to environmental concerns about inadequate river flows, etc. 
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*cwatrec cwatrecQGD G QGDWADJ comgovconst        (2) 
. cwatrec cwatrecQGD LO comgovconst         (3) 
4.4 The Case of Israel 
 Wastewater Recycling in Israel 
The annual freshwater supply in Israel is less than 250 m³ per capita, which is 50% below the 
threshold of severe water scarcity according to the Falkenmark indicator (Tal, 2006). All water in 
Israel, including sewage and wastewater, belongs to the state under the 1959 water law (Kislev, 2011). 
The Israeli Water Authority (IWA) manages the water sector and supervises all companies that are 
involved in the provision of water. Water authorities must treat municipal sewage (Inbar, 2010), such 
that 94% of the sewage is collected in a central sewer system and 91% is treated (Lavee, 2013). Some 
75% (355 million m³) of the sewage is recycled, which is among the highest recycling rates in the 
world8. The remainder of the treated water is discharged into rivers to improve water quality and river 
flow (Inbar, 2010; Lavee and Ash, 2013). Reclaimed wastewater is distributed via a separate network; 
in many localities, farmers can use potable water or reclaimed wastewater for irrigation. Irrigation 
with recycled wastewater is limited to crops not for human consumption, e.g. cotton, fodder crops, or 
for crops whose consumed parts do not have direct contact with the water, e.g. orchards and other tree 
crops (Inbar, 2010). 
Israel plans to increase the share of wastewater reuse to 95% over the next few years (Lavee and Ash, 
2013). An extension of the sewage system, further development of reclamation facilities and an 
assumed doubling of urban potable water consumption, means that by 2050 as much as 900 million m³ 
of reclaimed wastewater will be supplied annually (IWA, 2012). Furthermore, it is planned to upgrade 
the quality of reclaimed wastewater to allow for a wider use in agriculture (IWA, 2012).  
The Israeli government heavily subsidises the recycling of wastewater. The IWA has invested 4.6 
billion New Israeli Shekel (NIS) (~1.34 billion USD) in the last decade for wastewater recycling 
projects. There is financial assistance for farmers who switch to reclaimed wastewater, and for raising 
the quality of reclaimed wastewater. 15-60% of the construction costs for private recycling facilities 
are subsidised, while inter-facility infrastructure is fully government funded. The annual subsidy is 
about 170 million NIS (~50 million USD) and is financed by domestic consumers through potable 
water prices and sewage fees (Lavee and Ash, 2013). At the same time, quotas for the use of potable 
water for irrigation have been cut drastically since the 1980s (Zhou, 2006). 
                                                     
8 The wastewater-recycling rate is the share of recycled wastewater over total wastewater produced. 
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These policies result in a situation where demand for reclaimed water by agriculture exceeds supply. 
Demand will grow as reclamation facilities are upgraded to allow for unrestricted irrigation with 
reclaimed wastewater (Inbar, 2010). However, supply is limited in the short-run by the infrastructure, 
while in the long-run the available quantity is constrained by the quantity of wastewater entering the 
sewage-systems. 
 Model Database and Setup 
The model for this study uses an Israeli SAM for 2004, which was a ‘normal year’ after the Second 
Intifada and before the world financial crisis in 2009 (CBS, 2013). The SAM, which is based on 
Siddig et al. (2011), includes satellite accounts for all water types and was extended for this study by 
adding effective sewage as a production factor.  
The SAM has 46 economic activities that produce 45 commodities, including four water activities 
(freshwater purification, desalination, reclamation of wastewater, pumping of brackish groundwater), 
three water resources (freshwater, seawater and brackish groundwater) and one by-product 
(wastewater) to produce three water commodities (potable water, reclaimed wastewater, brackish 
water). Potable water is produced by a freshwater purification activity and a desalination activity. 
There are 41 production factors and 25 tax categories (two of which are implemented especially for 
the water pricing regime). Finally, there are 10 household groups, classified according to ethnic 
background (Jewish and non-Jewish) and income (five quintiles), that facilitate the analysis of welfare 
implications and distributional effects. An aggregated version of the SAM is reported in Luckmann 
and McDonald (2014). 
Sewage is owned, de facto, by the government that runs the sewage system. Since it has no price, it is 
not an economic good with transactions values. The quantities of sewage are recorded in the satellite 
accounts. Only the wastewater reclamation activity uses sewage as an input, which, by virtue of the 
production functions and data, guarantees that sewage cannot be substituted by or for other inputs or 
production factors.  
In this study the sewage produced by households, utilities and the service sector, except for 
construction, is quantified. The costs of the wastewater treatment activity include primary and 
secondary treatments; the latter is the most widespread treatment level in Israel. The reclaimed water 
can be used to irrigate non-food crops and crops for which lower sanitary restrictions apply.  
The calibration of the model assumes that water activities use capital, labour, intermediates and water 
inputs in fixed proportions9; holding the cost structures constant as suggested by Tirado et al. (2006). 
This is a short-run assumption under which the technologies of the water system activities are fixed.  
                                                     
9 This is achieved by setting the substitution elasticities to zero for water activities. For a long-run solution the substitution 
elasticities can be set to values greater than zero. 
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Substitution possibilities are imposed for non-water activities. Agricultural activities can substitute 
water commodities with a medium to low substitution elasticity (σ4) of 0.8 (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 
1995), which reflects the fact that not all components of the aggregated activities can use marginal10 
water qualities and that the option to use marginal water does not exist in all localities. On the third 
level of the production function, aggregate water and land have a substitution elasticity (σ3) of 0.3 
following Faust et al.’s, (2015) estimates of irrigation-land substitutability for Switzerland. The land-
water aggregate then combines with labour and capital at the second level of the production function: 
given the prevalence of drip irrigation systems in Israel (Saleth and Dinar, 1999), the substitution 
elasticity (σ2) is 0.8 (Berck et al., 1991). The top-level combines the value added and water aggregate 
with aggregate intermediate inputs with an elasticity (σ1) of 0.5.  
 Scenarios and Closures 
4.4.3.1 Scenarios 
Israel has sought to reduce freshwater uptake from aquifers, mainly due to a series of drought years, in 
which aquifer replenishment rates fell to as little as 63% of the multi-annual average (Shachar, 2009). 
This required a reduction in freshwater consumption, at a time of growing population and economy 
and thus, increasing demand for water. Consequently, Israel is seeking to replace potable water with 
reclaimed wastewater for irrigation. 
The scenarios assume a reduction of 50% in freshwater resources, which may appear drastic. Yet 
climate models indicate that drought conditions will be more likely in the future and that precipitation 
rates may decline by up to 50% in the region (Hertig and Jacobeit, 2008). Moreover, there is pressure 
for a more equitable allocation of water resource between Israel and Palestine, which may be 
necessary for a comprehensive peace agreement. Estimates indicate that water reallocation would 
reduce Israel’s renewable freshwater resources by 32% with loss of another 22% due to climate 
change (Chenoweth, 2011). Thus, a 50% reduction is not unrealistic even if it is on the high side.11 
The analyses assume that the quantity of desalinated water is constant. Thus, the reduced output of the 
freshwater activity reduces the quantity of potable water available to the economy.12 
Two scenarios demonstrate the implications of a 50% reduction in freshwater resources. The 
distinction between the two scenarios is whether the link between freshwater consumption and sewage 
supply (equation 1) is included or not. 
                                                     
10 In this paper, the term marginal water refers to reclaimed wastewater and brackish water. 
11 In exploratory simulations, the decrease of aquifer offtake was simulated by reductions in the output of the freshwater 
activity in 10% steps up to 80%; beyond which solutions became infeasible. Between 10% and 70%, the patterns of the 
results were consistent. A full set of these results is available from the authors. 
12 Increasing the quantity of desalinated water would require investment in new desalination plants, i.e., an increase in the 
capital stock of the desalination activity. The interaction between new investment in potable water supplies and recycled 
water is beyond the scope of this study. 
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1) Scenario "no-link": Reduced freshwater resources with unlimited sewage availability. In this 
scenario, the supply of sewage (FSsew) is unlimited at a constant very low price. The quantity 
of reclaimed wastewater then depends on the demand for and prices of other production 
factors and intermediate inputs, with the implicit tax rate on reclaimed water (TWc) fixed.  
2) Scenario "link": Reduced freshwater resources with limited sewage availability. In this 
scenario, any reduction in water consumption by municipalities reduces the quantity of 
reclaimed wastewater available to agriculture, which results in excess demand for reclaimed 
wastewater. The government can regulate demand by quotas or by a tax that raises the 
consumer price. The latter is an estimate of the marginal value of the sewage; thus, in this 
scenario the implicit tax rate on reclaimed water (TWc) is made flexible such that its level 
indicates the marginal value of sewage. 
The technical coefficients determining the shares of water collected in the sewage system (shsews), 
losses during the reclamation process (shsewl), and the ratio by which municipal entities convert water 
into sewage (shsew) are fixed to facilitate comparison between the two scenarios.13 This setup makes 
the quantity of wastewater available dependent on the cost of potable water. A comparison of the 
scenarios’ results highlights the relevance of modelling the link between potable water consumption 
and wastewater recycling. 
4.4.3.2 Market Clearing and Macroeconomic Closure 
The reduction of the freshwater resource and a fixed desalination capacity reduce the availability of 
potable water. The equilibriating variable for the potable water market is supply of sewage in 
scenario 1 (“no-link”) and the commodity tax rate for potable water (TWc) in scenario 2 (“link”). The 
production subsidy (TXa) to the desalination activity is flexible to maintain a constant quantity of 
desalinated water14 . The household income tax rates are (multiplicative) variables that clear the 
government account by compensating for endogenous changes in water taxes. All other tax rates 
remain constant.  
Full employment and factor mobility are assumed for capital, land and labour. Since water factors are 
only used by one respective water activity they are not mobile, with fixed prices that are politically 
determined. Therefore, the quantity used of these factors is flexible, which allows the output of water 
activities to vary.  
Israel is a small country so world market prices are fixed. The current account balance is fixed so that 
the external account is cleared by a variable exchange rate. For the government, consumption 
quantities and real transfers to households are fixed. Investment volumes and government savings are 
                                                     
13 If the technical variables are adjusted to simulate that additional households are connected to the sewage system and less 
sewage is lost within the system, the values of all result-variables lie in between the two described scenarios.  
14 This mirrors the long-term contracts of the Israeli government with the private operators of desalination plants, which 
guarantees the take-up of a fixed quantity of water for a certain period and at a particular price. 
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fixed with the savings rates of households and enterprises flexible to clear the capital account. Thus, 
all welfare changes in the solution period impact directly on households with no inter-generational 
utility trade-offs.  
 Results 
4.4.4.1 Water Prices 
Under both scenarios the prices charged for potable water triple as the implicit water commodity tax 
(TWcwatpot) increases until demand is brought into balance with the reduced supply of potable water 
(see Figure 4.2). The prices of potable water for agriculture increase accordingly from 0.24 USD/m³ to 
about 0.74 USD/m³ and for manufacturing from 0.48 USD/m³ to about 1.47 USD/m³, under the no-
link scenario. Under the link scenario the prices rise by an additional 0.01 USD/m³. The uniform 
proportionate price increases reflect the assumption that the water user subsidy rate (TWAcwatpot,a) is 
constant in relative terms.  
The reduction in the availability of freshwater cannot be fully compensated by substitution with other 
inputs; the economy therefore contracts which results in falling factor and intermediate input prices 
(production prices of all industrial commodities decrease by between 5% and 6%, see further below). 
Brackish water becomes slightly cheaper, as the implicit commodity tax on this water quality is 
constant while costs of provision decrease. But brackish water can only be used by two agricultural 
activities; hence, there is little scope to increase demand (Table 4.1) despite the decline in the supply 
price. 
With unlimited supplies of sewage, the no-link scenario, the price of reclaimed wastewater declines 
because costs fall with economic contraction. However, with limited sewage supply, the link scenario, 
the consumer price of reclaimed wastewater doubles with the increase in the implicit tax rate for 
reclaimed wastewater. In the link scenario, the total quantity of water available to the economy is 
lower than under the no-link scenario (Table 4.1); thus, the increase in the implicit water commodity 
tax is greater under the link scenario. Moreover, the impacts of the economic contraction on costs are 
greater in the link scenario, which explains the slightly larger decrease in the price of brackish water. 
In contrast, the slightly larger increase in the price of potable water under the link scenario reflects the 
fact that reclaimed wastewater increases in price due to the limited availability of sewage. 
4.4.4.2 Water Consumption 
The reduction in the availability of fresh water causes sharp reductions in the demand for potable 
water by all consumers. Except for households these are in the order of 60% under both scenarios, 
whereas household demand declines by less than 20% (see Table 4.1). These changes are in line with 
expectations given the 208% - 210% increases in consumer prices. The smaller reduction in demand 
by households reflects the greater substitution possibilities available to non-household users of potable 
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water, the small shares of household expenditure on water and fixed shares of subsistence 
consumption, between 38% and 5% (decreasing with increasing income), in the household demand 
functions. 
The importance of the link between potable water use and recycling of wastewater emerges in the 
results for water use by agriculture. Total water consumption by agriculture falls by 27% in the no-link 
scenario and by 43% in the link scenario. With no link and unlimited sewage, agriculture offsets the 
reduction in potable water availability by a small increase (5.7%) in consumption of reclaimed water. 
However, to do this the rate at which potable water used by municipalities is converted into reclaimed 
wastewater must increase from 72% to 111%, which is unrealistic, if the supply to the environment is 
to be kept constant. With the supply of reclaimed wastewater linked to the availability of sewage and 
fixed technical parameters of wastewater reclamation, the consumption falls sharply (43%) with 
consequent reductions in the output of crops irrigated with reclaimed wastewater.  
These consumption results highlight the importance of including the link between the availability of 
sewage and wastewater recycling. Neglecting this linkage is likely to bias the results. 
 
Figure 4.2. Provision costs and taxation of water commodities.  
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Table 4.1. Changes in water quantities consumed. 
    Water quantity Change compared to base 
    [million m³] [%] 
Water quality Sector base no-link link no-link link 
Potable Agriculture 565 233 234 -58.7 -58.6 
Manufacturing 123 48 47 -61.5 -61.7 
Municipalities 702 476 475 -32.2 -32.3 
 
   Services 218 84 84 -61.3 -61.5 
 
   Households 483 391 391 -19.1 -19.1 
Brackish Agriculture 185 195 197 5.6 6.7 
Reclaimed Agriculture 379 401 216 5.7 -43.0 
  Environment 126 126 126 0.0 0.0 
  Total 1954 1352 1170 -30.8 -40.1 
Reclamation rate 
 [% of municipal water consumption] 72.0 110.8 72.0     
4.4.4.3 Domestic Production and Prices 
The output of most activities is reduced in both scenarios since non-water factors and intermediate 
inputs can only partially compensate for increases in the price of potable water. The agricultural sector 
is the most affected because in agriculture water has the highest share of production costs, especially 
in the production of “other cereals”, “other crops” and “vegetables and fruit”, in which the share is 
7.5%, 6.6% and 6.2%, respectively. The output of the former two activities is reduced the most 
(Figure 4.3), while the production of “vegetables and fruit” falls less due to the relatively lower 
integration in the international market and thus, the lower dependence on the fixed world market 
prices. 
The economic contraction decreases the demand for labour and other factors of production: wages fall 
by about 6.1% and 6.3% in the no-link and link scenarios, respectively, which reduces production 
costs. The only exception is “other cereals”, for which costs rise by about 4.5% in both scenarios. This 
is due to the high water intensity of this activity, and the inability to substitute with marginal water 
commodities. The corollary is that where the water intensity of an activity is low and/or substitution 
possibilities are strong an activity’s output will decline less, as the decrease in wages and costs of 
other inputs compensates increasing water prices to a higher extent. 
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Figure 4.3. Changes in domestic production of agricultural activities. 
4.4.4.4 Trade 
The appreciation of the Israeli currency by 5.6% and 5.8% in the no-link and link scenarios, 
respectively, reflects the reduction in domestic production costs. Importantly, the composition of trade 
changes with increases in imports and reduced exports of (domestically) water-intensive products. 
Thus, there is a net gain in Israel’s virtual water trade balance that contributes to water saving.  
4.4.4.5 Government, Welfare and Macroeconomic Effects 
The government income from the water sector increases due to the increases in the water commodity 
tax rates on potable water (from 0.35 USD/m³ to 2.39 USD/m³ and 2.40 USD/m³ in the no-link and 
link scenarios) and the tax on reclaimed wastewater (from 0.04 USD/m³ to 0.27 USD/m³ under the 
link scenario). Overall, the government’s budget position allows the household income tax rates to fall 
by 2.6% and 2.8% in the no-link andn link scenarios. 
Household welfare declines (Figure 4.4) because of the reductions in wage rates and returns on capital 
that reduce household income by between 3.2% and 5.6%. The reductions in income tax rates reduce 
the adverse impacts on welfare, while the welfare gains for the poorest Jewish households (hj1) are 
attributable to the constant real transfers from the government. This indicates that targeted government 
transfers can offset the welfare implications of reductions in the availability of water resources. 
The real GDP15 of Israel contracts by 0.21% in the no-link scenario and by 0.24% in the link scenario. 
This translates into a difference of 31 million USD, by which the effects of the reduction in freshwater 
availability would be underestimated annually if the linkage between water consumption and 
wastewater recycling is not considered. 
                                                     
15 Measured by expenditure. 
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Figure 4.4. Household welfare measured in equivalent variation as percentage share of household expenditure. 
4.4.4.6 Uncertainty 
The prediction of future water resources involves several sources of uncertainty, e.g. the uncertainty 
about future greenhouse gas emissions and how they translate into hydrological effects in a given area 
(Chenoweth, 2011). The same holds for the allocation of water resources between the different 
political entities within the region. In order to see how much this uncertainty affects the model 
outcomes, the trends of the main parameters are investigated with respect to less and more severe 
shocks (Table 4.A1). 
A reduction in freshwater availability in 10% steps from 0% to -70% causes approximately linear 
changes in water consumption. This leads to near linear increases in reclaimed water prices. However, 
due to limited substitution possibilities, increases in the output of reclaimed water lag behind 
reductions of potable water consumption. Thus, the potable water price rises exponentially, secondary 
effects become more severe, and GDP falls at an increasing rate. Similarly, the welfare of household 
groups decreases at an increasing rate. For most households the effects become more pronounced for 
reductions of above 40%. 
4.5 Discussion 
For Israel, reductions in freshwater resources lead to increased demand for reclaimed wastewater, and 
thus, higher willingness to pay. The implicit water tax, which is endogenously adjusted in the link 
scenario to balance the limited supply with the increasing demand, is an estimate of the marginal value 
of unpurified sewage. This has three benefits. First, it can be used as an estimate of the losses to 
activities that use reclaimed wastewater if wastewater producing entities engage in water saving. 
Second, this shadow price could be added to the reclaimed wastewater fee in case supply is reduced, 
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so as to efficiently clear the market. And third, it can be used to evaluate the economic costs for 
expanding the infrastructure for water reclamation.16  
Another option for the IWA to mitigate a reduction in usable freshwater resources is to increase 
desalination capacity, as discussed in Luckmann et al. (2014). But due to the higher costs of 
desalination compared to freshwater purification, the economy-wide effects would still be negative (-
0.21 % of GDP, for the link-scenario). 
This study develops an approach to link the reclamation of wastewater to the consumption of potable 
water by economic entities. The case study shows that not considering this linkage can substantially 
bias the results due to an underestimation of the negative economic effects of a reduction in freshwater 
resources. Although the usage of reclaimed wastewater is restricted to a few agricultural activities, the 
losses to the Israeli economy are markedly lower when the link is not considered. If reclaimed 
wastewater can be used in a wider range of activities (such as industrial cooling) and in more locations 
(expressed by a larger substitution elasticity), which is intended by the Israeli government (IWA, 
2012), the losses would be lower.  
Moreover, the dependence of wastewater recycling on sewage-input makes water saving in the 
municipal sector less efficient the higher the reclamation rates are, as it reduces the reclaimed water 
availability. Due to this, increasing potable water fees in the municipal sector could lead to unintended 
outcomes such as rising potable water demand from the agricultural sector resulting from less sewage 
and thus reclaimed wastewater supply. Therefore, other options to save water, e.g. more efficient 
irrigation systems, may be more favourable.  
Finally, this study shows that wastewater recycling does not necessarily serve as a backstop 
technology as claimed by Roumasset and Wada (2011) and, thus, the aim of the Israeli government to 
make the agricultural sector more independent from potable water supply, might not be easily 
achieved under the conditions described.  
This model is the first CGE approach that captures cascading water use by interdependent economic 
agents. The generic formulation of the model means that it can be applied to a wide range of 
situations, countries and simulations. There are also manifold options for further extensions. One 
aspect would be to incorporate the spatial dimension of (reclaimed) water supply, since the provision 
costs of reclaimed wastewater increase considerably with the distance from the source (Haruvy, 1997). 
This is less relevant in the context of this study, as effects on the demand side depend on water fees, 
which independent from the location in Israel. However, considering increasing marginal provision 
costs would allow the optimal quantity of wastewater recycling to be estimated. The integration of 
                                                     
16 This possibility was tested in an additional scenario. However, even if all sewage was centrally collected (shsews = 1) and 
losses from the system (shsewl) would be reduced by 50%, only an additional 27 million m³ of reclaimed wastewater would 
be available, as the Israeli wastewater recycling network already has a quite high coverage. Therefore, the overall effects 
would be quite similar to the link-scenario.  
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different quality levels for reclaimed wastewater (with different cost structures) would add further to 
such an optimisation analysis.  
4.6 Conclusions 
This paper allows some conclusions to be made with respect to Israel, and, just as important, regarding 
the treatment of wastewater recycling in simulation models: 
 For Israel, a reduction in potable water availability results in an excess demand for reclaimed 
wastewater, which can be balanced by increasing reclaimed water fees. The model can 
quantify both the excess demand and the reclaimed water fees.  
 The study shows that indirect effects of changes in the water sector can be substantial, which 
demonstrates the advantages of economy-wide models. 
 The case study on Israel demonstrates the relevance of the model to countries in which a 
cascade usage of water is extensive. In such cases, it is advisable to apply an integrated model 
that considers water activities as interdependent. 
 The model provides a method for estimating the shadow price of wastewater, which can be 
used to inform the water pricing decisions. 
 The study demonstrates that wastewater recycling cannot be regarded as a backstop 
technology for the usage of potable water in case of reduced water availability if a high share 
of water is recycled already. 
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4.7 Appendix 
Table 4.A1. Sensitivity analysis: changes in economic indicators in the link scenario with different natural 
freshwater shocks (-50% = central scenario). 
  
Natural Freshwater Reduction [%] 
    -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 
  
Water Prices 
Potable 17.74 41.64 75.37 126.07 209.67 369.58 772.51 
  Brackish -0.51 -1.19 -2.13 -3.52 -5.78 -10.03 -20.55 
  Reclaimed 14.36 31.52 52.18 77.09 106.85 140.28 164.38 
  
 
Water Quantities [%] 
Potable Agriculture -11.15 -22.58 -34.29 -46.28 -58.55 -71.10 -83.93 
Manufacturing -12.68 -25.18 -37.51 -49.67 -61.71 -73.66 -85.59 
Municipalities -6.76 -13.33 -19.70 -25.88 -31.84 -37.61 -43.13 
Reclaimed Agriculture -9.14 -18.01 -26.62 -34.97 -43.05 -50.85 -58.35 
Brackish Agriculture 1.54 3.00 4.36 5.59 6.69 7.67 8.78 
    Production Quantities [%] 
 Agriculture -0.76 -1.65 -2.69 -3.95 -5.53 -7.65 -10.88 
Manufacturing -0.04 -0.09 -0.16 -0.26 -0.42 -0.67 -1.14 
Services -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.11 -0.17 
    Equivalent Variation [% of base household expenditure] 
Jewish 
Households 
1. Quintile -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.09 0.28 0.78 2.71 
2. Quintile -0.05 -0.10 -0.16 -0.23 -0.28 -0.28 0.12 
3. Quintile -0.08 -0.19 -0.34 -0.54 -0.83 -1.32 -2.35 
4. Quintile -0.04 -0.10 -0.19 -0.34 -0.58 -0.99 -1.90 
5. Quintile 0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.08 -0.30 -0.79 -2.05 
Arab and 
other 
Households 
1. Quintile -0.11 -0.24 -0.40 -0.59 -0.85 -1.21 -1.77 
2. Quintile -0.09 -0.19 -0.32 -0.49 -0.72 -1.04 -1.58 
3. Quintile -0.09 -0.20 -0.36 -0.57 -0.89 -1.41 -2.54 
4. Quintile -0.04 -0.11 -0.22 -0.39 -0.65 -1.12 -2.18 
5. Quintile 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.20 -0.50 -1.14 -2.78 
  Real GDP [%] 
    -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.14 -0.24 -0.39 -0.71 
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5 Synthesis, General Conclusions and Outlook 
5.1 Background and Achievements 
The 1992 Dublin Statement of the United Nations (WMO, 1992) officially recognizes that global 
freshwater resources are limited. At least since then it is generally understood that a more efficient 
management of these resources is required. Water management decisions usually have complex 
implications, as besides being vital for human survival water is used for various purposes in many 
different activities. To forecast potential consequences from water management decisions in advance 
economic models generally have been proven useful. Often applied approaches, however, such as 
cost-benefit analyses and programming as well as partial equilibrium and other single sector models, 
are unable to endogenously capture indirect effects from changes in the water sector. As an example 
for such indirect effects, an increase in irrigation fees results in increasing production costs of 
agricultural commodities. This leads to a reduction in farm income, which in turn results in a reduced 
demand for all non-inferior commodities. In contrast, the additional irrigation fee increases 
government income, which can be spent for different purposes. As competition for water between 
different sectors is increasing (OECD, 2012), it has been understood that more integrated approaches 
are needed to sustainably manage this precious resource (UNESCO-WWP, 2006). 
Being capable to consider economy-wide linkages as well as the behavior of economic agents and 
welfare implications, which are especially relevant in the analysis of water-related questions, is the 
advantage of general equilibrium models. The strongly growing number of water-related CGE 
publications especially since the beginning of this century (Figure 5.1) provides an exemplary proof of 
their usefulness in this respect. 
 
Figure 5.1. Number of SCOPUS listed water-related general equilibrium publications. 
Source: own compilation based on SCOPUS (2014). 
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So far, however, these studies were mostly focused on certain aspects of the water sector often 
considering water for irrigated agriculture only (e.g. Calzadilla et al., 2011; Wittwer & Griffith, 2011). 
No water CGE model has yet been developed which provides a flexible and comprehensive 
framework to capture different water resources and qualities as well as treatment activities, such that it 
can be applied in many different circumstances to analyze a wide range of scenarios. 
The aim of this thesis is to fill this research gap by developing a water-focused CGE model which 
depicts water in an integrated way and incorporates all dimensions of the water sector (supply, 
demand, management), including substitution possibilities for water on different levels. The model 
allows for cascading water use and the analysis of the effects on the welfare of different household 
groups. The different applications presented in the previous chapters provide a proof for the wide 
range of simulations the model can be applied to. Yet, the model is flexible to be calibrated to other 
databases and a different set of water qualities. 
5.2 Main Findings 
The findings from the analyses in the previous chapters underline the usefulness of the STAGE_W 
model developed in this thesis. The results of the first article (chapter 2), for instance, demonstrate that 
for Israel a tripling of potable water prices does not lead to very strong effects on the economy (GDP 
loss of 0.2%). This is mainly caused by the relatively low share potable water accounts for in the total 
consumption expenditure of Israeli households but also to a large extent due to the flexible adjustment 
possibilities depicted in the model. In activities which allow for the usage of marginal water, potable 
water is substituted with other water qualities. Other activities invest in more water-efficient systems 
and in general, the composition of domestic production as well as consumption shifts to less water-
intensive commodities. This could free 50% of the currently used freshwater resources, without the 
need of further desalination plants. 
The second article (chapter 3) shows that in the current situation an abolishment of water use subsidies 
in Israel would lead to a situation in which desalination would not be required anymore in normal 
years in terms of precipitation and the installed capacity could be used to provide additional supply in 
drought years. Yet, with increasing population and economic growth, the water demand is expected to 
rise in the future, which will require additional supply from desalination plants in order to achieve a 
more sustainable water management. 
For Israel it can be said in general that substantial pressure can be taken from aquifers at relatively low 
economic costs, due to a small share of water and water-intensive products in total consumption 
expenditure and a high technological level in the water sector, which allows for the provision of a 
range of alternative water sources. As shown in chapter 3 the price of potable water could even be 
increased to the cost of desalination (marginal pricing) at relatively modest costs to the economy and 
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potentially would make Israel completely independent from natural freshwater resources in the long-
run. 
Of course, one needs to be careful when generalizing the outcomes found with the help of a complex 
model like the one applied, as results might differ considerably for a country with a different 
economical structure but the advantage of STAGE_W is that it is generic and can be easily applied to 
other economies and based on their respective databases might deliver quite different results. 
An extension to the model is presented in the third article (chapter 4). The introduced link between the 
water consumption of economic entities connected to a sewer system and the sewage available for 
reclamation is especially relevant in countries which already use a considerable share of reclaimed 
wastewater such as Israel. As shown, simulations might lead to an overestimation of the remaining 
potential for increasing the use of reclaimed wastewater if the consumption of water from which 
sewage is generated is not considered. This would result in an underestimation of the negative effects 
caused by a cut in water supply. This extension, considering the cascading use of water, shows that the 
reclamation of wastewater cannot be considered a backstop technology in situations in which already a 
large share of the sewage collected is used. Moreover, accounting for the cascading water use yields 
that per m³ of water additional value added is created if it is used by economic agents connected to the 
sewer system, which influences the optimal water allocation. To this effect, the model also provides a 
measure to estimate the shadow price of sewage, which can be useful for the creation of an efficient 
water pricing system including sewage fees and reclaimed wastewater prices. This extension would be 
easily applicable for other cascading water use systems, too, e.g., water which is used for cooling of 
industrial processes or in hydropower plants and afterwards for irrigation. 
The case studies presented also showed, that the model provides results, which cannot necessarily be 
anticipated, as they are the outcome of the complex interrelations within the model. For example, the 
distribution of welfare effects results from the interplay of prices for potable water and other goods 
consumed on one side and factor wages and other household income on the other side. Thus, this 
model constitutes a helpful tool to implement a more sustainable management of water resources, 
allowing policy makers in any country, given the availability of an applicable database, to ex-ante 
estimate the economy-wide effects of water-related decisions. One of the major advantages of 
STAGE_W in this respect is its capability to include an unlimited range of various water qualities and 
maximal annual withdrawal quantities from different water resources, through the integrated water 
satellite accounts which also allow for a direct interpretation of results in terms of quantities and prices 
without the requirement for further ex-post calculations. This allows the model to be applied for a 
wide range of scenarios addressing water policy-related questions, but also regarding resource 
endowments or new technologies in the water sector. As the economy as a whole is depicted a more 
holistic picture of effects resulting from changes in the water sector can be drawn in comparison to 
single sector models or cost-benefit analyses. 
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5.3 Limitations 
The quality of the model results depends to a large extent on the underlying database, which needs to 
depict the production and consumption structure of the economy under investigation in a sufficiently 
detailed and correct manner. Especially with respect to water, it is often difficult to compile the 
required data, as the water sector is not integrated in the national accounts statistics of many countries 
in enough detail. This is the case even though in 2007 the System of Environmental-Economic 
Accounting (SEEA) for Water was adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission as an 
interim international standard and its usage has been encouraged (United Nations, 2012). The SEEA-
Water provides an accounting framework for physical and also economic water accounts. A reason 
why it has so far been largely neglected might lie in the fact that in most cases the water sector does 
not function like other economic activities: There is no free market for the trade of water but typically 
only one supplier, due to the dependence on the infrastructure for water provision. Moreover, this 
supplier is mostly state-controlled, as the provision of water is so vital for human survival and since 
the United Nations acknowledge that water should be considered as an economic good, the access to 
clean water is also considered a basic right of all humans (WMO, 1992). Thus, water fees charged 
from consumers in many countries neither reflect the scarcity of the resource nor the costs of water 
provision. Additionally, this would require that water consumption of each user is measured; however, 
the installation of water meters is costly and not always possible. Therefore, in many countries flat rate 
pricing schemes exist (OECD, 2012) or water abstraction is not charged at all (OECD, 2010). The 
Indian government even provides subsidies which reduce the marginal costs for water supply 
significantly (Poddar et al., 2014). Even in Ireland, being an OECD-member country, there are no 
water fees for domestic consumers. Although it is planned to introduce such fees in 2015, not all water 
will be metered due to lacking infrastructure (CER, 2014). 
Such water pricing schemes which are not based on the quantity of consumption and do not follow 
economic principles make it difficult to estimate the consumption quantities and the value of water in 
different economic activities. Thus, for many countries there still is insufficient data on water available 
on the national level to allow for a straightforward integration in a CGE-framework. A partial work-
around to this problem for the agricultural sector has been presented by Calzadilla et al. (2011), who 
split the value of irrigation water from the land rent according to the yield difference between irrigated 
and rainfed land in each region. 
Some countries also apply block rate pricing schemes especially for households. In most cases these 
schemes allow for a certain consumption quantity at a reduced rate and charge a higher fee beyond a 
certain threshold. An OECD study found that this is the case in about half of the utilities investigated 
(OECD, 2009). Although it would be useful to give policy advice with respect to household pricing, 
such a scheme has not yet been incorporated in the model. Technically it could be easily integrated 
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with the help of another tax instrument. Practically, however, it would require water consumption data 
at the household level, which is hardly available. Therefore, till now average prices are used. 
Furthermore, the econometric foundation for the estimation of the different elasticity parameters in 
STAGE_W can be further improved. Thereby, the model could benefit from findings in other research 
disciplines for example from agricultural engineering studies on how much water can be saved at 
which expenditure by employing a more efficient irrigation system. As these parameters vary 
depending on the time horizon and the production system, findings from case studies cannot be 
generalized easily. This is a common problem for many CGE models, however (Mitra-Kahn, 2008; 
Dixon & Jorgenson, 2013). Therefore, a carefully carried out sensitivity analysis should be included in 
any study providing policy advice in order to see in how far results are influenced by certain elasticity 
parameters. 
In general it needs to be said, that results obtained from the model presented in this thesis (as from 
CGE models in general) should not be considered as forecasts or predictions of the future. The results 
are always the outcome of one (or more) exogenous shock(s) to which the model reacts. All other 
aspects changing continuously and simultaneously in the real world remain unaltered within the model 
(ceteris paribus condition). Therefore, the model results should rather be used to assess the 
consequences and implications which can be traced back to the induced shock independent from other 
factors. The final section of this thesis gives an outlook on how the model could be further used and 
developed in this sense. 
5.4 Further Applications and Possible Extensions to the Model 
As shown in the previous chapters, the model developed in the course of this dissertation can be used 
to analyze a variety of simulations focusing on the water sector. Still, the capabilities of STAGE_W 
can be further exploited as it could be applied to a much wider range of further simulations. Thereby, 
the model can be easily adjusted to the specific conditions of any country of interest. As, for example, 
further water sources or commodities can easily be added. 
With respect to Israel, it would be interesting to look into the implications of the pursued upgrade of 
the wastewater quality. This causes higher costs for wastewater reclamation on the one side but also 
gives more flexibility regarding the application on the use side, as fewer restrictions apply. 
An application which may also be relevant in other country contexts is the estimation of the economy-
wide effects from building desalination plants or other investments in the water sector. In this respect 
it is advantageous that the model allows for several activities to simultaneously produce the same 
(homogenous) water commodity, despite of different cost structures. This is shown in the case studies 
of Israel for the purification of natural freshwater and desalination activities which concurrently 
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produce potable water. Thereby, differences in total supply costs are captured by an endogenously 
adjusted subsidy-instrument. 
On the global scale, the OECD (2012) found that till 2050 the water sector in most countries will 
mostly be influenced by socio-economic developments such as population growth, urbanization and 
economic growth. To depict such developments within the model it could be run in a (recursive) 
dynamic way. In the simplest form this means that, for example, estimated population and economic 
growth rates are exogenously enforced on the model, it is solved and the equilibrium presents the 
situation after one year with such growth rates. The resulting SAM is then used as the base for a 
second simulation in which the model is shocked by the growth rates again. In such a way many 
simulations can be run consecutively and the development-path e.g. with respect to water resources 
can be depicted. 
Especially in the long-run, climate change and variability have been found to have substantial impacts 
on water resources as well (OECD, 2012). Also climate-related scenarios could be easily investigated 
using STAGE_W. For example, droughts result in a reduced productivity of rainfed irrigation. This 
could be simulated by adjustments of the production coefficient of the respective activities. 
Additionally, a lasting drought might lead to a reduced recharge rate of aquifers which could be 
simulated in STAGE_W by a reduction of the supply of certain water factors or a reduced output of 
certain water activities as simulated in chapters 2 and 4. 
For such an analysis, it would be beneficial to separate rainfed cropping activities from irrigated 
agriculture, which is purely a matter of data work. This would ease the determination of more precise 
land-water-substitution elasticities for the individual activities. For rainfed activities the land water 
nest does not apply. For irrigated activities one could determine whether these crops can be grown 
with varying water intensity (e.g. deficit irrigation) or need a fixed quantity of water. In the latter case 
the elasticity σ3 would simply be set to zero. Independent of that, these activities still could be 
supplied with an adjusted composition of water qualities, which is governed by the lowest nest in the 
production function. 
If climate effects, water supply or water policy differ regionally within one economy, it would be 
beneficial to also regionalize the model and the database. A first step towards this would be to split up 
all activities which require land into activities of a certain region and allow for land and water 
commodities produced from local resources to be allocated within that region only, similar to the 
approach presented by Diao et al. (2005). 
STAGE_W could also be further developed to consider seasonality, since water supply lows often 
coincide with demand peaks, resulting in temporal water shortages and sometimes the imposition of 
short-term water use restrictions. One approach, similar to the one for regional variability described 
above, has been presented by Ferrari et al. (2014), who disaggregate agricultural production activities 
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according to seasons. A more complex approach in this direction is the CGE-W model developed by 
Robinson and Gueneau (2013). This model links a CGE model with a water system model and 
includes a water stress module. The CGE model is solved at the beginning of the cropping season, 
introducing an exogenous shock. This yields projections on the land being allocated to specific crops 
and together with the water stress module harvest expectations. Based on this first model run the total 
water demand is calculated. With the help of the water system model the available water is distributed 
on a monthly basis. From this, using the water stress module, yield shocks are calculated. These are 
fed into the CGE model, which is solved a second time with fixed allocation of land to crops 
simulating the economy-wide effects of the yield shocks at the end of the cropping season. The 
variables obtained from this run provide the starting parameters for the next year. Also STAGE_W 
could be linked to other (non-economic) water-related models in such a way. This would allow the 
analyses to directly benefit from the often more precise and detailed projections which can be made 
based on specialized water-focused models developed in other scientific disciplines e.g., regarding the 
development of the hydraulic cycle in a certain region or the reactions of crops towards water stress, 
which would deliver more realistic and detailed simulation results. 
Another interesting aspect towards which the STAGE_W model could be further extended would be 
the integration of environmental externalities, such as pollution effects arising from the discharge of 
untreated wastewater or consideration of greenhouse gas emissions, due to increased desalination, 
which is still a quite energy-intensive process (Siddiqi & Anadon, 2011). With respect to the latter the 
database of the Global Trade Analysis Project which includes a CO2 emissions dataset (GTAP, 2014) 
can provide a starting point. Also, the before mentioned SEEA for water allows to account for water 
pollution and emissions (United Nations, 2012). The pollution of water bodies could be considered by 
linking the production costs of water-purifying activities to the quantity of untreated wastewater 
discharge. This is because the provision costs of potable water would increase, if water bodies get 
more polluted, as the water either needs to be treated more, or the polluted water body cannot be used 
at all anymore, such that another (further away) source needs to be developed. In the current setup of 
STAGE_W, environmental aspects can be considered in an ex-post analysis, but the advantage to 
include externalities in the model itself would be the possibility to also integrate measures to 
internalize such negative externalities (e.g. a tax linked to CO2 emissions). 
Summing up, this thesis presents a novel CGE model which incorporates the water sector in a more 
holistic way compared to previous approaches. This, together with the flexibility of the model, allows 
for an in-depth analysis of a wide range of water-related simulations and scenarios. 
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A.1 STAGE_W: An Applied General Equilibrium Model with Multiple 
Types of Water 
The content of this chapter is identical with Luckmann, J. & S. McDonald, 2014. STAGE_W: an 
applied general equilibrium model with multiple types of water; technical documentation. Institute of 
Agricultural Policy and Markets, University of Hohenheim, Germany. 
A.1.1 Introduction 
This document provides a description of the STAGE_W computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model, which is a development of the STAGE model and allows for the depiction of diverse water 
resources and qualities as well as the simulation of detailed water policy scenarios. STAGE_W is a 
member of the STAGE suite of single country computable general equilibrium models. At the core of 
the suite is the basic STAGE model, but the basic STAGE model is not often used in practical work 
rather it is customised to the setting/economic environment being explored. The guiding principle is 
that the basic STAGE model provides a template that can support multiple variants; indeed the 
expectation is that for most studies it will be necessary/desirable to make changes and/or addition to 
the basic STAGE model. 
The basic STAGE model is characterised by several distinctive features. First, the model allows for a 
generalised treatment of trade relationships by incorporating provisions for non-traded exports and 
imports, i.e., commodities that are neither imported nor exported, competitive imports, i.e., 
commodities that are imported and domestically produced, non-competitive imports, i.e., commodities 
that are imported but not domestically produced, commodities that are exported and consumed 
domestically and commodities that are exported but not consumed domestically. Second, the model 
allows the relaxation of the small country assumption for exported commodities that do not face 
perfectly elastic demand on the world market. Third, the model allows for (simple) modelling of 
multiple product activities through an assumption of fixed proportions of commodity outputs by 
activities with commodities differentiated by the activities that produce them. Hence the numbers of 
commodity and activity accounts are not necessarily the same. Fourth, (value added) production 
technologies are specified as nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES). And fifth, household 
consumption expenditure is modelled using Stone-Geary utility functions. 
The main additional feature added for the STAGE_W version is the detailed description of the water 
sector, by allowing for the integration of various water resources as factors (e.g. groundwater, 
seawater, wastewater), from which specific activities (water activities e.g. pumping and purification of 
groundwater, desalination, water reclamation) produce water commodities (e.g. potable water, treated 
wastewater of different qualities). These commodities are used as inputs in the production process of 
other activities or are consumed by households and other agents (e.g. nature) as final users. The 
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number and specification of water factors, activities and commodities are flexible and can be adjusted 
to the local conditions of the country analyzed. Also the model allows for the substitution of water 
commodities by water consuming activities. Besides this, the addition of two water specific tax 
instruments, allows for various pricing schemes, including price differentiation according to water 
user. All other features of the STAGE model are carried over directly to STAGE_W. 
The model is designed for calibration using a reduced form of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) that 
broadly conforms to the UN System of National Accounts (SNA). Table A 1.1 contains a macro SAM 
in which the active sub matrices are identified by X and the inactive sub matrices are identified by 0. 
In general the model will run for any SAM that does not contain information in the inactive sub 
matrices and conforms to the rules of a SAM.17 In some cases a SAM might contain payments from 
and to both transacting parties, in which case recording the transactions as net payments between the 
parties will render the SAM consistent with the structure laid out in Table A 1.1. 
Table A 5.1. Macro SAM for the Standard Model. 
 Commodities Activities Factors Households Enterprises Government 
Capital 
Accounts 
RoW 
Commodities (X) X 0 X X X X X 
Activities X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Factors 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X 
Households 0 0 X 0 X X 0 X 
Enterprises 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 X 
Government X X X X X 0 0 X 
Capital 
Accounts 
0 0 X X X X 0 X 
RoW X 0 X X X X X 0 
Total X X X X X X X X 
The most notable differences between this SAM and one consistent with the SNA are: 
1) The SAM is assumed to contain only a single ‘stage’ of income distribution. However, fixed 
proportions are used in the functional distribution of income within the model and therefore a reduced 
form of a SNA SAM using apportionment (see Pyatt, 1989) will not violate the model’s behavioural 
assumptions. 
2) The trade and transport margins, referred to collectively as marketing margins, are subsumed 
into the values of commodities supplied to the economy. 
                                                     
17 If users have a SAM that does not run with no information in inactive sub matrices the author would appreciate a copy of 
the SAM so as to further generalise the model. 
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3) A series of tax accounts are identified (see below for details), each of which relates to specific 
tax instruments. Thereafter a consolidated government account is used to bring together the different 
forms of tax revenue and to record government expenditures. These adjustments do not change the 
information content of the SAM, but they do simplify the modelling process. However, they do have 
the consequence of creating a series of reserved names that are required for the operation of the 
model.18 
The model contains a section of code, immediately after the data have been read in, that resolves a 
number of common ‘problems’ encountered with SAM databases by transforming the SAM so that it 
is consistent with the model structure. Specifically, all transactions between an account with itself are 
eliminated by setting the appropriate cells in the SAM equal to zero. Second, all transfers from 
domestic institutions to the Rest of the World and between the Rest of the World and domestic 
institutions are treated net as transfers to the Rest of the World and domestic institutions, by 
transposing and changing the sign of the payments to the Rest of the World.19 And third, all transfers 
between domestic institutions and the government are treated as net and as payments from government 
to the respective institution. Since these adjustments change the account totals, which are used in 
calibration, the account totals are recalculated within the model. An example SAM can be found in 
Appendix 4. 
In addition to the SAM, which records transactions in value terms, three additional databases are used 
by the model. The first records the ‘quantities’ of primary inputs used by each activity. The second 
reports the quantities of the different water qualities consumed by each water user (activities and other 
agents). If such quantity data are not available then the entries in the factor use matrix are the same as 
those in the corresponding sub matrix of the SAM. The third series of additional data are the 
elasticities of substitution for imports and exports relative to domestic commodities, the elasticities of 
substitution for the CES production functions, the income elasticities of demand for the linear 
expenditure system and the Frisch (marginal utility of income) parameters for each household. 
All the data are accessed by the model from data recorded in Excel and GDX (GAMS data exchange) 
files. All the data recorded in Excel are converted into GDX format as part of the model. 
A.1.2 The Computable General Equilibrium Model 
The model is a member of the class of single country computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
that are descendants of the approach to CGE modeling described by Dervis et al., (1982). More 
specifically, the implementation of this model, using the GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling 
System) software, is a direct descendant and development of models devised in the late 1980s and 
                                                     
18 These and other reserved names are specified below as part of the description of the model. 
19 Treating transfers as net can be justified on the grounds that no clear body of economic theory exists that would seem to 
justify the adoption of specific behavioural relationships.  
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early 1990s, particularly those models reported by Robinson et al., (1990), Kilkenny (1991) and 
Devarajan et al., (1994). The model is a SAM based CGE model, wherein the SAM serves to identify 
the agents in the economy and provides the database with which the model is calibrated. Since the 
model is SAM based it contains the important assumption of the law of one price, i.e., prices are 
common across the rows of the SAM.20 The SAM also serves an important organisational role since 
the groups of agents identified by the SAM structure are also used to define sub-matrices of the SAM 
for which behavioural relationships need to be defined. As such the modelling approach has been 
influenced by Pyatt’s ‘SAM Approach to Modeling’ (Pyatt, 1989). 
The description of the model proceeds in five stages. The first stage is the identification of the 
behavioural relationships; these are defined by reference to the sub matrices of the SAM within which 
the associated transactions are recorded. The second stage is definitional, and involves the 
identification of the components of the transactions recorded in the SAM, while giving more substance 
to the behavioural relationships, especially those governing inter-institutional transactions, and in the 
process defining the notation. The third stage uses figures to illustrate the price and quantity systems 
for commodity and activity accounts that are embodied within the model. In the fourth stage an 
algebraic statement of the model is provided; the model’s equations are summarised in a table that also 
provides (generic) counts of the model’s equations and variables. A full listing of the parameters and 
variables contained within the model are located in Appendix 1.21 Finally in the fifth stage there is a 
discussion of the default and optional macroeconomic closure and market clearing rules available 
within the model. 
A.1.2.1 Behavioural Relationships 
While the accounts of the SAM determine the agents that can be included within the model, and the 
transactions recorded in the SAM identify the transactions that took place, the model is defined by the 
behavioural relationships. The behavioural relationships in this model are a mix of non-linear and 
linear relationships that govern how the model’s agents will respond to exogenously determined 
changes in the model’s parameters and/or variables. Table A 1.2 summarises these behavioural 
relationships by reference to the sub matrices of the SAM. 
Households are assumed to choose the bundles of commodities they consume so as to maximise utility 
where the utility function is Stone-Geary. For a developing country a Stone-Geary function may be 
generally preferable since it allows for subsistence consumption expenditures, which is an arguably 
                                                     
20 The one apparent exception to this is for exports. However the model implicitly creates a separate set of export commodity 
accounts and thereby preserves the ‘law of one price’, hence the SAM representation in the text is actually a somewhat 
condensed version of the SAM used in the model (see McDonald, 2007). 
21 The model includes specifications for transactions that were zero in the SAM. This is an important component of the 
model. It permits the implementation of policy experiments with exogenously imposed changes that impact upon transactions 
that were zero in the base period. 
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realistic assumption when there are substantial numbers of very poor consumers.22 The households 
choose their consumption bundles from a set of ‘composite’ commodities that are aggregates of 
domestically produced and imported commodities. These ‘composite’ commodities are formed as 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregates that embody the presumption that domestically 
produced and imported commodities are imperfect substitutes. The optimal ratios of imported and 
domestic commodities are determined by the relative prices of the imported and domestic 
commodities. This is the so-called Armington ‘insight’ (Armington, 1969), which allows for product 
differentiation via the assumption of imperfect substitution (see Devarajan et al., 1994). The 
assumption has the advantage of rendering the model practical by avoiding the extreme specialisation 
and price fluctuations associated with other trade assumptions, e.g., the Salter/Swan or Australian 
model. In this model the country is assumed to be a price taker for all imported commodities. 
                                                     
22 A Stone-Geary function reduces to a Cobb-Douglas function given appropriate specification of the parameters. 
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Table A 1.2. Behavioural Relationships for the Standard Model. 
 Commodities Activities Factors Households Enterprises Government Capital RoW Total Prices 
Commodities 0 
Leontief Input-
Output Coefficients 
0 
Utility Functions (CD 
or Stone-Geary) 
Fixed in Real Terms 
Fixed in Real Terms 
and Export Taxes 
Fixed Shares of 
Savings 
Commodity 
Exports 
Commodity 
Demand 
Consumer 
Commodity 
Prices 
Prices for Exports 
Activities Domestic Production 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Activity Supply  
Factors 0 
Factor Demands 
(CES) 
0 0 0 0 0 
Factor Income 
from RoW 
Factor Income  
Households 0 0 
Fixed Shares of 
Factor Income 
Fixed shares of 
income 
Fixed Shares of 
Dividends 
Fixed (Real) Transfers 0 Remittances 
Household 
Income 
 
Enterprises 0 0 
Fixed Shares of 
Factor Income 
0 0 Fixed (Real) Transfers 0 Transfers Enterprise Income  
Government 
Tariff Revenue 
Domestic Product 
Taxes 
Indirect Taxes on 
Activities 
Fixed Shares of 
Factor Income 
Direct Taxes on 
Factor Income 
Direct Taxes on 
Household Income 
Fixed Shares of 
Dividends 
Direct Taxes on 
Enterprise Income 
0 0 Transfers 
Government 
Income 
 
Capital 0 0 Depreciation Household Savings Enterprise Savings 
Government Savings 
(Residual) 
0 
Current Account 
‘Deficit’ 
Total Savings  
Rest of 
World 
Commodity Imports 0 
Fixed Shares of 
Factor Income 
0 0 0 0 0 
Total 
‘Expenditure’ 
Abroad 
 
Total Commodity Supply Activity Input Factor Expenditure 
Household 
Expenditure 
Enterprise 
Expenditure 
Government 
Expenditure 
Total 
Investment 
Total ‘Income’ 
from Abroad 
  
 
Producer Commodity 
Prices 
Domestic and World 
Prices for Imports 
Value Added Prices         
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Domestic production uses a four-stage production process. An example-case including four water 
resources and by-products as well as three water commodities is given in Figure A 1.1. On all levels of 
the nesting structure, with the exception of the aggregation of intermediate inputs, the user is free to 
decide to apply either CES or Leontief technology (indicated respectively by the s or 0 in 
Figure A 1.1). CES technology allows the proportion of inputs used to vary with their prices, while in 
a Leontief setup the quantity shares of inputs are fixed.  
On the lowest level, different water commodities or water resources and by-products are combined to 
form a water-aggregate. Thereby water resources and by-products can be only used by activities which 
produce water commodities (water activities). Usually one water activity, e.g., desalination, pumping 
of groundwater, water reclamation, is linked to one specific water resource, e.g., seawater, 
groundwater, wastewater, and thus there is no substitution possibilities. However, as described above, 
the setup of the model allows for this option. That water commodities are moved from the 
intermediate input nest to the value added side is a special feature of this approach. This is due to the 
fact, that water commodities can be substituted by several activities, especially in irrigated agriculture. 
In this case CES-technology can be applied. In the second stage the water-composite is combined with 
land to form a land-water-aggregate and in the third stage the land-water composite is merged with 
other factors of production (labour and capital) to form a value added-water-aggregate. At the same 
level in a second arm all non-water-intermediate inputs are aggregated using Leontief technology, 
such that activities demand non-water intermediate inputs in fixed proportions relative to aggregated 
intermediate input of each activity. At the top-level aggregated intermediate inputs are combined with 
the value added-water aggregate. For activities which do not consume all inputs (e.g. no land or 
water), this four level nesting structure simply collapses to fewer levels. 
As described above, there is usually one activity linked to each water resource or by-product. Utilising 
additional inputs and production factors it converts the resource or by-product to a water commodity, 
which is then used as an input in other activities or, in case of potable water, is consumed by 
households. But one water commodity can be also produced by several activities. In the example 
depicted in Figure A 1.1 there are four natural resources and by-products from which three water 
commodities are produced, as the fresh water activity and the desalination activity both produce 
potable water. The fresh water activity produces potable water from fresh water, which can be ground- 
or surface water, while desalination requires the use of sea water as an input. Thus two activities with, 
typically, different cost structures produce an homogenous product. The basic STAGE model assumes 
that if the “same” commodity is produced by different activities it is heterogeneous – a CES aggregate. 
This variant is adjusted so that the option exists to define such commodities as homogenous. Given 
differences in costs structures it is necessary for the model to include instruments that ensure the 
supply price for the homogeneous is the same from each activity. This is achieved by adjusting the 
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activity tax (TXa) in a way to equate activity prices (PXa) of the two activities producing potable water 
(compare Figure A 1.2). 
As all water activities depend on the use of a water-resources or by-product, plus other inputs that may 
or may not include other types of water, the user has the option to define exogenously determined 
extraction rates for the different water resources. Thereby one can condition the model, so that water 
producing activities are limited to a predefined production quantity. 
In case water leakage for the distribution network plays a role, water would be an input to its own 
production; if (aggregate) water is produced with Leontief technologies the implied rate of leakage is 
fixed while if it is produced with CES technologies it implies the rate of leakage is a function of the 
price of potable water. This implies a long run scenario where the water authorities respond to changes 
in prices by “adjusting” the rate of leakage and differs from the approach suggested by Faust et al. 
(2012). 
For water consuming activities the various types of water are used according to the input structure 
contained in the database. Irrigated agricultural activities use (agricultural) land and one, or more, 
types of water. It is useful to segment these activities and commodities so as to distinguish between 
activities that can use the different types of water, e.g., to single out crops that are salt resistant and 
thus can use either brackish or potable water for irrigation or non-food crops that can be irrigated with 
reclaimed water. Generally non-agricultural activities do not use agricultural land but do use water of 
different types. In such cases the land/water aggregate collapses to the water aggregate. 
Generally the nesting structure of the model is flexible and adjusts to the usage of different water 
commodities and factors, e.g., land, by different activities. For example, for service activities (e.g. 
transportation, communication), which typically do not use marginal water (reclaimed wastewater and 
brackish water) and land, the production structure collapses to two stages, such that potable water is 
combined with labor and capital in one value added nest. 
Finally water resources that are reserved for environmental or other reasons, e.g., to guarantee a 
certain level of river flow, are not usually accorded a monetary value. Such resources are subtracted 
from the water resources available to the economy. 
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Figure A 1.1. Production System for Activities in STAGE_W. 
In general, the activities are defined as multi-product activities with the assumption that the 
proportionate combinations of commodity outputs produced by each activity/industry remain constant; 
hence for any given vector of commodities demanded there is a unique vector of activity outputs that 
must be produced; in essence this is a strong by-product assumption.23 
The vector of commodities demanded is determined by the domestic demand for domestically 
produced commodities and export demand for domestically produced commodities. Using the 
assumption of imperfect transformation between domestic demand and export demand, in the form of 
a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function, the optimal distribution of domestically 
produced commodities between the domestic and export markets is determined by the relative prices 
on the alternative markets. The model can be specified as a small country, i.e., price taker, on all 
export markets, or selected export commodities can be deemed to face downward sloping export 
demand functions, i.e., a large country assumption. 
                                                     
23 A variant of the model allows activities to modify their output mix in response to changes in the relative prices of the 
commodities produced by different activities. 
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The other behavioural relationships in the model are generally linear. A few features do however 
justify mention. First, all the tax rates are declared as variables with various adjustments and/or scaling 
factors that are declared as variables or parameters according to how the user wishes to vary tax rates. 
If a fiscal policy constraint is imposed then one or more of the sets of tax rates can be allowed to vary 
equiproportionately and/or additively to define a new vector of tax rates that is consistent with the 
fiscal constraint. Relative tax rates can also be adjusted by the settings chosen by the user. Similar 
adjustment and/or scaling factors are available for a number of key parameters, e.g., household and 
enterprise savings rates and inter-institutional transfers. Second, technology changes can be introduced 
through changes in the activity specific efficiency variables – adjustment and/or scaling factors are 
also available for the efficiency parameters. Third, the proportions of current expenditure on 
commodities defined to constitute subsistence consumption can be varied. Fourth, although a 
substantial proportion of the sub matrices relating to transfers, especially with the rest of the world, 
contain zero entries, the model allows changes in such transfers, e.g., aid transfers to the government 
from the rest of the world may be defined equal to zero in the database but they can be made positive, 
or even negative, for model simulations. And fifth, the model is set up with a range of flexible 
macroeconomic closure rules and market clearing conditions. For convenience the default closure for 
the model is a standard neoclassical model closure, e.g., full employment, savings driven investment 
and a floating exchange rate; this is the simplest option for purposes of calibration and replication. All 
these closure conditions can all be readily altered; indeed it is rare for the core simulations to be 
implemented with the default closure. 
A.1.2.2 Transaction Relationships 
The transactions relationships are laid out in Table A 1.3, which is split in two parts. The prices of 
domestically consumed (composite) commodities are defined as PQDc, and they are the same 
irrespective of which agent purchases the commodity. The quantities of commodities demanded 
domestically are divided between intermediate demand, QINTDc, and final demand, with final demand 
further subdivided between demands by households, QCDc, enterprises, QENTDc, government, QGDc, 
investment, QINVDc, and stock changes, dstocconstc. The value of total domestic demand, at purchaser 
prices, is therefore (PQDc * QQc). Consequently the decision to represent export demand, QEc, as an 
entry in the commodity row is slightly misleading, since the domestic prices of exported commodities, 
*c cPE PWE ER , do not accord with the law of one price. The representation is a space saving 
device that removes the need to include separate rows and columns for domestic and exported 
commodities.24 The price wedges between domestic and exported commodities are represented by 
export duties, TEc, that are entered into the commodity columns. Commodity supplies come from 
                                                     
24 In this model the allocation by domestic producers of commodities between domestic and export markets is made on the 
supply side; implicitly there are two supply matrices – supplies to the domestic market and supplies to the export market. 
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domestic producers who receive the common prices, PXCc, for outputs irrespective of which activity 
produces the commodity, with the total domestic production of commodities being denoted as QXCc. 
Commodity imports, QMc, are valued carriage insurance and freight (cif) paid, such that the domestic 
price of imports, PMc, is defined as the world price, PWMc, times the exchange rate, ER, plus an ad 
valorem adjustment for import duties, TMc. All domestically consumed commodities are subject to a 
variety of product taxes, sales taxes, TSc, and excise taxes, TECc. Other taxes can be readily added.25 
Domestic production activities receive average prices for their output, PXa, that are determined by the 
commodity composition of their outputs. Since activities produce multiple outputs their outputs can be 
represented as an index, QXa, formed from the commodity composition of their outputs. In addition to 
intermediate inputs, activities also purchase primary inputs, FDf,a, for which they pay average prices, 
WFf. To create greater flexibility the model allows the price of each factor to vary according to the 
activity that employs the factor. Finally each activity pays production taxes, the rates, TXa, for which 
are proportionate to the value of activity outputs. 
 
                                                     
25 Various VAT systems, fuel taxes etc., have been used. 
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Table A 1.3. Transactions Relationships for STAGE_W. 
 Commodities Activities Factors Households 
Commodities 0  *c cPQD QINTD  0  *c cPQD QCD  
Activities 
 *c cPXC QXC  
 *a aPX QX  
0 0 0 
Factors 0  ,*f f aWF FD  0 0 
Households 0 0 ,
*h f f
f
hovash YFDISP   ,hh hhh hohoconst  
Enterprises 0 0 , *e f f
f
entvash YFDISP
 
 
 
  0 
Government 
 * * *c c cTM PWM QM ER  
 * * *c c cTE PWE QE ER  
 * *c c cTS PQS QQ  
( * * )c c cTEX PQS QQ  
( * * )c c cTWAT PQS QQ  
 
 * *a a aTX PX QX  
, , ,( * * * )f a f f a f aTF WF WFDIST FD  
, ,
( *
* * 2 )
c c
c a c a
TWATA PQD
PQDDIST QWAT
 
*f f
f
govvash YFDISP
 
 
 
  
 *f fTYF YFDISP  
 *h hTYH YH  
Capital 0 0 f
f
deprec   *h hSSH YH  
Rest of World  * *c cPWM QM ER  0 *f f
f
worvash YFDISP
 
 
 
  0 
Total  *c cPQD QQ   *a aPX QX  fYF  hYH  
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Table A 1.3. (cont) Transactions Relationships for the Standard Model. 
 Enterprises Government Capital RoW Total 
Commodities  ,*c c ePQD QED   *c cPQD QGD  
 *c cPQD QINVD  
 *c cPQD dstocconst  
 * *c cPWE QE ER   *c cPQD QQ  
Activities 0 0 0 0  *a aPX QX  
Factors 0 0 0  *ffactwor ER  fYF  
Households ,h eHOENT   *hhogovconst HGADJ  0  *hhowor ER  hYH  
Enterprises 0  *entgovconst EGADJ  0  *eentwor ER  eVED  
Government  *e eTYE YE  0 0  *govwor ER  EG  
Capital  e eYE VED   YG EG  0  *CAPWOR ER  TOTSAV  
Rest of World 0 0 0 0 Total ‘Expenditure’ Abroad 
Total eYE  YG  INVEST  Total ‘Income’ from Abroad  
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The model allows for the domestic use of both domestic and foreign owned factors of production, and 
for payments by foreign activities for the use of domestically owned factors. Factor incomes therefore 
accrue from payments by domestic activities and foreign activities, factworf, where payments by 
foreign activities are assumed exogenously determined and are denominated in foreign currencies. 
After allowing for depreciation, deprecf, and the payment of factor taxes, TFf, the residual factor 
incomes, YFDISTf, are divided between domestic institutions (households, enterprises and 
government) and the rest of the world in fixed proportions. 
Households receive incomes from factor rentals and/or sales, inter household transfers, hohoconsth,h, 
transfers from enterprises, hoentconsth, and government, hogovconsth, and remittances from the rest of 
the world, howorh, where remittances are defined in terms of the foreign currency. Household 
expenditures consist of payments of direct/income taxes, TYHh, after which savings are deducted, 
where the savings rates, SHHh, are fixed exogenously in the base configuration of the model. The 
residual household income is then divided between inter household transfers and consumption 
expenditures, with the pattern of consumption expenditures determined by the household utility 
functions. 
The enterprise account receives income from factor sales, primarily in the form of retained profits,26 
transfers from government, entgovconste, and foreign currency denominated transfers from the rest of 
the world, entwore. Expenditures then consist of the payment of direct/income taxes, TYEe, 
consumption, which is assumed fixed in real terms,27 and savings, which are defined as a residual, i.e., 
the difference between income, YEe, and committed expenditure, VEDe. There is an analogous 
treatment of government savings, i.e., the internal balance, which is defined as the difference 
(residual) between government income, YG, and committed government expenditure, EG. In the 
absence of a clearly definable set of behavioural relationships for the determination of government 
consumption expenditure, the quantities of commodities consumed by the government are fixed in real 
terms, and hence government consumption expenditure will vary with commodity prices.28 Transfers 
by the government to other domestic institutions are fixed in nominal terms, although there is a facility 
to allow them to vary, e.g., with consumer prices. On the other hand government incomes can vary 
widely. Incomes accrue from the various tax instruments (import and export duties, sales, production 
and factor taxes, and direct taxes), that can all vary due to changes in the values of production, trade 
and consumption. The government also receives foreign currency denominated transfers from the rest 
of the world, govwor, e.g., aid transfers. 
                                                     
26 Hence the model contains the implicit presumption that the proportions of profits retained by incorporated enterprises are 
constant. 
27 Hence consumption expenditure is defined as the fixed volume of consumption, QEDc,e, times the variable prices. It 
requires only a simple adjustment to the closure rules to fix consumption expenditures. Without a utility function, or 
equivalent, for enterprises it is not possible to define the quantities consumed as the result of an optimisation problem. 
28 The closure rules allow for the fixing of government consumption expenditure rather than real consumption. 
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Domestic investment demand consists of fixed capital formation, QINVDc, and stock changes, 
dstocconstc. The comparative static nature of the model and the absence of a capital composition 
matrix underpin the assumption that the commodity composition of fixed capital formation is fixed, 
while a lack of information means that stock changes are assumed invariant. However the value of 
fixed capital formation will vary with commodity prices while the volume of fixed capital formation 
can vary both as a consequence of the volume of savings changing or changes in exogenously 
determined parameters. In the base version of the model domestic savings are made up of savings by 
households, enterprises, the government (internal balance) and foreign savings, i.e., the balance on the 
capital account or external balance, CAPWOR. The various closure rules available within the model 
allow for different assumptions about the determination of domestic savings, e.g., flexible versus fixed 
savings rates for households, and value of ‘foreign’ savings, e.g., a flexible or fixed exchange rate. 
Incomes to the rest of the world account, i.e., expenditures by the domestic economy in the rest of the 
world, consist of the values of imported commodities and factor services. On the other hand 
expenditures by the rest of the world account, i.e., incomes to the domestic economy from the rest of 
the world, consist of the values of exported commodities and NET transfers by institutional accounts. 
All these transactions are subject to transformation by the exchange rate. In the base model the balance 
on the capital account is fixed at some target value, denominated in foreign currency terms, e.g., at a 
level deemed equal and opposite to a sustainable deficit on the current account, and the exchange rate 
is variable. This assumption can be reversed, where appropriate, in the model closure. 
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Figure A 1.2. Price Relationships for the STAGE Model. 
Figures A 1.2 and A 1.3 provide further detail on the interrelationships between the prices and 
quantities for commodities and activities. The supply prices of the composite commodities (PQSc) are 
defined as the weighted averages of the domestically produced commodities that are consumed 
domestically (PDc) and the domestic prices of imported commodities (PMc), which are defined as the 
products of the world prices of commodities (PWMc) and the exchange rate (ER) uplifted by ad 
valorem import duties (TMc). These weights are updated in the model through first order conditions for 
optima. The average prices exclude sales taxes, and hence must be uplifted by (ad valorem) sales taxes 
(TSc) and excise taxes (TEXc) to reflect the composite consumer price (PQDc). The producer prices of 
commodities (PXCc) are similarly defined as the weighted averages of the prices received for 
domestically produced commodities sold on domestic (PDc) and export (PEc) markets. These weights 
PQSc = 1
PMc = 1
PWMc * ER
TMc
c
PQDc
TSc
TEXc
PXCc = 1
PEc = 1
c
PXa1 PXa2
ac
TXa
PDc = 1
PWEc * ER
TEa
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are updated in the model through first order conditions for optima. The prices received on the export 
market are defined as the products of the world price of exports (PWEc) and the exchange rate (ER) 
less any exports duties due, which are defined by ad valorem export duty rates (TEc). 
The average price per unit of output received by an activity (PXa) is defined as the weighted average 
of the domestic producer prices, where the weights are constant. After paying 
indirect/production/output taxes (TXa), this is divided between payments to aggregate value added 
(PVAa), i.e., the amount available to pay primary inputs, and aggregate intermediate inputs (PINTa). 
Total payments for intermediate inputs per unit of aggregate intermediate input are defined as the 
weighted sums of the prices of the inputs (PQDc) (Figure A 1.5). 
 
Figure A 1.3. Quantity Relationships for the STAGE Model. 
Total demands for the composite commodities (QQc) consist of demands for intermediate inputs 
(QINTDc), consumption by households (QCDc), enterprises (QENTDc), and government (QGDc), gross 
fixed capital formation (QINVDc), and stock changes (dstocconstc). Supplies from domestic producers 
(QDc) plus imports (QMc) meet these demands; equilibrium conditions ensure that the total supplies 
and demands for all composite commodities equate. Commodities are delivered to both the domestic 
QDc
QQc
QXCc
QMc
QINVDc + 
dstocconstc
QGDc
QCDc
QINTDc
QEDc
QXACa1,c
QEc
c
c
QXACa2,c
ac
QXACa2,c2
QXa2
0
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(QDc) and export (QEc) markets subject to equilibrium conditions that require all domestic commodity 
production (QXCc) to be either domestically consumed or exported. 
The presence of multiple product activities means that domestically produced commodities can come 
from multiple activities, i.e., the total production of a commodity is defined as the sum of the amount 
of that commodity produced by each activity. Hence the domestic production of a commodity (QXCc) 
is a CES aggregate of the quantities of that commodity produced by a number of different activities 
(QXACa,c), which are produced by each activity in activity specific fixed proportions, i.e., the output of 
QXACa,c is a Leontief (fixed proportions) aggregate of the output of each activity (QXa). 
QXa
QINTa QVAa
FDl,aFDk,a
0
ioqtdqdc1,a
*QINTa
0 or 1
ioqtdqdc2,a
*QINTa
0 or 3
FDn,a
QWAT2c1,a QWAT2c2,a FDfw1,a FDfw2,a
0 
or 41
QNWa
0 or 2
QWATa
0 
or 42
 
Figure A 1.4. Production Relationships for the STAGE_W Model: Quantities. 
Production relationships by activities are defined by a series of nested CES/Leontief production 
functions29. The illustration in Figure A 1.4 shows the general four-level production structure, which 
holds for all activities. It is simplified, as it is based on a reduced number of inputs on most nests; 
however the model is flexible to include any number of inputs on all levels. 
                                                     
29 Peroni and Rutherford (1995) demonstrate that nested CES function can approximate any flexible functional form, e.g., 
translog. (Perroni, C. and Rutherford, T. F.; (1995). ‘Regular Flexibility of Nested CES Functions’, European Economic 
Review, Vol 39 (2), pp. 335-43.) 
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On the lowest level water activities use either their respective water resource or by-product (FDfw,a) 
whereas other activities utilize water commodities (QWAT2c,a). Both types of activities aggregate the 
respective inputs to QWATa. On the next level the water composit is grouped with land (FDn,a) to form 
a land-water aggregate (QNWa). This in turn is combined with other factors of production (e.g. capital 
FDk,a and labour FDl,a) to compose value added (QVAa). On the same level in a second nest non-water 
intermediate inputs are aggregated in fixed shares (Leontief technology) to form intermediate input 
(QINTa). Finally, on the highest level QVAa and QINTa are combined to form activity output QXa. 
For water activities, in the basic case however, each activity is linked to one specific resource and land 
requirements do not play a role in the provision of water. In this case, QNWa equals FDfw,a and thus the 
production structure collapses to a two level nest 30. If it is desired to keep the production structure 
fixed, as most water providing facilities are build in a certain setup and produce for decades without 
many options to alter the production structure to a large extend, Leontief technology can be applied for 
water activities on all levels. This also guarantees that the water resource cannot be substituted by 
other inputs such that the quantity of water resource use directly determines the output of water 
commodity by the water activity. However, the model allows for a shift to CES-technology, by setting 
an elasticity, if required. 
Water consuming activities, on the other side, usually allow for the substitution of water commodities 
and other factors of production, such that in the default setup on all levels CES technology is applied 
(σ1 - σ4). The optimal combinations of inputs in each CES aggregate are determined by first order 
conditions based on relative prices. The only exception is the aggregation of non-water intermediate 
inputs (QINTa), for which Leontief technology is applied. 
The advantage of using such a nesting structure is that it avoids making the assumption that all inputs 
are equally substitutable in the generation of value added. For activities which do not consume any 
land and/or water commodities, the nesting structure simply collapses to fewer levels. 
  
                                                     
30 Possible exceptions to this are the provision of potable water with a certain mineral level by mixing desalinated seawater 
(with zero mineral content) with purified freshwater. In the reclamation of wastewater land can play a role, if sewage farms 
are used. 
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Figure A 1.5. Production Relationships for the STAGE_W Model: Prices. 
The price relations for the production system are illustrated in Figure A 1.5. Note how the prices paid 
for intermediate inputs and water commodities (PQDc) are the same as paid for final demands, i.e., a 
‘law’ of one price relationship holds across all domestic demand. Note also that factor prices are factor 
and activity specific (WFf,a), which means that the allocation of finite supplies of factors (FSf) between 
competing activities depends upon relative factor prices via first order conditions for optima. 
A.1.3 Algebraic Statement of the Model 
A.1.3.1 Sets 
The model uses a series of sets, each of which is required to be declared and have members assigned. 
For the majority of the sets the declaration and assignment takes place simultaneously in a single block 
of code.31 However, the assignment for a number of the sets, specifically those used to control the 
                                                     
31 For practical purposes it is often easiest if this block of code is contained in a separate file that is then called up from 
within the *.gms file.  
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modelling of trade relationships is carried out dynamically by reference to the data used to calibrate 
the model. The following are the basic sets for this model: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
commodities
activities
factors
households
government
enterprises
investment
rest of the world
c
a
f
h
g
e
i
w








 
For each set there is an alias declared that has the same membership as the corresponding basic set. 
The notation used involves the addition of a ‘p’ suffix to the set label, e.g., the alias for c is cp. 
For practical/programming purposes these basic sets are declared and assigned as subsets of a global 
set, sac, 
 , , , , , , , ,sac c a f h g e i w total
. 
All the dynamic sets relate to the modelling of the commodity and activity accounts and therefore are 
subsets of the sets c and a. The subsets are: 
 
 
 
 
 
export commodities
non-export commodities
export commodities with export demand functions
export commodities without export demand functions
imported commodities
non-imported c
c
c
c
c
c
c
ce
cen
ced
cedn
cm
cmn





  
 
 
 
ommodities
commodities produced domestically
commodities NOT produced domestically AND imported
commodities produced AND demanded domestically
commodities NOT produced AND demanded domes
c
c
c
c
cx
cxn
cd
cdn



  tically
 
and members are assigned using the data used for calibration. Additionally there are some sets, 
referring to commodities and activities, which are used to control the behavioural equations 
implemented in specific cases. These are: 
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 
 
 
differentiated commodities produced domestically
UNdifferentiated commodities produced domestically
water-commodities,which enter on the value added side of the production function
c
c
c
cxac
cxacn
cwat
cnw



 
 
 
non-water-commodities,which enter on the intermediate side of the production function
activities with CES aggregation at Level 1
activities with Leontief aggregation at Level 1
activi
c
a
a
a
at
aqx
aqxn
afx



  
 
 
ties with CES aggregation at value added side of Level 2
activities with Leontief aggregation at value added side of Level 2
3 activities with CES aggregation at Level 3
3 activities with 
a
a
a
afxn
af x
af xn


  
 
 
Leontief aggregation at Level 3
4 activities with CES aggregation at Level 4
4 activities with Leontief aggregation at Level 4
a
a
af x
af xn


 
and their memberships are set during the model calibration phase. 
Finally a set is declared and assigned for a macro SAM that is used to check model calibration. This 
set and its members are: 
 , , , , , , , ,ss commdty activity valuad hholds entp govtn kapital world totals
. 
A.1.3.2 Reserved Names 
The model also uses a number of names that are reserved, in addition to those specified in the set 
statements detailed above. The majority of these reserved names are components of the government 
set; they are reserved to ease the modelling of tax instruments. The required members of the 
government set, with their descriptions, are: 
Import Taxes
Export Taxes
Sales Taxes
Excise Taxes
Indirect Taxes
Factor Taxes
Direct Taxes
Water Taxes
Water User Subsidies
Government
IMPTAX
EXPTAX
SALTAX
ECTAX
INDTAX
g
FACTTAX
DIRTAX
WATTAX
WATAXA
GOVT







 

















 
 
 
. 
The other reserved names are for the factor account and for the capital accounts. For simplicity the 
factor account relating to residual payments to factors has the reserved name of GOS (gross operating 
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surplus); in many SAMs this account would include payments to the factors of production land and 
physical capital, payments labelled mixed income and payments for entrepreneurial services. Where 
the factor accounts are fully articulated GOS would refer to payments to the residual factor, typically 
physical capital and entrepreneurial services. 
The capital account includes provision for two expenditure accounts relating to investment. All 
expenditures on stock changes are registered in the account dstoc, while all investment expenditures 
are registered to the account kap. All incomes to the capital account accrue to the kap account and 
stock changes are funded by an expenditure levied on the kap account to the dstoc account. 
A.1.3.3 Conventions 
The equations for the model are set out in eleven ‘blocks’; which group the equations under the 
following headings ‘trade’, ‘commodity price’, ‘numéraire’, ‘production’, ‘factor’, ‘household’, 
‘enterprise’, ‘government’, ‘kapital’, ‘foreign institutions’ and ‘market clearing’. This grouping of 
equations is intended to ease the reading of the model rather than being a requirement of the model; it 
also reflects the modular structure that underlies the programme and which is designed to simplify 
model extensions/developments. 
A series of conventions are adopted for the naming of variables and parameters. These conventions are 
not a requirement of the modelling language; rather they are designed to ease reading of the model. 
 All VARIABLES are in upper case. 
 Standard prefixes for variable names are: P for price variables, Q for quantity variables, E for 
expenditure variables, Y for income variables, and V for value variables 
 All variables have a matching parameter that identifies the value of the variable in the base period. 
These parameters are in upper case and carry a ‘0’ suffix, and are used to initialise variables. 
 A series of variables are declared that allow for the equiproportionate adjustment of groups of 
parameters. These variables are named using the convention **ADJ, where ** is the 
variable/parameter series they adjust. 
 All parameters are in lower case, except those used to initialise variables. 
 Names for parameters in CES/CET functions use standard prefixes – **  for all elasticity 
parameters, ac** and **  for commodity CES shift and share parameters, ad** and **  for 
activity CES shift and share parameters and at** and **  for CET shift and share parameters; 
 Other parameter names with prefixes or suffix which distinguishes their definition, e.g., io** is a 
quantity coefficient, **sh is a value share parameter, **av is an average and **const is a constant 
parameter, as far as possible the ** part of the name seeks to identify the component parts; 
 The names for all parameters and variables are kept short. 
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A.1.3.4 Trade Block Equations 
Trade relationships are modelled using the Armington assumption of imperfect substitutability 
between domestic and foreign commodities. The set of eleven equations are split across two sub-
blocks – exports and imports - and provide a general structure that accommodates most eventualities 
found with single country CGE models. In particular these equations allow for traded and non-traded 
commodities while simultaneously accommodating commodities that are produced or not produced 
domestically and are consumed or not consumed domestically and allowing a relaxation of the small 
country assumption of price taking for exports. 
A.1.3.4.1 Exports Block 
The domestic price of exports (E1) is defined as the product of the world price of exports (PWE), the 
exchange rate (ER) and one minus the export tax rate32 and are only implemented for members of the 
set c that are exported, i.e., for members of the subset ce. The world price of imports and exports are 
declared as variables to allow relaxation of the small country assumption, and are then fixed as 
appropriate in the model closure block. 
Export Block Equations 
 * * 1c c cPE PWE ER TE ce    (E1) 
  
1
* * 1 *   ANDc c c
t t t
c c c c c cQXC at QE QD ce cd
      
 (E2) 
   
1
11
*   AND
ct
cc c
c c c
QE PE
ce cd
QD PD


 
  
  . (E3) 
         c c cQXC QD QE cen cd ce cdn   ΑΝD  OR ΑΝD  (E4) 
*
c
c
c c
c
PWE
QE econ ced
pwse

 
  
   (E5) 
 
The output transformation functions (E2), and the associated first-order conditions (E3), establish the 
optimum allocation of domestic commodity output (QXC) between domestic demand (QD) and 
exports (QE), by way of Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) functions, with commodity 
specific share parameters (), elasticity parameters ( t ) and shift/efficiency parameters (at). The first 
order conditions define the optimum ratios of exports to domestic demand in relation to the relative 
                                                     
32 ALL tax rates are expressed as variables. How the tax rate variables are modeled is explained below. 
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prices of exported (PE) and domestically supplied (PD) commodities. But (E2) is only defined for 
commodities that are both produced and demanded domestically (cd) and exported (ce). Thus, 
although this condition might be satisfied for the majority of commodities, it is also necessary to cover 
those cases where commodities are produced and demanded domestically but not exported, and those 
cases where commodities are produced domestically and exported but not demanded domestically. 
If commodities are produced domestically but not exported, then domestic demand for domestically 
produced commodities (QD) is, by definition (E4), equal to domestic commodity production (QXC), 
where the sets cen (commodities not exported) and cd (commodities produced and demanded 
domestically) control implementation. On the other hand if commodities are produced domestically 
but not demanded by the domestic output, then domestic commodity production (QXC) is, by 
definition (E4), equal to commodity exports (QE), where the sets ce (commodities exported) and cdn 
(commodities not produced or not demanded domestically) control implementation. 
The equations E1 to E4 are sufficient for a general model of export relationships when combined with 
the small country assumption of price taking on all export markets. However, it may be appropriate to 
relax this assumption in some instances, most typically in cases where a country is a major supplier of 
a commodity to the world market, in which case it may be reasonable to expect that as exports of that 
commodity increase so the export price (PE) of that commodity might be expected to decline, i.e., the 
country faces a downward sloping export demand curve. The inclusion of export demand equations 
(E5) accommodates this feature, where export demands are defined by constant elasticity export 
demand functions, with constants (econ), elasticities of demand ( ) and prices for substitutes on the 
world market (pwse). 
A.1.3.4.2 Imports Block 
The domestic price of competitive imports (M1) is the product of the world price of imports (PWM), 
the exchange rate (ER) and one plus the import tariff rate (TM). These equations are only implemented 
for members of the set c that are imported, i.e., for members of the subset cm. 
The domestic supply equations are modelled using Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions 
and associated first order conditions to determine the optimum combination of supplies from domestic 
and foreign (import) producers. The domestic supplies of the composite commodities (QQ) are defined 
as CES aggregates (M2) of domestic production supplied to the domestic market (QD) and imports 
(QM), where aggregation is controlled by the share parameters (), the elasticity of substitution 
parameters (  ) and the shift/efficiency parameters (ac). The first order conditions (M3) define the 
optimum ratios of imports to domestic demand in relation to the relative prices of imported (PM) and 
domestically supplied (PDD) commodities. But (M2) is only defined for commodities that are both 
produced domestically (cx) and imported (cm). Although this condition might be satisfied for the 
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majority of commodities, it is also necessary to cover those cases where commodities are produced but 
not imported, and those cases where commodities are not produced domestically and are imported. 
Import Block Equations  
 * * 1c c cPM PWM ER TM cm    (M1) 
  
1
1   ANDc c cc c c c c cQQ ac QM QD cm cx
   

    
 (M2) 
 
 
1
1
*   
1
AND
c
c c c
c c c
QM PD
cm cx
QD PM


 
  
   (M3) 
         c c cQQ QD QM cmn cx cm cxn   ΑΝD OR ΑΝD  (M4) 
 
If commodities are produced domestically but not imported, then domestic supply of domestically 
produced commodities (QD) is, by definition (M4), equal to domestic commodity demand (QQ), 
where the sets cmn (commodities not imported) and cx (commodities produced domestically) control 
implementation. On the other hand if commodities are not produced domestically but are demanded 
on the domestic market, then commodity supply (QQ) is, by definition (M4), equal to commodity 
imports (QM), where the sets cm (commodities imported) and cxn (commodities not produced 
domestically) control implementation. 
A.1.3.5 Commodity Price Block 
The supply prices for commodities (P1) are defined as the volume share weighted sums of expenditure 
on domestically produced (QD) and imported (QM) commodities. These conditions derive from the 
first order conditions for the quantity equations for the composite commodities (QQ) above.33 This 
equation is implemented for all commodities that are imported (cm) and for all commodities that are 
produced and consumed domestically (cd). Similarly, domestically produced commodities (QXC) are 
supplied to either or both the domestic and foreign markets (exported). The supply prices of 
domestically produced commodities (PXC) are defined as the volume share weighted sums of 
expenditure on domestically produced and exported (QE) commodities (P2). These conditions derive 
from the first order conditions for the quantity equations for the composite commodities (QXC) 
below.34 This equation is implemented for all commodities that are produced domestically (cx), with a 
control to only include terms for exported commodities when there are exports (ce). 
  
                                                     
33 Using the properties of linearly homogenous functions defined by reference to Eulers theorem. 
34 Using the properties of linearly homogenous functions defined by reference to Eulers theorem. 
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Commodity Price Block Equations  
* *
  c c c cc
c
PD QD PM QM
PQS cd cm
QQ

  OR
 (P1) 
 * * $c c c c c
c
c
PD QD PE QE ce
PXC cx
QXC

 
 (P2) 
 * 1c c c cPQD PQS TS TEX +  (P3) 
 
Domestic agents consume composite consumption commodities (QQ) that are aggregates of 
domestically produced and imported commodities. The prices of these composite commodities (PQD) 
are defined (P3) as the supply prices of the composite commodities plus ad valorem sales taxes (TS) 
and excise taxes (TEX). It is relatively straightforward to include additional commodity taxes. 
A.1.3.6 Numéraire Price Block 
The price block is completed by two price indices that can be used for price normalisation. Equation 
(N1) is for the consumer price index (CPI), which is defined as a weighted sum of composite 
commodity prices (PQD) in the current period, where the weights are the shares of each commodity in 
total demand (comtotsh). The domestic producer price index (PPI) is defined (N2) by reference to the 
supply prices for domestically produced commodities (PD) with weights defined as shares of the value 
of domestic output for the domestic market (vddtotsh). 
Numéraire Block Equations  
*c c
c
CPI comtotsh PQD 
 (N1) 
*c c
c
PPI vddtotsh PD 
 (N2) 
 
A.1.3.7 Production Block 
A.1.3.7.1 Top level 
The supply prices of domestically produced commodities are determined by purchaser prices of those 
commodities on the domestic and international markets. Adopting the assumption that domestic 
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activities produce commodities in fixed proportions (ioqxacqx), the proportions provide a mapping 
(X1) between the supply prices of commodities and the (weighted) average activity prices (PX).35 
In this model a four-stage production process is adopted, with the top level as a CES or Leontief 
function. If a CES is imposed for an activity the value of activity output can be expressed as the 
volume share weighted sums of the expenditures on inputs after allowing for the production taxes 
(TX), which are assumed to be applied ad valorem (X2). This requires the definition of aggregate 
prices for non-water intermediates (PINT); these are defined as the intermediate input-output 
coefficient weighted sum of the prices of non-water intermediate inputs (PQD), see (X3), whereby 
ioqtdqd are the intermediate input-output coefficients). A condition (c$cnwat) is imposed in the 
summation to guarantee, that only non-water commodities are included.  
With CES technology the output by an activity, (QX) is determined by the aggregate quantities of 
factors used (QVA), i.e., aggregate value added, and aggregate intermediates used (QINT), where 
x is 
the share parameter, 
cx  is the substitution parameter and ADX  is the efficiency variable (X5). Note 
how the efficiency/shift factor is defined as a variable and an adjustment mechanism is provided (X4), 
where adxb is the base value, dabadx is an absolute change in the base value, ADXADJ is an 
equiproportionate (multiplicative) adjustment factor, DADX is an additive adjustment factor and adx01 
is a vector of zeros and non zeros used to scale the additive adjustment factor. The operation of this 
type of adjustment equation is explained below for the case of an import duty. The associated first 
order conditions defining the optimum ratios of value added to intermediate inputs can be expressed in 
terms of the relative prices of value added (PVA) and intermediate inputs (PINT), see (X6). 
Production Block Equations: Top Level  
, ,*a a c a c
c
PX ioqxacqx PXAC 
 (X1) 
     * 1 * * *a a a a a a aPX TX QX PVA QVA PINT QINT    (X2) 
 ,
$
*
c
a c a c
c cnwat
PINT ioqtdqd PQD 
 (X3) 
   * * 01Xa a a aAD adxb dabadx ADXADJ DADX adx      (X4) 
  
1
* 1 *
cx cx cx
a a a
X x x
a a a a a a aQX AD QVA QINT aqx
   

    
 (X5) 
                                                     
35 In the special case of each activity producing only one commodity and each commodity only being produced by a single 
activity, which is the case in the reduced form model reported in Dervis et al., (1982), then the aggregation weights ioqxacqx 
correspond to an identity matrix. 
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 
 
1
1
*
1
cx
ax
a a a
ax
a a a
QVA PINT
aqx
QINT PVA


 
  
    (X6) 
*a a a aQVA ioqvaqx QX aqxn   (X7a) 
*a a a aQINT ioqintqx QX aqxn   (X7b) 
 
With Leontief technology at the top level the aggregate quantities of factors used (QVA), i.e., 
aggregate value added, and intermediates used (QINT), are determined by simple aggregation 
functions, (X7a) and (X7b), where ioqvaqx and ioqintqx are the (fixed) volume shares of QVA and 
QINT (respectively) in QX. The choice of top level aggregation function is controlled by the 
membership of the set aqx, with the membership of aqxn being the complement of aqx. 
A.1.3.7.2 Second level 
There are two arms to the second level production nest. For aggregate value added (QVA) the 
production function can be a multi-factor CES function. For activities with CES setup on the second 
level (afx) (X9) QVA is based on the sum of consumed factors (FD) multiplied by the activity specific 
factor use efficiency (ADFD).Thereby
va is a share parameter, va  is a substitution parameter and 
aADVA  is an efficiency factor. Again the efficiency/shift factor is defined as a variable with an 
adjustment mechanism (X8), where advab is the base values, dabadva is an absolute change in the 
base value, ADVAADJ is an equiproportionate (multiplicative) adjustment factor, DADVA is an 
additive adjustment factor and adva01 is a vector of zeros and non zeros used to scale the additive 
adjustment factor. For activities which are consuming water and/or land (conditioned by $ " "
va
cnw ) the 
production function is expanded by an additional term for the land-water-composite (QNW) multiplied 
by its share parameter " "
va
cnw .  
The associated first order conditions for profit maximisation determine the wage rate of factors (WF) 
(X10) and, for those activities it applies to, the price of the land-water aggregate (PNW) (X11). 
Thereby the ratio of factor payments to factor f from activity a (WFDIST) is included to allow for non-
homogenous factors, and is derived directly from the first order condition for profit maximisation as 
equality between the wage rates for each factor in each activity and the values of the marginal 
products of those factors in each activity. For activities with Leontief production technology on the 
second level (afxn), factor and aggregated land-water quantities (FD and QNW) as well as the price of 
value added (PVA) are determined by simple aggregation functions (X12 to X14) with the help of 
share parameters io**.  
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On the second arm of the second level production nest (X15) intermediate input demand (QINTD) is 
defined as the product of the fixed (Leontief) input coefficients of demand for commodity c by activity 
a (ioqtdqd), multiplied by the quantity of activity intermediate input (QINT) to which the consumption 
of water commodities by activities (QWAT2) is added. 
Production Block Equations: Second Level  
   * * 01VAa a a aAD advab dabadva ADVAADJ DADVA adva      (X8) 
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f p a
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a a a
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f p a f p a f p a cnw a a
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AD FD QNW
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 


 
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 
 

 
 
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
  (X11) 
2, 2, 2,* *
FD
f a f a f a a aFD AD ioffqva QVA afxn   (X12) 
*a a a a
cwat
QNW ioqnwqva QVA afxn 
 (X13) 
2, 2 2, 2,
2
* * * *(1 )a a a f a f f a f a a
f
PVA PNW ioqnwqva ioffqva WF WFDIST TF afxn   
 (X14) 
, ,* 2c c a a c a
a a
QINTD ioqtdqd QINT QWAT  
 (X15) 
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A.1.3.7.3 Third level 
On the third level land enters the production function. Equation X16 is a CES production function 
forming the land-water aggregate (QNW). It holds for all activities which use land (an) and which 
allow for the substitution (af3x) between the water aggregate and land. It is structurally similar to 
equation X9 on level 2 36 and so are the first order conditions for the prices of land (X17) and water-
aggregate (X18), which resemble equations X10 and X11. For activities which do not consume water, 
the water term in equations X16 and X17 as well as equation X18 are dropped (conditioned by 
" ",$
nw
cwat a  ). 
Equations X19 to X21 represent the case of no substitution (Leontief production technology) (af3xn). 
Thereby equation X19 and X20 calculate factor and aggregated water demand quantities (FD and 
QWAT) as shares of QNW and X21 sums factor and aggregate water prices proportionally to form 
PNW.  
For activities, which do not consume land (ann) iocwatqnw is 1 and iof3qnw is 0. This guarantees that 
quantity and price of the aggregate (QNW and PNW) are equal to the quantity and price of the water 
aggregate (QWAT and PWAT) (X20 and X21). 
Production Block Equations: Third Level 
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3, 3, 3,* 3 * 3
FD
f a f a f a a aFD AD iof qnw QNW af xn   (X19) 
                                                     
36 The only exception is the shift parameter (atnw) which is not an endogenous variable in this case. This reflects the 
expectation that there will be no endogenously determined changes in this shift factor. 
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* 3   ORa a a a aQWAT iocwatqnw QNW af xn ann   (X20) 
3, 3 3, 3,
3
*
3 * * *(1 ) 3   OR
a a a
f a f f a f a a a
f
PNW PWAT iocwatqnw
iof qnw WF WFDIST TF af xn ann

  
 (X21) 
 
A.1.3.7.4 Fourth Level 
The lowest level of the production nest aggregates water commodities and water factors again for the 
two cases of CES (af4x) and Leontief (af4xn) production technology.  
For activities with CES technology and which use water commodities or factors the production 
function is X22, with the first order conditions X23 for water factor prices and X24 for water 
commodity prices, analogous to X16 to X18 in the third nest. As the water commodity price (PQD) is 
defined over the set cwat only, the price ratio (PQDDIST) is included in X24 to allow for price 
discrimination for payments to water commodity cwat from activity a, similar to (WFDIST) on the 
factor price side. 
In case Leontief technology is assumed equation X25 to X27 are applied. Thereby X25 holds for 
activities which consume water commodities (acwat) and X26 is applied for activities which use water 
factors (afwat). In both cases quantities of water commodities (QWAT2) or factors (FD) are simple 
shares of the water aggregate (QWAT). Also the price of the water aggregate is formed by a 
summation of the weighted shares of water commodity and/or factor input prices, including tax rates 
(TWATA and TF, respectively) (X27).  
If additional levels of nesting are required then it is only necessary to add additional primal and first-
order conditions that will have the same structures as for the third and fourth level nests but with 
appropriately revised set identifiers.37 
Also the allocation of production factors on the various nesting levels can be varied. Currently this is 
done in an Excel workbook that contains the sets and data used to calibrate the model. 
  
                                                     
37 The only tricky parts are the derivation of the set mappings and the extensions to the code for calibrating the parameters. 
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Production Block Equations: Fourth Level 
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A.1.3.7.5 Commodity Outputs 
Equation X28 aggregates the commodity outputs by each activity (QXAC) to form the composite 
supplies of each commodity (QXC). The default assumption is that when a commodity is produced by 
multiple activities it is differentiated by reference to the activity that produces the commodity; this is 
achieved by defining total production of a commodity as a CES aggregate of the quantities produced 
by each activity. This provides a practical/modelling solution for two typical situations; first, where 
there are quality differences between two commodities that are notionally the same, e.g., modern 
digital vv disposable cameras, and second, where the mix of commodities within an aggregate differ 
between activities, e.g., a cereal grain aggregate made up of wheat and maize (corn) where different 
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activities produce wheat and maize in different ratios. This assumption of imperfect substitution is 
implemented by a CES aggregator function with 
xcad  as the shift parameter, xc  as the share 
parameter and 
xc  as the elasticity parameter. 
The matching first order condition for the optimal combination of commodity outputs is therefore 
given by (X29), where PXAC are the prices of each commodity produced by each activity. Note how, 
as with the case of the value added production function two formulations are given for the first-order 
conditions and the second version is the default version used in the model. Further note that the 
efficiency/shift factor is in this case declare as a parameter; this reflects the expectation that there will 
be no endogenously determined changes in these shift factors. 
Production Block Equations: Commodity Outputs 
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,   ANDc a c c c
a
QXC QXAC cx cxacn 
 (X30) 
,a c cPXAC PXC cxacn  . (X31) 
, , *a c a c aQXAC ioqxacqx QX  (X32) 
 
However there are circumstances where perfect substitution may be a more appropriate assumption 
given the characteristics of either or both of the activity and commodity accounts. Thus an alternative 
specification for commodity aggregation is proved where commodities produced by different activities 
are modelled as perfect substitutes, (X30), and the matching price condition therefore requires that 
PXAC is equal to PXC for relevant commodity activity combinations (X31). The choice of aggregation 
function is controlled by the membership of the set cxac, with the membership of cxacn being the 
complement of cxac. 
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Finally the output to commodity supplies, where the ‘weights’ (ioqxacqx) identify the amount of each 
commodity produced per unit of output of each activity (X32). This equation not only captures the 
patterns of secondary production it also provides the market clearing conditions for equality between 
the supply and demand of domestic output. 
A.1.3.8 Factor Block 
There are two sources of income for factors. First there are payments to factor accounts for services 
supplied to activities, i.e., domestic value added, and second there are payments to domestic factors 
that are used overseas, the value of these are assumed fixed in terms of the foreign currency. Factor 
incomes (YF) are therefore defined as the sum of all income to the factors across all activities (F1). 
Factor Block Equations  
 , ,* * *f f f a f a f
a
YF WF WFDIST FD factwor ER
 
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 
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 (F1) 
    * 1 * 1f f f fYFDISP YF deprec TYF  
 (F2) 
 
Before distributing factor incomes to the institutions that supply factor services allowance is made for 
depreciation rates (deprec) and factor (income) taxes (TYF) so that factor income for distribution 
(YFDISP) is defined (F2). 
A.1.3.9 Household Block 
A.1.3.9.1 Household Income 
Households receive income from a variety of sources (H1). Factor incomes are distributed to 
households as fixed proportions (hovash) of the distributed factor income for all factors owned by the 
household, plus inter household transfers (HOHO), distributed payments/dividends from incorporated 
enterprises (HOENT) and real transfers from government (hogovconst) that are adjustable using a 
scaling factor (HGADJ) and transfers from the rest of the world (howor) converted into domestic 
currency units. 
A.1.3.9.2 Household Expenditure 
Inter household transfers (HOHO) are defined (H2) as a fixed proportions of household income (YH) 
after payment of direct taxes and savings, and then household consumption expenditure (HEXP) is 
defined as household income after tax income less savings and transfers to other households (H3). 
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Households are then assumed to maximise utility subject to Stone-Geary utility functions. In a Stone-
Geary utility function household consumption demand consists of two components; ‘subsistence’ 
demand (qcdconst) and ‘discretionary’ demand, and the equation must therefore capture both 
elements. This can be written as (H4) where discretionary demand is defined as the marginal budget 
shares (beta) spent on each commodity out of ‘uncommitted’ income, i.e., household consumption 
expenditure less total expenditure on ‘subsistence’ demand. If the user wants to use Cobb-Douglas 
utility function this can be achieved by setting the Frisch parameters equal to minus one and all the 
income elasticities of demand equal to one (the model code includes documentation of the calibration 
steps). 
A.1.3.10 Enterprise Block 
A.1.3.10.1 Enterprise Income 
Similarly, income to enterprises (EN1) comes from the share of distributed factor incomes accruing to 
enterprises (entvash) and real transfers from government (entgovconst), which are adjustable using a 
scaling factor (EGADJ) and the rest of the world (entwor); all converted in to domestic currency units. 
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Enterprise Block Equations  
   
, *
* * *
e e f f
f
e e
YE entvash YFDISP
entgovconst EGADJ CPI entwor ER
 
  
 
 

 (EN1) 
, , *c e c eQED qedconst QEADJ  (EN2) 
    
 , , ,
* 1 * 1
*
*
e e e
h e h e
c e c
c
YE TYE SEN
HOENT hoentsh
QED PQD
  
 
  
 

 (EN3) 
    
 
* 1 * 1
*
*
e e e
e e
c c
c
YE TYE SEN
GOVENT goventsh
QED PQD
  
 
 
 

 (EN4) 
, *e c e c
c
VED QED PQD
 
  
 

 (EN5) 
 
A.1.3.10.2 Enterprise Expenditure 
The consumption of commodities by enterprises (QED) is defined (EN2) in terms of fixed volumes 
(qedconst), which can be varied via the volume adjuster (QEDADJ), and associated with any given 
volume of enterprise final demand there is a level of expenditure (VED); this is defined by (EN5) and 
creates an option for the macroeconomic closure conditions that distribute absorption across domestic 
institutions (see below). 
If QEDADJ is made flexible, then qedconst ensures that the quantities of commodities demanded are 
varied in fixed proportions; clearly this specification of demand is not a consequence of a defined set 
of behavioural relationships, as was the case for households, which reflects the difficulties inherent to 
defining utility functions for non-household institutions. 38  If VED is fixed then the volume of 
consumption by enterprises (QED) must be allowed to vary, via the variable QENTDADJ. 
The incomes to households from enterprises, which are assumed to consist primarily of distributed 
profits/dividends, are defined by (EN3), where hoentsh are defined as fixed shares of enterprise 
income after payments of direct/income taxes, savings and consumption expenditure. Similarly the 
income to government from enterprises, which is assumed to consist primarily of distributed 
profits/dividends on government owned enterprises, is defined by (EN4), where goventsh is defined as 
                                                     
38 Some models use some form of utility function for non-household domestic institutions. If a Cobb-Douglas function is 
used then value shares of demand by institution are held constant, other choices typical alter value and quantity shares. 
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a fixed share of enterprise income after payments of direct/income taxes, savings and consumption 
expenditure. 
A.1.3.11 Government Block 
A.1.3.11.1 Tax Rates 
All tax rates are variables in this model. The tax rates in the base solution are defined as parameters, 
e.g., tmbc are the import duties by commodity c in the base solution, and the equations then allow for 
varying the tax rates in 5 different ways. For each tax instrument there are four methods that allow 
adjustments to the tax rates; two of the methods use variables that can be solved for optimum values in 
the model according to the choice of closure rule and two methods allow for deterministic adjustments 
to the structure of the tax rates. The operation of this method is discussed in detail only for the 
equations for import duties while the other equations are simply reported. 
Import duty tax rates are defined by (GT1), where tmbc is the vector of import duties in the base 
solution, dabtmc is a vector of absolute changes in the vector of import duties, TMADJ is a variable 
whose initial value is ONE, DTM is a variable whose initial value is ZERO and tm01c is a vector of 
zeros and non zeros. In the base solution the values of tm01c and dabtmc are all ZERO and TMADJ and 
DTM are fixed as their initial values – a closure rule decision – then the applied import duties are those 
from the base solution. Now the different methods of adjustment can be considered in turn: 
2. If TMADJ is made a variable, which requires the fixing of another variable, and all other 
initial conditions hold then the solution value for TMADJ yields the optimum 
equiproportionate change in the import duty rates necessary to satisfy model constraints, e.g., 
if TMADJ equals 1.1 then all import duties are increased by 10%. 
3. If any element of dabtm is non zero and all the other initial conditions hold, then an absolute 
change in the initial import duty for the relevant commodity can be imposed using dabtm, e.g., 
if tmb for one element of c is 0.1 (a 10% import duty) and dabtm for that element is 0.05, then 
the applied import duty is 0.15 (15%). 
4. If TMADJ is a variable, any elements of dabtm are non zero and all other initial conditions 
hold then the solution value for TMADJ yields the optimum equiproportionate change in the 
applied import duty rates. 
5. If DTM is made a variable, which requires the fixing of another variable, AND at least one 
element of tm01 is equal to ONE then the subset of elements of c identified by tm01 are 
allowed to (additively) increase by an equiproportionate amount determined by the solution 
value for DTM. Note how it is necessary to both ‘free’ a variable and give values to a 
parameter for a solution to emerge. 
6. If DTM is made a variable AND at least one element of tm01 is NOT equal to ZERO then the 
subset of elements of c identified by tm01 are allowed to (additively) increase by an 
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equiproportionate amount determined by the solution value for DTM times the values of tm01. 
Note how using different values of tm01 for different members of the set c will cause 
commodity specific changes in import duty rates, e.g., the values of tm01 for food 
commodities could be set to 0.5 and manufactured commodities set to 1, with the result that 
the additive increases in import duties for food commodities would be half those for other 
manufactured commodities. 
This combination of alternative adjustment methods covers a range of common tax rate adjustment 
used in many applied applications while being flexible and easy to use. 
Tax Rate Block Equations 
    * * 01c c c cTM tmb dabtm TMADJ DTM tm    (GT1) 
    * * 01c c c cTE teb dabte TEADJ DTE te    (GT2) 
    * * 01   ORc c c c c cTS tsb dabts TSADJ DTS ts cd cm     (GT3) 
    * * 01   ORc c c c c cTEX texb dabtex TEXADJ DTEX tex cd cm     (GT4) 
    * * 01a a a aTX txb dabtx TXADJ DTX tx    (GT5) 
    , , , ,* * 01ff a ff a ff a ff aTF tfb dabtf TFADJ DTF tf  
 (GT6) 
    * * 01f f f fTYF tyfb dabtyf TYFADJ DTYF tyf  
 (GT7) 
    * * * 01h h h hTYH tyhb dabtyh TYHADJ DTYH DTY tyh    (GT8) 
    * * * 01e e e eTYE tyeb dabtye TYEADJ DTYE DTY tye   . (GT9) 
(( )* ) ( * 01 )+     c c c cTWAT twatb dabtwat TWATADJ DTWAT twat   (GT10) 
, , , ,(( )* ) ( * 01 )c a c a c a c aTWATA twatab dabtwata TWATAADJ DTWATA twata    (GT11) 
 
Export tax rates are defined by (GT2), where tebc is the vector of export duties in the base solution, 
dabtec is a vector of absolute changes in the vector of export duties, TEADJ is a variable whose initial 
value is ONE, DTE is a variable whose initial value is ZERO and te01c is a vector of zeros and non 
zeros. Sales tax rates are defined by (GT3), where tsbc is the vector of sales tax rates in the base 
solution, dabtsc is a vector of absolute changes in the vector of sales taxes, TSADJ is a variable whose 
initial value is ONE, DTS is a variable whose initial value is ZERO and ts01c is a vector of zeros and 
non zeros. Excise tax rates are defined by (GT4), where texbc is the vector of excise tax rates in the 
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base solution, dabtexc is a vector of absolute changes in the vector of import duties, TEXADJ is a 
variable whose initial value is ONE, DTEX is a variable whose initial value is ZERO and tex01c is a 
vector of zeros and non zeros. 
Indirect tax rates on production are defined by (GT5), where txbc is the vector of production taxes in 
the base solution, dabtxc is a vector of absolute changes in the vector of production taxes, TXADJ is a 
variable whose initial value is ONE, DTX is a variable whose initial value is ZERO and tx01c is a 
vector of zeros and non zeros. 
Taxes on factor use by each factor and activity are defined by (GT6), where tfbff,a is the matrix of 
factor use tax rates in the base solution, dabtfff,a is a matrix of absolute changes in the matrix of factor 
use taxes, TFADJ is a variable whose initial value is ONE, DTF is a variable whose initial value is 
ZERO and tf01ff,a is a matrix of zeros and non zeros. An important feature of taxes on factor use is 
they enter into the first order conditions of the production functions that determine factor input choices 
by activities. 
Factor income tax rates39 are defined by (GT7), where tyfbf is the vector of factor income taxes in the 
base solution, dabtyyf is a vector of absolute changes in the vector of factor income taxes, TYFADJ is a 
variable whose initial value is ONE, DTYF is a variable whose initial value is ZERO and tyf01f is a 
vector of zeros and non zeros. Household income tax rates are defined by (GT8), where tyhbh is the 
vector of household income tax rates in the base solution, dabtyhh is a vector of absolute changes in 
the vector of income tax rates, TYFADJ is a variable whose initial value is ONE, DTYH and DTY 40are 
variables whose initial values are ZERO and tyh01c is a vector of zeros and non zeros. Enterprise 
income tax rates are defined by (GT9), where tyebe is the vector of enterprise income tax rates in the 
base solution, dabtyee is a vector of absolute changes in the income tax rates, TYEADJ is a variable 
whose initial value is ONE, DTYE and DTY are variables whose initial values are ZERO and tye01e is 
a vector of zeros and non zeros. 
Finally two water specific tax instruments are added to the model, to allow for different pricing policy 
scenarios (GT10 and GT11). TWAT is a water commodity tax set up accordingly to the sales tax 
(GT3) and allows to drive a margin between production costs and consumer price of water 
commodities. Thereby twatbc is the vector of water commodity tax rates in the base solution, dabtwatc 
is a vector of absolute changes in the water commodity tax rates, TWATADJ is a variable whose initial 
value is ONE, DTWAT is a variable whose initial value is ZERO and twat01c is a vector of zeros and 
non zeros. TWATA is a water user specific tax rate, allowing to charge differentiated prices from 
different water users. Thereby twatabc,a is the matrix of water use tax rates in the base solution, 
dabtwatac,a is a matrix of absolute changes in the matrix of water use taxes, TWATAADJ is a variable 
                                                     
39 These are defined as taxes on factor incomes that are independent of the activity that employs the factor. They could 
include social security type payments. 
40 DTY is also included in GT9 and thereby allows for simultaneous changes in the income tax rate of households and 
enterprises. 
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whose initial value is ONE, DTWATA is a variable whose initial value is ZERO and tf01ff,a is a matrix 
of zeros and non zeros. Similar to facter use taxes, water user taxes enter into the first order conditions 
of the production functions and by this determine factor input choices by activities. 
A.1.3.11.2 Tax Revenues 
Although it is not necessary to keep the tax revenue equations separate from other equations, e.g., they 
can be embedded into the equation for government income (YG), it does aid clarity and assist with 
implementing fiscal policy simulations, e.g., when seeking to fix total revenues from a tax instrument. 
For this model there are ten tax revenue equations. The patterns of tax rates are controlled by the tax 
rate variable equations. In all cases the tax rates can be negative indicating a ‘transfer’ from the 
government. 
There are six tax instruments that are dependent upon expenditure on commodities, with each 
expressed as an ad valorem tax rate. Tariff revenue (MTAX) is defined (GR1) as the sum of the 
product of tariff rates (TM) and the value of expenditure on imports at world prices, the revenue from 
export duties (ETAX) is defined (GR2) as the sum of the product of export duty rates (TE) and the 
value of expenditure on exports at world prices. The sale tax revenues (STAX) are defined (GR3) as 
the sum of the product of sales tax rates (TS) and the value of domestic expenditure on commodities, 
and excise tax revenues (EXTAX) are defined (GR4) as the sum of the product of excise tax rates 
(TEX) and the value of domestic expenditure on commodities. 
Government Tax Revenue Block Equations  
 * * *c c c
c
MTAX TM PWM ER QM 
 (GR1) 
 * * *c c c
c
ETAX TE PWE ER QE 
 (GR2) 
 
 
* *
* *
c c
c c c c c c c
c c c
c
TS PQS
STAX
QINTD QCD QENTD QGD QINVD dstocconst
TS PQS QQ
 
  
     



 (GR3) 
 * *c c c
c
EXTAX TEX PQS QQ 
 (GR4) 
 * *a a a
a
ITAX TX PX QX 
 (GR5) 
 , , ,
,
* * *f a f f a f a
f a
FTAX TF WF WFDIST FD 
 (GR6) 
   * * 1f f f
f
FYTAX TYF YF deprec 
 (GR7) 
STAGE_W: An Applied General Equilibrium Model with Multiple Types of Water 
127 
   * *h h e e
h e
DTAX TYH YH TYE YE  
 (GR8) 
( * * )c c c
c
WATTAX TWAT PQS QQ 
 (GR9) 
, , ,
,
( * * * 2 )c a c c a c a
c a
WATATAX TWATA PQD PQDDIST QWAT 
 (GR10) 
 
There is a single tax on production (ITAX). As with other taxes this is defined (GR5) as the sum of the 
product of indirect tax rates (TX) and the value of output by each activity evaluated in terms of the 
activity prices (PX). In addition activities can pay taxes based on the value of employed factors – 
factor use taxes (FTAX). The revenue from these taxes is defined (GR6) as the sum of the product of 
factor income tax rates and the value of the factor services employed by each activity for each factor; 
the sum is over both activities and factors. These two taxes are the instruments most likely to yield 
negative revenues through the existence of production and/or factor use subsidies. 
Income taxes are collected on both factors and domestic institutions. The income tax on factors 
(FYTAX) is defined (GR7) as the product of factor tax rates (TYF) and factor incomes for all factors, 
while those on institutions (DTAX) are defined (GR8) as the sum of the product of household income 
tax rates (TYH) and household incomes plus the product of the direct tax rate for enterprises (TYE) and 
enterprise income. 
Revenue from water commodity taxes (WATTAX) is defined (GR9) as the sum of the product of water 
commodity tax rates (TWAT) and the value of domestic expenditure on water commodities. The 
revenue from the water user tax (WATATAX) is negative in most cases, as usually user groups are 
charged reduced water prices. It is defined (GR10) as the sum of the product of water user tax rates 
and the value of water commodities employed by each activity; the sum is over both activities and 
commodities. 
A.1.3.11.3 Government Income 
The sources of income to the government account (G1) are more complex than for other institutions. 
Income accrues from ten tax instruments; tariff revenues (MTAX), export duties (ETAX), sales taxes 
(STAX), excise taxes (EXTAX), production taxes (ITAX), factor use taxes (FTAX), factor income taxes 
(FYTAX) direct income taxes (DTAX), water commodity tax (WATTAX), and water user tax 
(WATATAX), which are defined in the tax equation block above. In addition the government can 
receive income as a share (govvash) of distributed factor incomes, distributed payments/dividends 
from incorporated enterprises (GOVENT) and transfers from abroad (govwor) converted in to domestic 
currency units. It would be relatively easy to subsume the tax revenue equations into the equation for 
government income, but they are kept separate to facilitate the implementation of fiscal policy 
experiments. Ultimately however the choice is a matter of personal preference. 
STAGE_W: An Applied General Equilibrium Model with Multiple Types of Water 
128 
A.1.3.11.4 Government Expenditure 
The demand for commodities by the government for consumption (QGD) is defined (G2) in terms of 
fixed proportions (qgdconst) that can be varied with a scaling adjuster (QGDADJ), and associated with 
any given volume of government final demand there is a level of expenditure defined by (G3); this 
creates an option for the macroeconomic closure conditions that distribute absorption across domestic 
institutions (see below). 
Hence, total government expenditure (EG) can be defined (G4) as equal to the sum of expenditure by 
government on consumption demand at current prices, plus real transfers to households (hogovconsth) 
that can be adjusted using a scaling factor (HGADJ) and real transfers to enterprises (entgovconste) 
that can also be adjusted by a scaling factor (EGADJ) 
As with enterprises there are difficulties inherent to defining utility functions for a government.41 
Changing QGDADJ, either exogenously or endogenously, by allowing it to be a variable in the closure 
conditions, provides a means of changing the behavioural assumption with respect to the ‘volume’ of 
commodity demand by the government. If the value of government final demand (VGD) is fixed then 
government expenditure is fixed and hence the volume of consumption by government (QGD) must be 
allowed to vary, via the QGDADJ variable. If it is deemed appropriate to modify the patterns of 
commodity demand by the government then the components of qgdconstc must be changed. 
Government Income and Expenditure Block Equations  
 * *f f
f
YG MTAX ETAX STAX EXTAX FTAX ITAX
FYTAX DTAX WATTAX WATATAX
govvash YFDISP GOVENT govwor ER
     
   
 
   
 

 (G1) 
*c cQGD qgdconst QGDADJ  (G2) 
*c c
c
VGD QGD PQD
 
  
 

 (G3) 
* * *
* *
c c h
c h
e
e
EG QGD PQD hogovconst HGADJ CPI
entgovconst EGADJ CPI
   
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 
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 
 

 (G4) 
 
                                                     
41 Some models use some form of utility function for non-household domestic institutions. If a Cobb-Douglas function is 
used then value shares of demand by institution are held constant, other choices typical alter value and quantity shares. 
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A.1.3.12 Kapital Block 
A.1.3.12.1 Savings Block 
The savings rates for households (SHH in I1) and enterprises (SEN in I2) are defined as variables 
using the same adjustment mechanisms used for tax rates; shhbh and senbe are the savings rates in the 
base solution, dabshhh and dabsene are absolute changes in the base rates, SHADJ and SEADJ are 
multiplicative adjustment factors, DSHH and DSEN are additive adjustment factors and shh01h and 
sen01e are vectors of zeros and non zeros that scale the additive adjustment factors. However, each of 
the savings rates equations has two additional adjustment factors – SADJ and DS. These allow the 
user to vary the savings rates for households and enterprises in tandem; this is useful when the 
macroeconomic closure conditions require increases in savings by domestic institutions and it is not 
deemed appropriate to force all the adjustment on a single group of institutions. 
Kapital Block Equations  
    * * * * 01h h h hSHH shhb dabshh SHADJ SADJ DSHH DS shh    (I1) 
    * * * * 01e e e eSEN sen dabsen SEADJ SADJ DSEN DS sen    (I2) 
   
   
   
* 1 *
* 1 *
* *
h h h
h
e e
e
f f
f
TOTSAV YH TYH SHH
YE TYE SEN
YF deprec KAPGOV CAPWOR ER
 
 
  



 (I3) 
*c cQINVD IADJ qinvdconst  (I4) 
  *c c c
c
INVEST PQD QINVD dstocconst 
 (I5) 
 
Total savings in the economy are defined (I3) as shares (SHH) of households’ after tax income, where 
direct taxes (TYH) have first call on household income, plus the allowances for depreciation at fixed 
rates (deprec) out of factor income, the savings by enterprises at fixed rates (SEN) out of after tax 
income, the government budget deficit/surplus (KAPGOV) and the current account deficit/surplus 
(CAPWOR). The last two terms of I3 – KAPGOV and CAPWOR - are defined below by equations in 
the market clearing block. 
A.1.3.12.2 Investment Block 
The same structure of relationships as for enterprises and government is adopted for investment 
demand (I4). The volumes of commodities purchased for investment are determined by the volumes in 
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the base period (qinvdconst) and can be varied using the adjuster (IADJ).42 Then value of investment 
expenditure (INVEST) is equal (I5) to the sum of investment demand valued at current prices plus the 
current priced value of stock changes (dstocconst) that are defined as being fixed, usually in volume 
terms at the levels in the base period. If IADJ is made variable then the volumes of investment demand 
by commodity will adjust equiproportionately, in the ratios set by qinvdconst, such as to satisfy the 
closure rule defined for the capital account. Changes to the patterns of investment demand require 
changes in the ratios of investment demand set by qinvdconst. 
A.1.3.13 Foreign Institutions Block 
The economy also employs foreign owned factors whose services must be recompensed. It is assumed 
that these services receive fixed proportions of the factor incomes available for distribution, (W1). 
Foreign Institutions Block Equations  
*f f fYFWOR worvash YFDISP  (W1) 
 
A.1.3.14 Market Clearing Block 
The market clearing equations ensure the simultaneous clearing of all markets. In this model there are 
six relevant markets: factor and commodity markets and enterprise, government, capital and rest of 
world accounts. Market clearing with respect to activities has effectively been achieved by (X20), 
wherein the supply and demand equality for domestically produced commodities was enforced, while 
the demand system and the specification of expenditure relationships ensures that the household 
markets are cleared. 
The description immediately below refers to the default set of closure rules/market clearing conditions 
imposed for this model; a subsequent section explores alternative closure rule configurations available 
with this model. 
A.1.3.15 Account Closures 
Adopting an initial assumption of full employment, which the model closure rules will demonstrate 
can be easily relaxed, amounts to requiring that the factor market is cleared by equating factor supplies 
(FS) for all factors with factor demands (FD) (C1).  
Market clearing for the composite commodity markets requires that the supplies of the composite 
commodity (QQ) are equal to total of domestic demands for composite commodities, which consists 
of intermediate demand (QINTD), household (QCD), enterprise (QED) and government (QGD) and 
                                                     
42 Some models use some form of utility function for non-household domestic institutions. If a Cobb-Douglas function is used 
then value shares of demand by institution are held constant, other choices typical alter value and quantity shares. 
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investment (QINVD) final demands and stock changes (dstocconstc) (C2). Since the markets for 
domestically produced commodities are also cleared (X20) this ensures a full clearing of all 
commodity markets. 
Making savings a residual for each account clears the two institutional accounts that are not cleared 
elsewhere – government and rest of the world. Thus the government account clears (C3) by defining 
government savings (KAPGOV) as the difference between government income and other expenditures, 
i.e., a residual. The rest of world account clears (C4) by defining the balance on the capital account 
(CAPWOR) as the difference between expenditure on imports, of commodities and factor services, and 
total income from the rest of the world, which includes export revenues and payments for factor 
services, transfers from the rest of the world to the household, enterprise and government accounts, 
i.e., it is a residual. 
Account Closure Block Equations  
,f f a
a
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, ,c c c h c e c c c
h e
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 (C4) 
 
A.1.3.15.1 Absorption Closure 
The total value of domestic final demand (absorption) (VFDOMD) is defined (C5) as the sum of the 
expenditures on final demands by households and other domestic institutions (enterprises, government 
and investment). 
It is also useful to express the values of final demand by each non-household domestic institution as a 
proportion of the total value of domestic final demand; this allows the implementation of what has 
been called a ‘balanced macroeconomic closure’43. Hence the share of the value of final demand by 
                                                     
43 The adoption of such a closure rule for this class of model has been advocated by Sherman Robinson and is a feature, albeit 
implemented slightly differently, of the IFPRI standard model. 
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enterprises (C6) can be defined as a proportion of total final domestic demand, and similarly for 
government’s value share of final demand (C7) and for investment’s value share of final demand (C8). 
Absorption Closure Block Equations  
, ,*c c h c e c c c
c h e
VFDOMD PQD QCD QED QGD QINVD dstocconst
 
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If the share variables (VEDSH, VGDSH and INVESTSH) are fixed then the quantity adjustment 
variables on the associated volumes of final demand by domestic non-household institutions 
(QEDADJ, QGDADJ and IADJ or S*ADJ) must be free to vary. On the other hand if the volume 
adjusters are fixed the associated share variables must be free so as to allow the value of final demand 
by ‘each’ institution to vary. 
A.1.3.15.2 Slack 
The final account to be cleared is the capital account. Total savings (TOTSAV), see I3 above, is 
defined within the model and hence there has been an implicit presumption in the description that the 
total value of investment (INVEST) is driven by the volume of savings. This is the market clearing 
condition imposed by (C9). But this market clearing condition includes another term, WALRAS, which 
is a slack variable that returns a zero value when the model is fully closed and all markets are cleared, 
and hence its inclusion provides a quick check on model specification. 
SLACK Block Equation  
TOTSAV INVEST WALRAS   (C9) 
 
A.1.3.16 Model Closure Conditions or Rules 
In mathematical programming terms the model closure conditions are, at their simplest, a matter of 
ensuring that the numbers of equations and variables are consistent. However economic theoretic 
dimensions of model closure rules are more complex, and, as would be expected in the context of an 
economic model, more important. The essence of model closure rules is that they define important and 
fundamental differences in perceptions of how an economic system operates (see Sen, 1963; Pyatt, 
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1987; Kilkenny and Robinson, 1990). The closure rules can be perceived as operating on two levels; 
on a general level whereby the closure rules relate to macroeconomic considerations, e.g., is 
investment expenditure determined by the volume of savings or exogenously, and on a specific level 
where the closure rules are used to capture particular features of an economic system, e.g., the degree 
of intersectoral capital mobility. 
This model allows for a range of both general and specific closure rules. The discussion below 
provides details of the main options available with this formulation of the model by reference to the 
accounts to which the rules refer. 
A.1.3.16.1 Foreign Exchange Account Closure 
The closure of the rest of the world account can be achieved by fixing either the exchange rate variable 
(AC1a) or the balance on the current account (AC1b). Fixing the exchange rate is appropriate for 
countries with a fixed exchange rate regime whilst fixing the current account balance is appropriate for 
countries that face restrictions on the value of the current account balance, e.g., countries following 
structural adjustment programmes. It is a common practice to fix a variable at its initial level by using 
the associated parameter, i.e., ***0, but it is possible to fix the variable to any appropriate value. 
The model is formulated with the world prices for traded commodities declared as variables, i.e., 
PWMc and PWEc. If a strong small country assumption is adopted, i.e., the country is assumed to be a 
price taker on all world commodity markets, then all world prices will be fixed. When calibrating the 
model the world prices will be fixed at their initial levels, (AC1c), but this does not mean they cannot 
be changed as parts of experiments. 
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Foreign Exchange Market Closure Equations  
ER ER  (AC1a) 
CAPWOR CAPWOR  (AC1b) 
c c
c c
PWE PWE
PWM PWM


 (AC1c) 
cedn cednPWE PWE  (AC1d) 
 
However, the model allows for a relaxation of the strong small country assumption, such that the 
country may face a downward sloping demand curve for one or more of its export commodities. 
Hence the world prices of some commodities are determined by the interaction of demand and supply 
on the world market, i.e., they are variables. This is achieved by limiting the range of world export 
prices that are fixed to those for which there are no export demand function, (AC1d), by selecting 
membership of the set cedn.44 
A.1.3.16.2 Capital Account Closure 
To ensure that aggregate savings equal aggregate investment, the determinants of either savings or 
investment must be fixed. There are multiple ways of achieving this result. For instance this can be 
achieved by fixing either the saving rates for households or the volumes of commodity investment. 
This involves fixing either the savings rates adjusters (AC2a) or the investment volume adjuster 
(AC2c). Note that fixing the investment volume adjuster (AC2c) means that the value of investment 
expenditure might change due to changes in the prices of investment commodities (PQD). Note also 
that only one of the savings rate adjusters should be fixed; if SADJ is fixed the adjustment takes place 
through equiproportionate changes in the savings rates of households and enterprises, if SHADJ is 
fixed the adjustment takes place through equiproportionate changes in the savings rates of households, 
and if SEADJ is fixed the adjustment takes place through equiproportionate changes in the savings 
rates of enterprises. Alternatively savings rates can be adjusted through the additive adjustment factors 
(DS, DSHH, DSEN) with the same relationships between the savings rates of different classes of 
institutions (AC2b). Note that there are other sources of savings. The magnitudes of these other 
savings sources can also be changed through the closure rules (see below). 
                                                     
44 Practically membership of cedn is set by assigning a non zero value to the export demand elasticity in the model database. 
The set ced is then defined as a complement. 
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Fixing savings, and thus deeming the economy to be savings-driven, could be considered a Neo-
Classical approach. Closing the economy by fixing investment could be construed as making the 
model reflect the Keynesian investment-driven assumption for the operation of an economy. 
The model includes a variable for the value of investment (INVEST), which can also be used to close 
the capital account (AC2d). If INVEST is fixed in an investment driven closure, then the model will 
need to adjust the savings rates to maintain equilibrium between the value of savings (TOTSAV) and 
the fixed value of investment. This can only be achieved by changes in the volumes of commodities 
demanded for investment (QINVD) or their prices (PQD). But the prices (PQD) depend on much more 
than investment, hence the main adjustment must take place through the volumes of commodities 
demanded, i.e., QINVD, and therefore the volume adjuster (IADJ) must be variable, as must a savings 
rate adjuster (SADJ). 
Capital Account Closure Equations  
SADJ SADJ
SHADJ SHADJ
SEADJ SEADJ


  (AC2a) 
DS DS
DSHH DSHH
DSEN DSEN


  (AC2b) 
IADJ IADJ  (AC2c) 
INVEST INVEST  (AC2d) 
INVESTSH INVESTSH  (AC2e) 
 
Alternatively the share of investment expenditure in the total value of domestic final demand can be 
fixed, (AC2e), which means that the total value of investment is fixed by reference to the value of total 
final demand, which requires that the investment volumes must be free to vary, i.e., IADJ must be 
made variable. Otherwise the adjustment mechanisms follow the same processes as for fixing INVEST 
equal to some level. 
A.1.3.16.3 Enterprise Account Closure  
Fixing the volumes of commodities demand by enterprises, (AC3a), closes the enterprise account. 
Note that this rule allows the value of commodity expenditures by the enterprise account to vary, 
which ceteris paribus means that the value of savings by enterprises (CAPENT) and thus total savings 
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(TOTSAV) vary. If the value of this adjuster is changed, but left fixed, this imposes equiproportionate 
changes on the volumes of commodities demanded. 
If QEDADJ is allowed to vary then another variable must be fixed; the most likely alternative is the 
value of consumption expenditures by enterprises (VED) (AC3b). This would impose adjustments 
through equiproportionate changes in the volumes of commodities demanded, and would feed through 
so that enterprise savings (CAPENT) reflecting directly the changes in the income of enterprises (YE). 
Alternatively the share of enterprise expenditure in the total value of domestic final demand can be 
fixed, (AC3c), which means that the total value of enterprise consumption expenditure (VED) is fixed 
by reference to the value of total final demand, but otherwise the adjustment mechanisms follow the 
same processes as for fixing VED equal to some level. 
Enterprise Account Closure Equations  
QEDADJ QEDADJ  (AC3a) 
VED VED  (AC3b) 
VEDSH VEDSH  (AC3c) 
HEADJ HEADJ  (AC3d) 
 
Finally the scaling factor for enterprise transfers to households (HEADJ) needs fixing (AC3d). 
A.1.3.16.4 Government Account Closure 
The closure rules for the government account are slightly more tricky because they are important 
components of the model that are used to investigate fiscal policy considerations. The base 
specification uses the assumption that government savings are a residual; when the determinants of 
government income and expenditure are ‘fixed’, government savings must be free to adjust. 
Thus in the base specification all the tax rates (variables) are fixed by declaring the base tax rates as 
parameters and then fixing all the multiplicative and additive tax rate scaling factors (AC4a – AC4u). 
Consequently changes in tax revenue to the government are consequences of changes in the other 
variables that enter into the tax income equations (GR1 to GR10). The two other sources of income to 
the government are controlled by parameters, govvash and govwor, and therefore are not a source of 
concern for model closure.45 
  
                                                     
45 The values of income from non-tax sources can of course vary because each component involves a variable. 
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Tax Rate Adjustment Closure Equations  
TMADJ TMADJ  (AC4a) 
TEADJ TEADJ  (AC4b) 
TSADJ TSADJ  (AC4c) 
TEXADJ TEXADJ  (AC4d) 
TXADJ TXADJ  (AC4e) 
TFADJ TFADJ  (AC4f) 
TYADJ TYADJ  (AC4g) 
TYEADJ TYEADJ  (AC4h) 
TYHADJ TYHADJ  (AC4i) 
TWATADJ TWATADJ  (AC4j) 
TWATAADJ TWATAADJ  (AC4k) 
DTM DTM  (AC4l) 
DTE DTE  (AC4m) 
DTS DTS  (AC4n) 
DTEX DTEX  (AC4o) 
DTX DTX  (AC4p) 
DTF DTF  (AC4q) 
DTY DTY  (AC4r) 
DTYF DTYF  (AC4s) 
DTYH DTYH  (AC4t) 
DTYE DTYE  (AC4u) 
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DTWAT DTWAT  (AC4v) 
DTWATA DTWATA  (AC4w) 
 
Also note that because there are equations for the revenues by each tax instrument (GR1 to GR10) it is 
straightforward to adjust the tax rates to achieve a given volume of revenue from each tax instrument; 
this type of arrangement is potentially useful in circumstances where it is argued/believed that there 
are binding constraints upon the revenue possibilities from specific tax instruments. 
In the base specification government expenditure is controlled by fixing the volumes of commodity 
demand (QGD) through the government demand adjuster (QGDADJ) in (AC4x). Alternatively either 
the value of government consumption expenditure (VGD) can be fixed, (AC4y), or the share of 
government expenditure in the total value of domestic final demand (VGDSH) can be fixed, (AC4z). 
The scaling factor on the values of transfers to households and enterprises through the household 
(HGADJ) and enterprise (EGADJ) adjusters, (AC4aa and AC4ab) also need to be fixed. 
Government Expenditure Closure Equations  
QGDADJ QGDADJ  (AC4x) 
VGD VGD  (AC4y) 
VGDSH VGDSH  (AC4z) 
HGADJ HGADJ  (AC4aa) 
EGADJ EGADJ  (AC4ab) 
KAPGOV KAPGOV  (AC4ac) 
 
This specification ensures that all the parameters that the government can/does control are fixed and 
consequently that the only determinants of government income and expenditure that are free to vary 
are those that the government does not directly control. Hence the equilibrating condition is that 
government savings, the internal balance, is not fixed. 
If however the model requires government savings to be fixed (AC4ac), then either government 
income or expenditure must be free to adjust. Such a condition might reasonably be expected in many 
circumstances, e.g., the government might define an acceptable level of borrowing or such a condition 
might be imposed externally. In its simplest form this can be achieved by allowing one of the 
previously fixed adjusters (AC4a to AC4ab) to vary. Thus if the sales tax adjuster (TSADJ) is made 
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variable then the sales tax rates will be varied equiproportionately so as to satisfy the internal balance 
condition. More complex experiments might result from the imposition of multiple conditions, e.g., a 
halving of import duty rates coupled with a reduction in government deficit, in which case the 
variables TMADJ and KAPGOV would also require resetting. But these conditions might create a 
model that is infeasible, e.g., due to insufficient flexibility through the sales tax mechanism, or 
unrealistically high rates of sales taxes. In such circumstances it may be necessary to allow 
adjustments in multiple tax adjusters. One method then would be to fix the tax adjusters to move in 
parallel with each other. 
However, if the adjustments only take place through the tax rate scaling factors the relative tax rates 
will be fixed. To change relative tax rates it is necessary to change the relevant tax parameters. 
Typically such changes would be implemented in policy experiment files rather than within the 
closure section of the model. 
A.1.3.16.5 Numéraire 
The model specification allows for a choice of two price normalisation equations (AC5a and AC5b), 
the consumer price index (CPI) and a producer price index (PPI). A numéraire is needed to serve as a 
base since the model is homogenous of degree zero in prices and hence only defines relative prices. 
Numéraire Closure Equations  
CPICPI   (AC5a) 
PPI PPI  (AC5b) 
 
A.1.3.16.6 Factor Market Closure 
The factor market closure rules are more difficult to implement than many of the other closure rules. 
Hence the discussion below proceeds in three stages; the first stage sets up a basic specification 
whereby all factors are deemed perfectly mobile, the second stage introduces a more general 
specification whereby factors can be made activity specific and allowance can be made for 
unemployed factors, while the third stage introduces the idea that factor market restrictions may arise 
from activity specific characteristics, rather than the factor inspired restrictions considered in the 
second stage. 
A.1.3.16.7 Full Factor Mobility and Employment Closure 
This factor market closure requires that the total supply (FS) of and total demand for factors (FD) 
equate (AC6a). The total supplies of each factor are determined exogenously and hence define the first 
set of factor market closure conditions. The demands for factor f by activity a and the wage rates for 
factors are determined endogenously. But the model specification includes the assumption that the 
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wage rates for factors are averages, by allowing for the possibility that the payments to notionally 
identical factors might vary across activities through the variable that captures the ‘sectoral 
proportions for factor prices’. These proportions are assumed to be a consequence of the use made by 
activities of factors, rather than of the factors themselves, and are therefore assumed fixed, (AC6b). 
The same holds true for the ‘sectoral proportions for water commodity prices’ (AC6c). Finally while it 
may seem that factor prices must be limited to positive values the actual bounds placed upon the 
average factor prices, (AC6d) are plus or minus infinity. This is a consequence of the use of the PATH 
solver. 
Basic Factor Market and Water Commodity Price Closure Equations  
ff FSFS   (AC6a) 
, ,f a f aWFDIST WFDIST  (AC6b) 
, ,c a c aPQDDIST PQDDIST  (AC6c) 
Min infinity
Max infinity
f
f
WF
WF
 
 
 (AC6d) 
 
A.1.3.16.8 Factor Immobility and/or Unemployment Closures 
More general factor market closures wherein factor immobility and/or factor unemployment are 
assumed can be achieved by determining which of the variables referring to factors are treated as 
variables and which of the variables are treated as parameters. If factor market closure rules are 
changed it is important to be careful to preserve the equation and variable counts when relaxing 
conditions, i.e., converting parameters into variables, and imposing conditions, i.e., converting 
variables into parameters, while preserving the economic logic of the model. 
A convenient way to proceed is to define a block of conditions for each factor. For this model this 
amounts to defining the following possible equations (AC6e) where fact indicates the specific factor 
and activ a specific activity. This block of equations includes all the variables that were declared for 
the model with reference to factors plus an extra equation for WFDIST, i.e., 
, ,fact activ fact activWFDIST WFDIST , whose role will be defined below. The choice of which equations 
are binding and which are not imposed will determine the factor market closure conditions. 
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Factor Block Equations  
, ,
, ,
, ,
Min infinity
Max infinity
Min infinity
Max infinity
fact fact
fact a fact a
fact
fact
fact a fact a
fact fact
fact activ fact activ
fact
fact
FS FS
WFDIST WFDIST
WF
WF
FD FD
WF WF
WFDIST WFDIST
FS
FS


 
 



 
 
 (AC6e) 
 
As can be seen the first four equations in the block (AC6f) are the same as those in the ‘Full Factor 
Mobility and Employment Closure’; hence ensuring that these four equations are operating for each of 
the factors is a longhand method for imposing the ‘Full Factor Mobility and Employment Closure’. 
Assume that this set of conditions represents a starting point, i.e., the first four equations are binding 
and the last five equations are not imposed. 
Assume now that it is planned to impose a short run closure on the model, whereby a factor is assumed 
to be activity specific, and hence there is no inter sectoral factor mobility. Typically this would involve 
making capital activity specific and immobile, although it can be applied to any factor. This requires 
imposing the condition that factor demands are activity specific, i.e., the condition (
, ,fact a fact aFD FD ) must be imposed. But the returns to this factor in different uses (activities) must 
now be allowed to vary, i.e., the condition (AC6b) must now be relaxed. 
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Factor Market Closure Equations  
, ,fact a fact aFD FD  (AC6f) 
, ,fact a fact aWFDIST WFDIST  (AC6g) 
fact factFS FS  (AC6h) 
, ,fact activ fact activWFDIST WFDIST  (AC6i) 
fact factWF WF  (AC6j) 
fact factFS FS  (AC6k) 
Min 0
Max infinity
fact
fact
FS
FS

 
 (AC6l) 
 
The number of imposed conditions is equal to the number of relaxed conditions, which suggests that 
the model will still be consistent. But the condition fixing the total supply of the factor is redundant 
since if factor demands are fixed the total factor supply cannot vary. Hence the condition (AC6a) is 
redundant and must be relaxed. Hence at least one other condition must be imposed to restore balance 
between the numbers of equations and variables. This can be achieved by fixing one of the sectoral 
proportions for factor prices for a specific activity, i.e., (AC6b), which means that the activity specific 
returns to the factor will be defined relative to the return to the factor in activ.46 
Start again from the closure conditions for full factor mobility and employments and then assume that 
there is unemployment of one or more factors in the economy; typically this would be one type or 
another of unskilled labour. If the supply of the unemployed factor is perfectly elastic, then activities 
can employ any amount of that factor at a fixed price. This requires imposing the condition that factor 
prices are fixed (AC6j) and relaxing the assumption that the total supply of the factor is fixed at the 
base level, i.e., relaxing (AC6a). It is useful however to impose some restrictions on the total supply of 
the factor that is unemployed. Hence the conditions (AC6l) can be imposed.47 
This also holds for water factors in most cases: The consumption of water factors mostly depends on 
the demand for water commodities. Therefore extraction rates and thus FD need to vary. As usually 
                                                     
46 It can be important to ensure a sensible choice of reference activity. In particular this is important if a factor is not used, or 
little used, by the chosen activity. 
47 If the total demand for the unemployed factor increases unrealistically in the policy simulations then it is possible to place 
an upper bound of the supply of the factor and then allow the wage rate from that factor to vary. 
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one water activity is linked to one specific water factor this means also FS needs to be relaxed. If 
required an upper limit can be set by adjusting (AC6l). 
On the other hand usually prices for the usage of water factors, if existent, are rather politically fixed 
and do not vary with extraction rates. In this case WF and also WFDIST should be fixed (AC6j and 
AC6i).  
A.1.3.16.9 Activity Inspired Restrictions on Factor Market Closures 
There are circumstances where factor use by an activity might be restricted as a consequence of 
activity specific characteristics. For instance it might be assumed that the volume of production by an 
activity might be predetermined, e.g., known mineral resources might be fixed and/or there might be 
an exogenously fixed restriction upon the rate of extraction of a mineral commodity. In such cases the 
objective might be to fix the quantities of all factors used by an activity, rather than to fix the amounts 
of a factor used by all activities. This is clearly a variation on the factor market closure conditions for 
making a factor activity specific. 
Factor Market Clearing Equations  
, ,f activ f activFD FD  (AC6m) 
, ,f activ f activWFDIST WFDIST  (AC6n) 
 
If all factors used by an activity are fixed, this requires imposing the conditions that factor demands 
are fixed, (AC6m), where activ refers to the activity of concern. But the returns to these factors in this 
activities must now be allowed to vary, i.e., the conditions (AC6n) must now be relaxed. In this case 
the condition fixing the total supply of the factor is not redundant since only the factor demands by 
activ are fixed and the factor supplies to be allocated across other activities are the total supplies 
unaccounted for by activ. 
Such conditions can be imposed by extending the blocks of equations for each factor in the factor 
market closure section. However, it is often easier to manage the model by gathering together factor 
market conditions that are inspired by activity characteristics after the factor inspired equations. In this 
context it is useful to note that when working in GAMS that the last condition imposed, in terms of the 
order of the code, is binding and supersedes previous conditions.  
The full set of equations included in the STAGE_W model and described in this document as well as 
the closure rules can be found in Appendix 2, while Appendix 3 provides a translation of the equations 
into GAMS-code. Appendix 4 provides an example SAM, depicting the Israeli economy in 2004. 
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A.1.5 Appendices 
A.1.5.1 Appendix 1: Parameter and Variable Lists 
The parameter and variable listings are in alphabetic order, and are included for reference purposes. 
The parameters listed below are those used in the behavioural specifications/equations of the model, in 
addition to these parameters there are a further set of parameters. This extra set of parameters is used 
in model calibrated and for deriving results; there is one such parameter for each variable and they are 
identified by appending a ‘0’ (zero) to the respective variable name. 
Parameter List 
Parameter Name Parameter Description 
ac(c) Shift parameter for Armington CES function 
actcomactsh(a,c) Share of commodity c in output by activity a 
actcomcomsh(a,c) Share of activity a in output of commodity c 
adva(a) Shift parameter for CES production functions for QVA 
adx(a) Shift parameter for CES production functions for QX 
adxc(c) Shift parameter for commodity output CES aggregation 
alphah(c,h) Expenditure share by commodity c for household h 
at(c) Shift parameter for Armington CET function 
atnw(a) Shift parameter for CES function for land-water nest 
atwat(a) Shift parameter for CES function for water nest 
beta(c,h) Marginal budget shares 
caphosh(h) Shares of household income saved (after taxes) 
comactactco(c,a) intermediate input output coefficients 
comactco(c,a) use matrix coefficients 
comentconst(c,e) Enterprise demand volume 
comgovconst(c) Government demand volume 
comhoav(c,h) Household consumption shares 
comtotsh(c) Share of commodity c in total commodity demand 
dabte(c) Change in base export taxes on comm’y imported from region w 
dabtex(c) Change in base excise tax rate 
dabtf(f) Change in base factor use tax rate 
dabtm(c) Change in base tariff rates on comm’y imported from region w 
dabts(c) Change in base sales tax rate 
dabtwat(c) Change in base water tax rate 
dabtwata(c,a) Change in base water use tax rate 
dabtx(a) Change in base indirect tax rate 
dabtye(e) Change in base direct tax rate on enterprises 
dabtyf(f) Change in base direct tax rate on factors 
dabtyh(h) Change in base direct tax rate on households 
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Parameter Name Parameter Description 
delta(c) Share parameter for Armington CES function 
deltafd4(f4,a) Share parameter for factors on 4. level 
deltanw(f3,a) Share parameter of land and water factors for land-water nest 
deltanwva(a) Share parameter for land-water composite in QVA 
deltava(ff,a) Share parameters for CES production functions for QVA 
deltawat(a) Share parameter for water commodity composite in land water nest 
deltawat2(c,a) Share parameter for single water commodities in water nest 
deltax(a) Share parameter for CES production functions for QX 
deltaxc(a,c) Share parameters for commodity output CES aggregation 
deprec(f) depreciation rate by factor f 
dstocconst(c) Stock change demand volume 
econ(c) constant for export demand equations 
entgovconst(e) Government transfers to enterprise e 
entvash(e,f) Share of income from factor f to enterprise e 
entwor(e) Transfers to enterprise e from world (constant in foreign currency) 
eta(c) export demand elasticity 
factwor(f) Factor payments from RoW (constant in foreign currency) 
frisch(h) Elasticity of the marginal utility of income 
gamma(c) Share parameter for Armington CET function 
goventsh(e) Share of entp’ income after tax save and consump to govt 
govvash(f) Share of income from factor f to government 
govwor Transfers to government from world (constant in foreign currency) 
hexps(h) Subsistence consumption expenditure 
hoentconst(h,e) transfers to hhold h from enterprise e (nominal) 
hoentsh(h,e) Share of entp’ income after tax save and consump to h’hold 
hogovconst(h) Transfers to hhold h from government (nominal but scalable) 
hohoconst(h,hp) interhousehold transfers 
hohosh(h,hp) Share of h’hold h after tax and saving income transferred to hp 
hovash(h,f) Share of income from factor f to household h 
howor(h) Transfers to household from world (constant in foreign currency) 
invconst(c) Investment demand volume 
iocwatqnw(a) Water commodity i-o coefficients in QNW for Level 3 Leontief agg 
iocwatqva(c,a) Water com i-o coefficients in QVA for Level 2 Leontief agg 
ioffqva(ff,a) Factor input output coefficients in QVA for Level 2 Leontief agg  
iof3qnw(f3,a) Factor input output coefficients in QNW for Level 3 Leontief agg  
iof4aggf4(f4,a) Factor input output coefficients in QWAT for Level 4 Leontief agg 
ioqintqx(a) Agg intermed quantity per unit QX for Level 1 Leontief agg 
ioqvaqx(a) Agg value added quant per unit QX for Level 1 Leontief agg 
ioqwat(c,a) Water com i-o coefficient in QWAT for Level 4 Leontief agg 
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Parameter Name Parameter Description 
kapentsh(e) Average savings rate for enterprise e out of after tax income 
predeltax(a) dummy used to estimated deltax 
pwse(c) world price of export substitutes 
qcdconst(c,h) Volume of subsistence consumption 
rhoc(c) Elasticity parameter for Armington CES function 
rhocva(a) Elasticity parameter for CES production function for QVA 
rhocx(a) Elasticity parameter for CES production function for QX 
rhocxc(c) Elasticity parameter for commodity output CES aggregation 
rhonw(a) Elasticity parameter for CES prod function for land-water nest 
rhot(c) Elasticity parameter for Output Armington CET function 
rhowat(a) Elasticity parameter for CES production function for CWAT 
sumelast(h) Weighted sum of income elasticities 
te01(c) 0-1 par for potential flexing of export taxes on comm’ies 
tex01(c) 0-1 par for potential flexing of excise tax rates 
tf01(ff) 0-1 par for potential flexing of factor use tax rates 
tm01(c) 0-1 par for potential flexing of Tariff rates on comm’ies 
ts01(c) 0-1 par for potential flexing of sales tax rates 
twat01(c)  0-1 par for potential flexing of water tax rates 
twata01(c,a)  0-1 par for potential flexing of water use tax rates 
tx01(a) 0-1 par for potential flexing of indirect tax rates 
tye01(e) 0-1 par for potential flexing of direct tax rates on e’rises 
tyf01(f) 0-1 par for potential flexing of direct tax rates on factors 
tyh01(h) 0-1 par for potential flexing of direct tax rates on h’holds 
use(c,a) use matrix transactions 
vddtotsh(c) Share of value of domestic output for the domestic market 
worvash(f) Share of income from factor f to RoW 
yhelast(c,h) (Normalised) household income elasticities 
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Variable List 
Variable Name Variable Description 
ADFD(f,a) Shift parameter for factor and activity specific efficiency 
ADX(a) Shift parameter for CES production functions for QX 
ADXADJ Scaling Factor for shift parameter on CES functions for QX 
CAPWOR Current account balance 
CPI Consumer price index 
DADX Partial scaling factor for shift parameter on CES functions for QX 
DS Partial household and enterprise savings rate scaling factor 
DSEN Partial enterprise savings rate scaling factor 
DSHH Partial household savings rate scaling factor 
DTAX Direct income tax revenue 
DTE Partial export tax rate scaling factor 
DTEX Partial excise tax rate scaling factor 
DTF Uniform adjustment to factor use tax by activity 
DTM Partial tariff rate scaling factor 
DTS Partial sales tax rate scaling factor 
DTWAT Partial water tax rate scaling factor 
DTWATA Uniform adjustment to water use tax by activity 
DTX Partial indirect tax rate scaling factor 
DTY Partial direct tax on enterprise and households rate scaling factor 
DTYE Partial direct tax on enterprise rate scaling factor 
DTYF Partial direct tax on factor rate scaling factor 
DTYH Partial direct tax on households rate scaling factor 
EG Expenditure by government 
EGADJ Transfers to enterprises by government scaling factor 
ER Exchange rate (domestic per world unit) 
ETAX Export tax revenue 
EXTAX Excise tax revenue 
FD(f,a) Demand for factor f by activity a 
FS(f) Supply of factor f 
FTAX Factor use tax revenue 
FYTAX Factor income tax revenue 
GDPVA GDP from value added 
GOVENT(e) Government income from enterprise e 
HEADJ Scaling factor for enterprise transfers to households 
HEXP(h) Household consumption expenditure 
HGADJ Scaling factor for government transfers to households 
HOENT(h,e) Household Income from enterprise e 
HOHO(h,hp) Inter household transfer 
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Variable Name Variable Description 
IADJ Investment scaling factor 
INVEST Total investment expenditure 
INVESTSH Value share of investment in total final domestic demand 
ITAX Indirect tax revenue 
KAPGOV Government savings 
MTAX Tariff revenue 
PD(c) Consumer price for domestic supply of commodity c 
PE(c) Domestic price of exports by activity a 
PINT(a) Price of aggregate intermediate input 
PM(c) Domestic price of competitive imports of commodity c 
PNW(a) Water and Land composite price 
PPI Producer (domestic) price index 
PQD(c) Purchaser price of composite commodity c 
PQDDIST(c,a) Secotral proportion of water prices 
PQS(c) Supply price of composite commodity c 
PVA(a) Value added price for activity a 
PWAT(sac) Composite price for water demand 
PWE(c) World price of exports in dollars 
PWM(c) World price of imports in dollars 
PX(a) Composite price of output by activity a 
PXAC(a,c) Activity commodity prices 
PXC(c) Producer price of composite domestic output 
QCD(c,h) Household consumption by commodity c 
QD(c) Domestic demand for commodity c 
QE(c) Domestic output exported by commodity c 
QENTD(c,e) Enterprise consumption by commodity c 
QENTDADJ Enterprise demand volume scaling factor 
QGD(c) Government consumption demand by commodity c 
QGDADJ Government consumption demand scaling factor 
QINT(a) Aggregate quantity of intermediates used by activity a 
QINTD(c) Demand for intermediate inputs by commodity 
QINVD(c) Investment demand by commodity c 
QM(c) Imports of commodity c 
QNW(a) Water and Land composite quantity 
QQ(c) Supply of composite commodity c 
QVA(a) Quantity of aggregate value added for level 1 production 
QWAT(sac) Domestic demand for water composite 
QWAT2(c,sac) Domestic demand of (single) water commodities 
QX(a) Domestic production by activity a 
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Variable Name Variable Description 
QXAC(a,c) Domestic commodity output by each activity 
QXC(c) Domestic production by commodity c 
SADJ Savings rate scaling factor for BOTH households and enterprises 
SEADJ Savings rate scaling factor for enterprises 
SEN(e) Enterprise savings rates 
SHADJ Savings rate scaling factor for households 
SHH(h) Household savings rates 
STAX Sales tax revenue 
TE(c) Export taxes on exported comm'y c 
TEADJ Export subsidy scaling factor 
TEX(c) Excise tax rate 
TEXADJ Excise tax rate scaling factor 
TF(f) Factor use tax rate 
TFADJ Factor use tax rate scaling factor 
TM(c) Tariff rates on imported comm’y c 
TMADJ Tariff rate scaling factor 
TOTSAV Total savings 
TS(c) Sales tax rate 
TSADJ Sales tax rate scaling factor 
TWAT(c) Water commodity tax rate 
TWATADJ Water tax rate scaling factor 
TWATA(c,a) Water user tax rate 
TWATAADJ Water user tax rate scaling factor 
TX(a) Indirect tax rate 
TXADJ Indirect tax scaling factor 
TYE(e) Direct tax rate on enterprises 
TYEADJ Enterprise income tax scaling factor 
TYF(f) Direct tax rate on factor income 
TYFADJ Factor tax scaling factor 
TYH(h) Direct tax rate on households 
TYHADJ Household income tax scaling factor 
VENTD(e) Value of enterprise e consumption expenditure 
VENTDSH(e) Value share of Ent consumption in total final domestic demand 
VFDOMD Value of final domestic demand 
VGD Value of Government consumption expenditure 
VGDSH Value share of Govt consumption in total final domestic demand 
WALRAS Slack variable for Walras's Law 
WATTAX Water commodity tax revenue 
WATATAX Water user tax revenue 
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Variable Name Variable Description 
WF(f) Price of factor f 
WFDIST(f,a) Sectoral proportion for factor prices 
YE(e) Enterprise incomes 
YF(f) Income to factor f 
YFDISP(f) Factor income for distribution after depreciation 
YFWOR(f) Foreign factor income 
YG Government income 
YH(h) Income to household h 
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A.1.5.2 Appendix 2: Equation and Variable Counts for the Model 
Name Equation 
Number of 
Equations 
Variable 
Number of 
Variables 
 
EXPORTS BLOCK 
   
    
PEDEFc  * * 1c c cPE PWE ER TE ce    ce PEc ce 
CETc   
1
* * 1 *   ANDc c c
rhot rhot rhot
c c c c c cQXC at QE QD ce cd      c QDDc c 
ESUPPLYa 
   
1
11
*   AND
crhot
cc c
c c c
QE PE
ce cd
QD PD


 
  
 
 c QEc c 
EDEMANDc *
ceta
c
c c
c
PWE
QE econ ced
pwse

 
  
 
    
CETALTc          ΑΝD  OR ΑΝDc c cQXC QD QE cen cd ce cdn       
 IMPORTS BLOCK 
   
    
PMDEFc  * * 1c c cPM PWM ER TM cm    cm PMc cm 
ARMINGTONc   
1
1   c c c
rhoc rhoc rhoc
c c c c c cQQ ac QM QD cm cx 

     AND  c QQc c 
COSTMINc 
 
 
1
1
*   
1
AND
crhoc
c c c
c c c
QM PD
cm cx
QD PM


 
  
 
 c QMc c 
ARMALT                          c c cQQ QD QM cmn cx cm cxn   ΑΝD OR ΑΝD     
 
COMMODITY PRICE BLOCK 
   
    
PQDDEFc  * 1c c c cPQD PQS TS TEX +  c PQDc c 
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Name Equation 
Number of 
Equations 
Variable 
Number of 
Variables 
PQSDEFc 
* *
  ORc c c cc
c
PD QD PM QM
PQS cd cm
QQ

   c PQSc c 
PXCDEFc 
 * * $c c c c c
c
c
PD QD PE QE ce
PXC cx
QXC

   cx PXCc cx 
 
NUMERAIRE BLOCK 
   
    
CPIDEF *c c
c
CPI comtotsh PQD   1 CPI 1 
PPIDEF *c c
c
PPI vddtotsh PD   1 PPI 1 
 
PRODUCTION BLOCK 
  
   
PXDEFa ,
*a a c c
c
PX ioqxacqx PXC   a PXa a 
PVADEFa      * 1 * * *a a a a a a aPX TX QX PVA QVA PINT QINT    a PVAa a 
PINTDEFa  , *a c a c
c
PINT ioqtdqd PQD   a PINTa a 
ADXEQa    * * 01Xa a a aAD adxb dabadx ADXADJ DADX adx    
 
a 𝐴𝐷𝑎
𝑋
 
a 
QXPRODFNa   
1
* 1 *
cx cx cx
a a a
X x x
a a a a a a aQX AD QVA QINT aqx
   

      a QXa a 
QXFOCa 
 
 
1
1
*
1
cx
ax
a a a
ax
a a a
QVA PINT
aqx
QINT PVA


 
  
  
 a QINTa a 
QVADEF *                                                         a a a aQVA ioqvaqx QX aqxn      
QINTDEF *                                                             a a a aQINT ioqintqx QX aqx   
   
ADVAEQ    * * 01VAa a a aAD advab dabadva ADVAADJ DADVA adva      
a VA
a
AD  
a 
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Name Equation 
Number of 
Equations 
Variable 
Number of 
Variables 
QVAPRODFNa 2,
1
2, 2, 2,
2$
" ", " ",
* *
*
( * )$
 
cva cva
a a
va
f a
cva
a
va FD
f a f a f a
VA f
a a a
va va
cnw a a cnw a
AD FD
QVA AD afx
QNW
 



 



 
 
  
  

 a QVAa a 
QVAFOC1f2,a 
 
 
2 ,
2 2, 2,
1
2 , 2, 2 ,
1
2 $
2, 2, 2,
" ", " ",
* * 1 *
* *
* * * *
( * )$
cva
a
cvacvava aaf p a
cva
a
f f a f a a a
va FD
f p a f a f p a
va FDf p
f a f a f a a
va va
cnw a a cnw a
WF WFDIST TF PVA QVA
AD FD
AD FD afx
QNW





 


 

 
 
 
 
  
  f2*a FDf2,a f2*a 
QVAFOC2a 
 
2 ,
1
2 , 2 , 2 , " ",
2 $
1
" ",
*
* * * *
* *
cva cva
a a
va
f p a
cva
a
a a a
va FD va
f p a f p a f p a cnw a a
f p
va
cnw a a a
PNW PVA QVA
AD FD QNW
QNW afx
 


 


 
 

 
 
  

  a QNWa  a 
QVAEQ1f2,a 
2, 2, 2,* *
FD
f a f a f a a aFD AD ioqnwqva QVA afxn   f2*a FDf2,a f2*a 
QVAEQ2a 
" ", *a cnw a a aQNW ioqnwqva QVA afxn   a QNWa a 
PVAEQa " ", 2, 2 2, 2,
2
* * * *(1 )a a cnw a f a f f a f a a
f
PVA PNW ioqnwqva ioqnwqva WF WFDIST TF afxn     a QVAa a 
QINTDEQc , ,
* 2c c a a c a
a a
QINTD ioqtdqd QINT QWAT    c QINTDc c 
QNWPRODFN1a 3 ,
1
3, 3, 3,
3$
" ", " ",
* *
* 3   
( * )$
AND
nw nw
a a
nw
f p a
nw
a
nw FD
f a f a f a
nw f
a a a a
nw nw
cwat a a cwat a
AD FD
QNW ad af x an
QWAT
 



 



 
 
  
  

 a QNWa a 
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Name Equation 
Number of 
Equations 
Variable 
Number of 
Variables 
QNWFOC1f3,a 
 
 
3 ,
3 3, 3,
1
3 , 3 , 3 ,
1
3 $
3 , 3, 3,
" ", " ",
* * 1 *
* *
* * * * 3  
( * )$
nw
a
nwnwnw aaf p a
nw
a
f f a f a a a
nw FD
f p a f p a f p a
nw FDf p
f p a f a f a a
nw nw
cwat a a cwat a
WF WFDIST TF PNW QNW
AD FD
AD FD af x
QWAT





 


 

 
 
 
 
  
  f3*a FDf3,a f3*a 
QNWFOC2a  
3 ,
1
3 , 3 , 3 ,
1
3 $
" ",
" ",
*
* *
* * * 3  
*
nw
a
nw
nw a
f p a
nw
a
a a a
nw FD
f p a f p a f p a
nwf p
cwat a a a
nw
cwat a a
PWAT PNW QNW
AD FD
QWAT af x
QWAT









 


 
 
 
  
  a QWATa a 
QNWEQ1f3,a 3, 3, 3,* * 3
FD
f a f a f a a aFD AD ioqwatqnw QNW af xn   f3*a FDf3,a f3*a 
QNWEQ2a " ", * 3   ORa cwat a a a aQWAT ioqwatqnw QNW af xn ann   a QWATa a 
PNWEQa 
" ",
3, 3 3, 3,
3
*
* * *(1 ) 3   OR
a a cwat a
f a f f a f a a a
f
PNW PWAT ioqwatqnw
ioqwatqnw WF WFDIST TF af xn ann

    a QNWa a 
WATDPRODFNa 4,
1
4, 4, 4,
4$
, ,
* *
* 4   
* 2
AND
wat wat
a a
wat
f a
wat
a
wat FD
f a f a f a
fwat
a a a a
wat
cwat a cwat a
cwat
AD FD
QWAT ad af x awat
QWAT
 







 
 
  
 
  


 a QWATa a 
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Name Equation 
Number of 
Equations 
Variable 
Number of 
Variables 
FD4FOCf4,a 
 
 
4 ,
,
4 4, 4,
1
4 , 4 , 4 ,
4 $
, ,
$
1
4 , 4, 4,
* * 1 *
* *
*
* 2
* * * 4
wat
a
wat
f p a
wat
a
wat
cwatp a
watwat
aa
f f a f a a a
wat FD
f p a f p a f p a
f p
wat
cwatp a cwatp a
cwatp
wat FD
f p a f a f a a
WF WFDIST TF PWAT QWAT
AD FD
QWAT
AD FD af x











 
 
 
 
 
 
  



 f4*a FDf4,a f4*a 
WATDFOCcwat,a  4 ,
,
, ,
1
4 , 4 , 4 ,
4 $ 1
, ,
, ,
$
* *(1 ) *
* *
* * * 2 4
* 2
wat
a
wat wat
f p a a
wat
a
wat
cwatp a
cwat cwat a cwat a a a
wat FD
f p a f p a f p a
f p
wat
cwatp a cwat a a
wat
cwatp a cwatp a
cwatp
PQD PQDDIST TWATA PWAT QWAT
AD FD
QWAT af x
QWAT

 







 

 
 
 
  
 
  


 cwat*a QWAT2cwat,a cwat*a 
QWATEQ1c,a , ,2 * 4   ANDc a c a a a aQWAT iofcqwat QWAT af xn acwat   cwat*a QWAT2cwat,a cwat*a 
QWATEQ2f4,a 4, 4, 4,* * 4   AND
FD
f a f a f a a a aFD AD iofcqwat QWAT af xn afwat   f4*a FDf4,a f4*a 
PWATEQa 
, , ,
$
4, 4 4, 4,
4
* * *(1 )
* * *(1 ) 4
c
a c a c c a c a
c cwat
f a f f a f a a
f
PWAT iofcqwat PQD PQDDIST TWATA
iofcqwat WF WFDIST TF af xn
 
  


 a PWATa a 
COMOUTc 
,
1
, ,
$
* *   AND
xc
c
xc
c
xc
a c
xc xc
c c a c a c c c
a
QXC ad QXAC cx cxac






 
  
  
  c QXCc c 
COMOUT2c ,
  ANDc a c c c
a
QXC QXAC cx cxacn   c QXCc c 
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Name Equation 
Number of 
Equations 
Variable 
Number of 
Variables 
COMOUTFOCa,c 
 
 
,
,
1
1
, , , , ,
$
1
1
, , , ,
$
* * * * *
* * * * *
xc
c
xc
c xcxc
cc
xc
a c
xc
c
xc
c xcxc
cc
xc
a c
xc xc xc
a c c c a c a c a c a c
a
xc xc
c c a c a c a c a c c
a
PXAC PXC ad QXAC QXAC
PXC QXC QXAC QXAC cxac








 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
 
  
  


 a*c PXACa,c a*c 
COMOUTFOC2a,c ,                a c cPXAC PXC cxacn   a*c PXACa,c a*c 
ACTIVOUTa,c , , *a c a c aQXAC ioqxacqx QX  a*c QXACa,c a*c 
 
FACTOR BLOCK 
  
   
YFEQf  , ,* * *f f f a f a f
a
YF WF WFDIST FD factwor ER
 
  
 
  f YFf f 
YFDISPEQf     * 1 * 1f f f fYFDISP YF deprec TYF    f YFDISTf f 
 
HOUSEHOLD BLOCK 
  
   
YHEQh 
   
, ,*
* * *
h h f f h hp
f hp
h h h
YH hovash YFDISP HOHO
HOENT hogovconst HGADJ CPI howor ER
   
    
   
  
 
 h YHh h 
HOHOEQh,hp     , , * * 1 * 1h hp h hp h h hHOHO hohosh YH TYH SHH    h*hp HOHOh,hp h*hp 
HEXPEQh       ,* 1 * 1h h h h hp h
hp
HEXP YH TYH SHH HOHO
 
     
 
  h HEXPh h 
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Name Equation 
Number of 
Equations 
Variable 
Number of 
Variables 
QCDEQc 
 
, ,
,
*
1
*
* *
c c h c h
h
c
h c
h c c h
c
PQD qcdconst beta
QCD
PQDHEXP PQD qcdconst
  
  
   
      
   



 c QCDc c 
 
ENTERPRISE BLOCK 
  
   
YEEQe    , * * * *e e f f e e
f
YE entvash YFDISP entgovconst EGADJ CPI entwor ER
 
   
 
  e YEe e 
QENTDEQc,e , , *c e c eQED qedconst QEDADJ  c*e QEDc,e c*e 
VEDEQe , *e c e c
c
VED QED PQD
 
  
 
  e VEDe e 
HOENTEQh..       , , ,* * 1 * 1 *h e h e e e e c e c
c
HOENT hoentsh YE TYE SEN QED PQD
 
    
 
  h*e HOENTh,e h*e 
GOVENTEQe        * * 1 * 1 *e e e e e c c
c
GOVENT goventsh YE TYE SEN QED PQD
 
    
 
  e GOVENTe e 
 
TAX RATE BLOCK 
   
    
TMDEFc     * * 01c c c cTM tmb dabtm TMADJ DTM tm    cm TMc cm 
TEDEFc     * * 01c c c cTE teb dabte TEADJ DTE te    ce TEc ce 
TSDEFc     * * 01c c c cTS tsb dabts TSADJ DTS ts    c TSc c 
TEXDEFc     * * 01c c c cTEX texb dabtex TEXADJ DTEX tex    c TEXc c 
TXDEFa     * * 01a a a aTX txb dabtx TXADJ DTX tx    a TXa a 
TFDEFff,a     , , , ,* * 01ff a ff a ff a ff aTF tfb dabtf TFADJ DTF tf    f*a TFf,a f*a 
TYFDEFf     * * 01f f f fTYF tyfb dabtyf TYFADJ DTYF tyf    f TYFf f 
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Name Equation 
Number of 
Equations 
Variable 
Number of 
Variables 
THYDEFh     * * * 01h h h hTYH tyhb dabtyh TYHADJ DTYH DTY tyh    h TYHh h 
TYEDEFe     * * * 01e e e eTYE tyeb dabtye TYEADJ DTYE DTY tye    e TYEe e 
TWATDEFc (( )* ) ( * 01 )+     c c c cTWAT twatb dabtwat TWATADJ DTWAT twat   c TWATc c 
TWATADEFc,a , , , ,(( )* ) ( * 01 )c a c a c a c aTWATA twatab dabtwata TWATAADJ DTWATA twata    c*a TWATAc,a c*a 
 
TAX REVENUE BLOCK 
   
    
MTAXEQ  * * *c c c
c
MTAX TM PWM ER QM   1 MTAX 1 
ETAXEQ  * * *c c c
c
ETAX TE PWE ER QE   1 ETAX 1 
STAXEQ 
  
 
* *
* *
c c c c c c c c
c
c c c
c
STAX TS PQS QINTD QCD QED QGD QINVD dstocconst
TS PQS QQ
     



 1 STAX 1 
EXTAXEQ  * *c c c
c
EXTAX TEX PQS QQ   1 EXTAX 1 
ITAXEQ  * *a a a
a
ITAX TX PX QX   1 ITAX 1 
FTAXEQ  , , ,
,
* * *f a f f a f a
f a
FTAX TF WF WFDIST FD   1 FTAX 1 
FYTAXEQ    * * 1f f f
f
FYTAX TYF YF deprec   1 FYTAX 1 
DTAXEQ    * *h h e
h e
DTAX TYH YH TYE YE    1 DTAX 1 
WATTAXEQ ( * * )c c c
c
WATTAX TWAT PQS QQ 
 
1 WATTAX 1 
WATATAXEQ , , ,
,
( * * * 2 )c a c c a c a
c a
WATATAX TWATA PQD PQDDIST QWAT 
 
1 WATATAX 1 
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Name Equation 
Number of 
Equations 
Variable 
Number of 
Variables 
 
GOVERNMENT BLOCK 
  
    
YGEQ 
 
*
*
f f
f
YG MTAX ETAX STAX EXTAX FTAX ITAX FYTAX DTAX
WATTAX WATATAX govvash YFDISP
GOVENT govwor ER
       
 
    
 
 
  1 YG 1 
QGDEQc *c cQGD qgdconst QGDADJ  c cQGD  c 
VGDEQ *c c
c
VGD QGD PQD
 
  
 
  1 VQGD 1 
EGEQ 
* * *
* *
c c h
c h
e
e
EG QGD PQD hogovconst HGADJ CPI
entgovconst EGADJ CPI
   
    
   
 
 
 
 

 1 EG 1 
 
INVESTMENT BLOCK 
  
   
SHHDEFh     * * * * 01h h h hSHH shhb dabshh SHADJ SADJ DSHH DS shh  
 
h SHH H 
SENDEFe     * * * * 01e e e eSEN sen dabsen SEADJ SADJ DSEN DS sen  
 
e SEN e 
TOTSAVEQ 
       
   
* 1 * * 1 *
* *
h h h e e
h e
f f
f
TOTSAV YH TYH SHH YE TYE SEN
YF deprec KAPGOV CAPWOR ER
   
  
 

 1 TOTSAV 1 
QINVDEQc  *c cQINVD IADJ qinvdconst  c QINVDc c 
INVEST   *c c c
c
INVEST PQD QINVD dstocconst   1 INVEST 1 
 
FOREIGN INSTITUTIONS BLOCK 
  
   
fYFWOREQ  *f f fYFWOR worvash YFDISP  f YFWORf f 
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Name Equation 
Number of 
Equations 
Variable 
Number of 
Variables 
 
MARKET CLEARING BLOCK 
  
   
FMEQUILf ,f f a
a
FS FD   f FSf f 
QEQUILc , ,c c c h c e c c c
h e
QQ QINTD QCD QED QGD QINVD dstocconst        c   
CAPGOVEQ KAPGOV YG EG   1 CAPGOV 1 
CAEQUIL 
* *
f
c c c c f
c f c f
h
h
YFWOR
CAPWOR pwm QM pwe QE factwor
ER
howor entwor govwor
      
         
      
 
   
 
   

 1 CAPWOR 1 
VFDOMDEQ 
, ,
*
c h c e c
h e
c
c
c c
QCD QED QGD
VFDOMD PQD
QINVD dstocconst
  
 
   
 
  1 VFDOMD 1 
VENTDSHEQ e
e
VENTD
VENTDSH
VFDOMD
  1 VENTDSH 1 
VGDSHEQ VGDVGDSH VFDOMD
  1 VGDSH 1 
INVESTSHEQ INVESTINVESTSH VFDOMD
  1 INVESTSH 1 
WALRASEQ TOTSAV INVEST WALRAS   1 WALRAS 1 
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Name Equation 
Number of 
Equations 
Variable 
Number of 
Variables 
 
MODEL CLOSURE 
  
   
  or ER CAPWOR  1 
  and  or c c cednPWM PWE PWE  2c 
 
,c aPQDDIST  
c*a 
 , ,  or  or or SADJ SHADJ SEADJ IADJ INVEST INVESTSH  1 
  or  or QEDADJ VED VEDSH  1 
 at least  of , , , , , , , , ,  ,
 ,  ,
 , , , , ,  , , , , , ,  and 
one TMADJ TEADJ TSADJ TEXADJ TYFADJ TXADJ TFADJ TYHADJ TYEADJ TYADJ
TWATADJ TWATAADJ
DTM DTE DTS DTEX DTYF DTX DTF DTYH DTYE DTY DTWAT DTWATA CAPGOV
 7 
 at least of , , ,  and QGDADJ HGADJ EGADJ VGD VGDSH two  3 
 
, and f f aFS WFDIST  (f*(a+1)) 
    or CPI PPI  1 
STAGE_W: An Applied General Equilibrium Model with Multiple Types of Water 
163 
A.1.5.3 Appendix 3: Equation Code 
*################ 15. EQUATIONS ASSIGNMENTS ############### 
* ------- TRADE BLOCK ----------------------------------------------- 
* #### Exports Block 
 
* For some c there are no exports hence only implement for ce(c) 
 
 PEDEF(c)$ce(c)..  PE(c) =E= PWE(c) * ER * (1 - TE(c)) ; 
 
* For some c there are no exports hence only implement for ce(c) 
 
 CET(c)$(cd(c) AND ce(c)).. 
            QXC(c) =E= at(c)*(gamma(c)*QE(c)**rhot(c) + 
                      (1-gamma(c))*QD(c)**rhot(c))**(1/rhot(c)) ; 
 
 ESUPPLY(c)$(cd(c) AND ce(c)).. 
                   QE(c) =E= QD(c)*((PE(c)/PD(c))*((1-gamma(c)) 
                                 /gamma(c)))**(1/(rhot(c)-1)) ; 
 
 EDEMAND(c)$ced(c).. 
                   QE(c) =E= econ(c)*((PWE(c)/pwse(c))**(-eta(c))) ; 
 
* For c with no exports OR for c with no domestic production 
* domestic supply is by CETALT 
 
 CETALT(c)$((cd(c) AND cen(c)) OR (cdn(c) AND ce(c))).. 
                  QXC(c) =E= QD(c) + QE(c) ; 
 
* #### Imports Block 
 
* For some c there are no imports hence only implement for cm(c) 
 
 PMDEF(c)$cm(c)..  PM(c) =E= (PWM(c) *(1 + TM(c))) * ER ; 
 
* For some c there are no imports or domestic production 
* hence only implement for cd(c) AND cm(c) 
 
 ARMINGTON(c)$(cx(c) AND cm(c) ).. 
        QQ(c)  =E= ac(c)*(delta(c)*QM(c)**(-rhoc(c)) + 
                   (1-delta(c))*QD(c)**(-rhoc(c)))**(-1/rhoc(c)) ; 
 
 COSTMIN(c)$(cx(c) AND cm(c)).. 
                   QM(c) =E= QD(c)*((PD(c)/PM(c))*(delta(c)/ 
                                 (1-delta(c))))**(1/(1+rhoc(c))) ; 
 
* For c with no imports OR for c with no domestic production 
* supply is from ARMALT 
 
 ARMALT(c)$((cx(c) AND cmn(c)) OR (cxn(c) AND cm(c))).. 
                    QQ(c) =E= QD(c) + QM(c) ; 
 
* ------- COMMODITY PRICE BLOCK ----------------------------------- 
 PQDDEF(c)$(cd(c) OR cm(c)).. 
             PQD(c) =E= PQS(c) * (1 + TS(c) + TEX(c)+ TWAT(c)) ; 
 
 PQSDEF(c)$((cd(c) OR cm(c))).. 
            PQS(c)*QQ(c) =E= (PD(c)*QD(c))+(PM(c)*QM(c)) ; 
 
 PXCDEF(c)$(cx(c)).. 
           PXC(c)*QXC(c) =E= (PD(c)*QD(c)) + (PE(c)*QE(c))$ce(c) ; 
 
* ------- NUMERAIRE PRICE BLOCK ----------------------------------- 
 
 CPIDEF..            CPI =E= SUM(c,comtotsh(c)*PQD(c)) ; 
 
 PPIDEF..            PPI =E= SUM(c,vddtotsh(c)*PD(c)) ; 
 
* ------- PRODUCTION BLOCK ---------------------------------------- 
 
*------------- Level 1--------------------------- 
 
 PXDEF(a)$QINT0(a)..     PX(a) =E= SUM(c,ioqxacqx(a,c)*PXAC(a,c)) ; 
 
 PVADEF(a)..  PX(a)*(1 - TX(a))*QX(a) 
                         =E= (PVA(a)*QVA(a)) + (PINT(a)*QINT(a)) ; 
 
 PINTDEF(a)..     PINT(a) =E= SUM(c$cnwat(c),ioqtdqd(c,a) * PQD(c)) ; 
 
 ADXEQ(a)..       ADX(a) =E= ((adxb(a) + dabadx(a)) * ADXADJ) 
                                      + (DADX * adx01(a)) ; 
 
* CES aggregation functions for Level 1 of production nest 
 QXPRODFN(a)$aqx(a).. 
                   QX(a) =E= ADX(a)*(deltax(a)*QVA(a)**(-rhocx(a)) 
                              + (1-deltax(a))*QINT(a)**(-rhocx(a))) 
                              **(-1/rhocx(a)) ; 
 
 QXFOC(a)$aqx(a).. 
                  QVA(a) =E= QINT(a)*((PINT(a)/PVA(a))*(deltax(a)/ 
                                 (1-deltax(a))))**(1/(1+rhocx(a))) ; 
 
* Leontief aggregation functions for Level 1 of production nest 
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 QINTDEF(a)$aqxn(a).. 
                 QINT(a) =E= ioqintqx(a) * QX(a) ; 
 
 QVADEF(a)$aqxn(a).. 
                  QVA(a) =E= ioqvaqx(a) * QX(a) ; 
 
*------------------------ Level 2---------------------------------- 
 
* CES aggregation functions for Level 2 of production nest 
 
 ADVAEQ(a)..     ADVA(a) =E= ((advab(a) + dabadva(a)) * ADVAADJ) 
                                      + (DADVA * adva01(a)) ; 
 
* CES Prod'n func'n 
 QVAPRODFN(a)$(QVA0(a) and afx(a)).. 
         QVA(a)  =E= ADVA(a)*(SUM(f2$deltava(f2,a), deltava(f2,a) 
                     *(ADFD(f2,a)* FD(f2,a))**(-rhocva(a))) 
                       +(deltava("cnw",a)*QNW(a) 
                       **(-rhocva(a)))$deltava("cnw",a)) 
                       **(-1/rhocva(a)); 
 
* FOC for the factor composite 
 QVAFOC1(f2,a)$(deltava(f2,a)and afx(a) ).. 
         WF(f2)*WFDIST(f2,a)*(1 + TF(f2,a) ) 
           =E= PVA(a)*QVA(a) 
              *(SUM(f2p$deltava(f2p,a),deltava(f2p,a) 
              *(ADFD(f2p,a)*FD(f2p,a))**(-rhocva(a))) 
              + (deltava("cnw",a)*QNW(a) 
               **(-rhocva(a)))$deltava("cnw",a))**(-1) 
              * deltava(f2,a)*ADFD(f2,a)**(-rhocva(a)) 
              * FD(f2,a)**(-rhocva(a)-1) ; 
 
 QVAFOC2(a)$(afx(a)and deltava("cnw",a) ).. 
      PNW(a) =E= PVA(a)*QVA(a) 
                *(SUM(f2p$deltava(f2p,a),deltava(f2p,a) 
                *(ADFD(f2p,a)*FD(f2p,a))**(-rhocva(a))) 
                + deltava("cnw",a)*QNW(a) **(-rhocva(a)))**(-1) 
                * deltava("cnw",a)*QNW(a)**(-rhocva(a)-1) ; 
 
 QVAEQ1(f2,a)$afxn(a).. 
                FD(f2,a)*ADFD(f2,a) =E= ioffqva(f2,a)*QVA(a)  ; 
 
 QVAEQ2(a)$afxn(a).. 
                QNW(a)    =E=   ioqnwqva(a)*QVA(a); 
 
 PVAEQ(a)$afxn(a).. 
   PVA(a)  =E=  PNW(a)* ioqnwqva(a) 
           +SUM(f2,ioffqva(f2,a)*WF(f2)*WFDIST(f2,a)*(1+TF(f2,a))); 
 
* Intermediate Input Demand 
 
 QINTDEQ(c)..   QINTD(c) =E= SUM(a,ioqtdqd(c,a)*QINT(a)) 
                                 + SUM(a, QWAT2(c,a)); 
 
*------------- Level 3--------------------------------------------- 
 
 QNWPRODFN1(a)$(af3x(a) and an(a) ).. 
     QNW(a)  =E= atnw(a)*(SUM(f3$deltanw(f3,a), 
                deltanw(f3,a)*(ADFD(f3,a)* FD(f3,a))**(-rhonw(a))) 
                  +(deltanw("cwat",a)*QWAT(a) 
                  **(-rhonw(a)))$deltanw("cwat",a))**(-1/rhonw(a)); 
 
* FOC for the factor composite 
 
 QNWFOC1(f3,a)$(af3x(a) and deltanw(f3,a)).. 
      WF(f3)*WFDIST(f3,a)*(1 + TF(f3,a)) 
                   =E= PNW(a)*QNW(a) 
                      *(SUM(f3p$deltanw(f3p,a),deltanw(f3p,a) 
                      *(ADFD(f3p,a)*FD(f3p,a))**(-rhonw(a))) 
                       + (deltanw("cwat",a)*QWAT(a) 
                       **(-rhonw(a)))$deltanw("cwat",a))**(-1) 
                       * deltanw(f3,a)*ADFD(f3,a)**(-rhonw(a)) 
                          * FD(f3,a)**(-rhonw(a)-1) ; 
 
* FOC for the water-commodity composite 
 
QNWFOC2(a)$(af3x(a) and deltanw("cwat",a) and SUM(f3,deltanw(f3,a))) 
     PWAT(a) =E= PNW(a)*QNW(a) 
                  *(SUM(f3p$deltanw(f3p,a),deltanw(f3p,a) 
                  *(ADFD(f3p,a)*FD(f3p,a))**(-rhonw(a))) 
                  + deltanw("cwat",a)*QWAT(a) **(-rhonw(a)))**(-1) 
                  * deltanw("cwat",a)*QWAT(a)**(-rhonw(a)-1) ; 
 
 QNWEQ1(f3,a)$af3xn(a).. 
              FD(f3,a)*ADFD(f3,a) =E= iof3qnw(f3,a)*QNW(a) ; 
 
 QNWEQ2(a)$(af3xn(a)or ann(a)).. 
               QWAT(a) =E= iocwatqnw(a)*QNW(a) ; 
 
 PNWEQ(a)$ (af3xn(a) or ann(a)).. 
  PNW(a) =E= PWAT(a)*iocwatqnw(a) 
     +SUM(f3,iof3qnw(f3,a)* WF(f3)*WFDIST(f3,a)*(1 + TF(f3,a))); 
 
*------------- Level 4--------------------------- 
 
 WATDPRODFN(a)$(af4x(a) and awat(a) ).. 
  QWAT(a) =E= atwat(a)*(SUM(f4$deltafcwat(f4,a),deltafcwat(f4,a) 
                 *(ADFD(f4,a)* FD(f4,a)) **(-rhowat(a))) 
                + SUM(cwat,deltafcwat(cwat,a)*QWAT2(cwat,a) 
                             **(-rhowat(a))))**(-1/rhowat(a)) ; 
STAGE_W: An Applied General Equilibrium Model with Multiple Types of Water 
165 
 
 WATDFOC(cwat,a)$(af4x(a) and deltafcwat(cwat,a)).. 
    PQD(cwat)*PQDDIST(cwat,a)*(1+TWATA(cwat,a)) 
            =E=  PWAT(a)*QWAT(a)* ( 
                 SUM(f4p$deltafcwat(f4p,a),deltafcwat(f4p,a) 
                * ADFD(f4p,a)*FD(f4p,a)**(-rhowat(a)))+ 
                  SUM(cwatp$deltafcwat(cwatp,a), 
                  deltafcwat(cwatp,a)*QWAT2(cwatp,a) 
                  **(-rhowat(a))))**(-1) 
                 *deltafcwat(cwat,a)*QWAT2(cwat,a)**(-rhowat(a)-1) ; 
 
* FOC  for factor prices 
 
 FD4FOC(f4,a)$(af4x(a) and  deltafcwat(f4,a)).. 
         WF(f4)*WFDIST(f4,a)*(1 + TF(f4,a)) 
                 =E=  PWAT(a)*QWAT(a)* 
                      (SUM(f4p$deltafcwat(f4p,a),deltafcwat(f4p,a) 
                       * ADFD(f4p,a)*FD(f4p,a)**(-rhowat(a))) 
                       +  SUM(cwatp$deltafcwat(cwatp,a), 
                         deltafcwat(cwatp,a)*QWAT2(cwatp,a) 
                         **(-rhowat(a))))**(-1) 
                         * deltafcwat(f4,a)*ADFD(f4,a)**(-rhowat(a)) 
                         * FD(f4,a)**(-rhowat(a)-1) ; 
 
QWATEQ1(c,a)$ (af4xn(a) and acwat(a))  .. 
          QWAT2(c,a)=E= ioqwat(c,a)*QWAT(a)    ; 
 
QWATEQ2(f4,a)$(af4xn(a) and afwat(a)).. 
         FD(f4,a)*ADFD(f4,a)  =E=  iof4aggf4(f4,a)*QWAT(a); 
 
 PWATEQ(a)$(af4xn(a))  .. 
         PWAT(a) =E=   SUM(c$cwat(c),ioqwat(c,a)*PQD(c)*PQDDIST(c,a) 
                          *(1+TWATA(c,a))) 
                     + SUM(f4, iof4aggf4(f4,a)*WF(f4)*WFDIST(f4,a) 
                                *(1 + TF(f4,a))); 
 
*---------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Commodity Output 
 
* CES aggregation of differentiated commodities 
 
 COMOUT(c)$(cx(c) and cxac(c)).. 
             QXC(c) =E= adxc(c)*(SUM(a$deltaxc(a,c),deltaxc(a,c) 
                       *QXAC(a,c)**(-rhocxc(c))))**(-1/rhocxc(c)) ; 
 
 COMOUTFOC(a,c)$(deltaxc(a,c) and cxac(c)  ).. 
          PXAC(a,c) =E= PXC(c)*QXC(c) 
                        *(SUM(ap$deltaxc(ap,c),deltaxc(ap,c) 
                        *QXAC(ap,c)**(-rhocxc(c))))**(-1) 
                       *deltaxc(a,c)*QXAC(a,c)**(-rhocxc(c)-1) ; 
 
* Aggregation of homogenous commodities 
 
 COMOUT2(c)$(cx(c) and cxacn(c)).. 
                  QXC(c) =E= SUM(a,QXAC(a,c)) ; 
 
 COMOUTFOC2(a,c)$(deltaxc(a,c) and cxacn(c)).. 
               PXAC(a,c) =E= PXC(c) ; 
 
* Activity Output 
 
 ACTIVOUT(a,c)$ioqxacqx(a,c).. 
               QXAC(a,c) =E= ioqxacqx(a,c) * QX(a) ; 
 
* ######## FACTOR BLOCK 
 
 YFEQ(f)..         YF(f) =E= SUM(a,WF(f)*WFDIST(f,a)*FD(f,a)) 
                             + (factwor(f)*ER) ; 
 
 YFDISPEQ(f)..  
    YFDISP(f) =E= (YF(f) * (1- deprec(f)))*(1 - TYF(f)) ; 
 
* ######## HOUSEHOLD BLOCK 
* ## Household Income 
 
 YHEQ(h)..         YH(h) =E= SUM(f,hovash(h,f)*YFDISP(f)) 
                             + SUM(hp,HOHO(h,hp)) 
                             + SUM(e,HOENT(h,e)) 
                             + (HGADJ * hogovconst(h)*CPI) 
                             + (howor(h)*ER) ; 
 
* Household Expenditure 
 
 HOHOEQ(h,hp).. 
              HOHO(h,hp) =E= hohosh(h,hp) 
                             *((YH(h) * (1 - TYH(h))) * (1 - SHH(h))) 
; 
 
 HEXPEQ(h)..     HEXP(h) =E= ((YH(h) * (1 - TYH(h))) * (1 - SHH(h))) 
                             - SUM(hp,HOHO(hp,h)) ; 
 
 QCDEQ(c,h) .. 
    PQD(c)*QCD(c,h) =E= PQD(c)*qcdconst(c,h) 
                      + beta(c,h) 
                      *(HEXP(h)-SUM(cp,PQD(cp)*qcdconst(cp,h))) ; 
 
* ------- ENTERPRISE BLOCK ------------------------------------------
* ## Enterprise Income 
 
 YEEQ(e)..         YE(e) =E= SUM(f,entvash(e,f)*YFDISP(f)) 
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                             + (EGADJ * entgovconst(e) * CPI) 
                             + (entwor(e)*ER) ; 
 
* ## Enterprise Expenditure 
 
 QEDEQ(c,e).. 
               QED(c,e) =E= QEDADJ*qedconst(c,e) ; 
 
 HOENTEQ(h,e).. 
               HOENT(h,e) =E= hoentsh(h,e) 
                             * (((YE(e) * (1 - TYE(e))) * (1 - 
SEN(e))) 
                             - SUM(c,QED(c,e)*PQD(c))) ; 
 
 GOVENTEQ(e).. GOVENT(e) =E= goventsh(e) 
                         * (((YE(e) * (1 - TYE(e))) * (1 - SEN(e))) 
                              - SUM(c,QED(c,e)*PQD(c))) ; 
 
 VEDEQ(e)..       VED(e) =E= SUM(c ,QED(c,e)*PQD(c)) ; 
 
* ------- GOVERNMENT BLOCK ------------------------------------------ 
* #### Government Income Block 
 
* ## Government Tax Rates 
 
 TMDEF(c)..        TM(c) =E= ((tmb(c) + dabtm(c)) * TMADJ) 
                                      + (DTM * tm01(c)) ; 
 
 TEDEF(c)..        TE(c) =E= ((teb(c) + dabte(c)) * TEADJ) 
                                      + (DTE * te01(c)) ; 
 
 TSDEF(c)$(cd(c) OR cm(c)).. 
                   TS(c) =E= ((tsb(c) + dabts(c)) * TSADJ) 
                                      + (DTS * ts01(c)) ; 
 
 TEXDEF(c)$(cd(c) OR cm(c)).. 
                  TEX(c) =E= ((texb(c) + dabtex(c)) * TEXADJ) 
                                      + (DTEX * tex01(c)) ; 
 
 TXDEF(a)..       TX(a) =E= ((txb(a) + dabtx(a)) * TXADJ) 
                                      + (DTX * tx01(a)) ; 
 
 TFDEF(f,a)..     TF(f,a) =E= ((tfb(f,a) + dabtf(f,a))* TFADJ) 
                                      + (DTF*tf01(f,a)) ; 
 
 TYFDEF(f)..      TYF(f) =E= ((tyfb(f) + dabtyf(f)) * TYFADJ) 
                                     + (DTYF * tyf01(f)) ; 
 
 TYHDEF(h)..      TYH(h) =E= ((tyhb(h) + dabtyh(h)) * TYHADJ * TYADJ) 
                                     + (DTYH * DTY * tyh01(h)) ; 
 
 TYEDEF(e)..      TYE(e) =E= ((tyeb(e) + dabtye(e)) * TYEADJ * TYADJ) 
                                      + (DTYE * DTY * tye01(e)) ; 
 
 TWATDEF(c)..      TWAT(c)   =E= ((twatb(c) + dabtwat(c))* TWATADJ) 
                                      + (DTWAT*twat01(c)) ; 
 
 TWATADEF(c,a).. 
           TWATA(c,a)=E= ((twatab(c,a)+dabtwata(c,a))* TWATAADJ) 
                                      + (DTWATA*twata01(c,a)) ; 
 
* ## Government Tax Revenues 
 
 MTAXEQ..            MTAX =E= SUM(c,TM(c)*PWM(c)*ER*QM(c)) ; 
 
 ETAXEQ..            ETAX =E= SUM(c,TE(c)*PWE(c)*ER*QE(c)) ; 
 
 STAXEQ..            STAX =E= SUM(c,TS(c)*PQS(c)*QQ(c)) ; 
 
 EXTAXEQ..           EXTAX =E= SUM(c,TEX(c)*PQS(c)*QQ(c)) ; 
 
 ITAXEQ..            ITAX =E= SUM(a,TX(a)*PX(a)*QX(a)) ; 
 
 FTAXEQ..        
         FTAX =E= SUM((f,a),TF(f,a)*WF(f)*WFDIST(f,a)*FD(f,a)) ; 
 
 FYTAXEQ..       FYTAX =E= SUM(f,TYF(f)*(YF(f) * (1- deprec(f)))) ; 
 
 DTAXEQ..            DTAX =E= SUM(h,TYH(h)*YH(h)) 
                              + SUM(e,TYE(e)*YE(e)); 
 
 WATTAXEQ..          WATTAX  =E= SUM(c,TWAT(c)*PQS(c)*QQ(c)); 
 
 WATATAXEQ..      
   WATATAX =E= SUM((c,a),TWATA(c,a)*PQD(c)*PQDDIST(c,a)*QWAT2(c,a)) ; 
 
* ## Government Income 
 
 YGEQ..               YG =E= MTAX + ETAX 
                             + STAX + EXTAX + ITAX + FTAX 
                             + FYTAX + DTAX 
                             + WATTAX + WATATAX 
                             + SUM(f,govvash(f)*YFDISP(f)) 
                             + SUM(e,GOVENT(e)) + (govwor*ER)  ; 
 
* #### Government Expenditure Block 
 
 QGDEQ(c)..       QGD(c) =E= QGDADJ*comgovconst(c) ; 
 
 EGEQ..               EG =E= SUM(c,QGD(c)*PQD(c)) 
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                             + SUM(h,hogovconst(h)*CPI*HGADJ) 
                             + SUM(e,EGADJ*entgovconst(e)*CPI) ; 
 
 VGDEQ..             VGD =E= SUM(c,QGD(c)*PQD(c)) ; 
 
* ------- KAPITAL BLOCK ------------------------------------------- 
* ## Savings Block 
 
 SHHDEF(h)..     SHH(h) =E= ((shhb(h) + dabshh(h)) * SHADJ * SADJ) 
                              + (DSHH * DS * shh01(h)) ; 
 
 SENDEF(e)..     SEN(e) =E= ((senb(e) + dabsen(e)) * SEADJ * SADJ) 
                              + (DSEN * DS * sen01(e)) ; 
 
 TOTSAVEQ..       TOTSAV =E= SUM(f,(deprec(f)*YF(f))) 
                             + SUM(h,(YH(h) * (1 - TYH(h))) * SHH(h)) 
                             + SUM(e,(YE(e) * (1 - TYE(e))) * SEN(e)) 
                             + KAPGOV 
                             + (CAPWOR*ER) ; 
 
* ## Investment Block 
 
 QINVDEQ(c)..     QINVD(c) =E= IADJ*invconst(c); 
 
 INVESTEQ..       INVEST =E= SUM(c,PQD(c)*(QINVD(c) + dstocconst(c))) 
; 
 
* ------- FOREIGN INSTITUTIONS BLOCK ----------------------------- 
 YFWOREQ(f)..   YFWOR(f) =E= worvash(f)*YFDISP(f) ; 
 
* ------- MARKET CLEARING BLOCK ---------------------------------- 
 
* ##### Account Closure 
 
 FMEQUIL(f)..      FS(f) =E= SUM(a,FD(f,a)) ; 
 
 QEQUIL(c)..   
    QQ(c)  =E= QINTD(c) + SUM(h,QCD(c,h)) + SUM(e,QED(c,e)) 
                              + QGD(c) + QINVD(c) + dstocconst(c) ; 
 
 GOVEQUIL..       KAPGOV =E= YG - EG ; 
 
 CAEQUIL..        CAPWOR =E= SUM(cm,PWM(cm)*QM(cm)) 
                             + (SUM(f,YFWOR(f))/ER) 
                             - SUM(ce,PWE(ce)*QE(ce)) 
                             - SUM(h,howor(h)) 
                             - SUM(e,entwor(e)) 
                             - govwor 
                             - SUM(f,factwor(f)) ; 
 
* #### Absorption Closure 
 
 VFDOMDEQ..       VFDOMD =E= SUM(c, PQD(c) * 
                                (SUM(h,QCD(c,h)) + SUM(e,QED(c,e)) 
                                 + QGD(c) + QINVD(c) + 
dstocconst(c))) ; 
 
 INVESTSHEQ.. 
       INVESTSH * VFDOMD =E= INVEST ; 
 
 VGDSHEQ.. 
          VGDSH * VFDOMD =E= VGD ; 
 
 VEDSHEQ(e).. 
       VEDSH(e) * VFDOMD =E= VED(e) ; 
 
* ##### GDP 
 
 GDPVAEQ..         GDPVA =E= SUM((f,a),WF(f)*WFDIST(f,a)*FD(f,a)) 
                         + MTAX + ETAX + STAX + EXTAX + ITAX + FTAX 
                         + WATTAX + WATATAX  ; 
 
* ##### Slack 
 
 WALRASEQ..       TOTSAV =E= INVEST + WALRAS ; 
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A.1.5.4 Appendix 4: Example SAM 
  
cc
ro
ps
cv
eg
fr
ui
t
cm
ix
fa
rm
ca
gr
i
ci
nd
cs
er
cw
at
po
t
cw
at
re
c
cw
at
sa
l
ac
ro
ps
av
eg
fr
ui
t
am
ix
fa
rm
aa
gr
i
ai
nd
as
er
aw
at
po
t
aw
at
re
c
aw
at
sa
l
aw
at
ds
al
fl
ab
fc
ap
fl
an
d
fw
at
hj
ha
o
tw
at
tw
at
a
to
th
er
go
v
en
t
ka
p
ro
w
TO
TA
L
cc
ro
ps
3.
17
2.
68
3.
08
4.
36
9.
55
1.
18
9.
42
1.
39
2.
74
17
.6
1
55
.1
8
cv
eg
fr
ui
t
0.
01
0.
20
0.
01
0.
09
10
.4
3
8.
46
71
.1
4
13
.6
6
0.
29
24
.1
1
12
8.
37
cm
ix
fa
rm
0.
01
0.
50
13
.3
7
0.
16
0.
01
0.
05
6.
00
1.
14
1.
63
0.
17
23
.0
6
ca
gr
i
0.
08
0.
25
0.
32
10
.3
0
83
.1
5
4.
09
17
.7
7
3.
70
1.
06
9.
49
13
0.
21
ci
nd
7.
64
21
.9
9
6.
15
26
.4
7
14
98
.6
1
91
7.
02
9.
70
1.
16
0.
21
2.
44
10
14
.8
0
16
0.
44
42
5.
65
16
35
.0
1
57
27
.3
1
cs
er
11
.4
9
57
.1
9
0.
69
25
.9
1
10
00
.8
0
22
60
.6
6
7.
61
0.
64
0.
20
1.
24
16
06
.0
5
23
0.
94
14
95
.4
6
55
5.
74
66
0.
77
79
15
.4
0
cw
at
po
t
4.
94
14
.7
7
0.
41
4.
18
4.
86
9.
83
17
.7
3
3.
07
59
.8
0
cw
at
re
c
0.
88
2.
62
0.
06
3.
55
cw
at
sa
l
0.
48
1.
44
1.
93
ac
ro
ps
38
.0
9
1.
02
39
.1
1
av
eg
fr
ui
t
12
4.
55
0.
44
12
4.
99
am
ix
fa
rm
20
.8
2
20
.8
2
aa
gr
i
95
.9
8
0.
92
96
.9
0
ai
nd
6.
14
33
82
.1
4
33
88
.2
9
as
er
10
.6
4
71
96
.4
0
72
07
.0
4
aw
at
po
t
31
.3
4
31
.3
4
aw
at
re
c
2.
70
2.
70
aw
at
sa
l
0.
68
0.
68
aw
at
ds
al
3.
04
3.
04
fl
ab
8.
56
18
.7
9
8.
96
16
.6
7
70
0.
35
26
07
.8
0
5.
87
0.
41
0.
15
0.
33
13
.3
5
33
81
.2
5
fc
ap
4.
63
13
.6
4
1.
17
10
.8
2
66
.8
0
12
57
.5
9
3.
61
0.
45
0.
10
0.
84
12
1.
20
14
80
.8
4
fl
an
d
0.
47
1.
25
0.
05
0.
25
2.
02
fw
at
4.
04
4.
04
hj
27
08
.6
0
62
.3
4
17
.3
8
2.
51
58
8.
83
29
0.
29
10
5.
90
37
75
.8
5
ha
o
35
6.
09
3.
97
3.
92
0.
33
99
.7
8
28
.6
3
17
.7
3
51
0.
45
tw
at
21
.3
5
0.
61
1.
11
23
.0
6
tw
at
a
-3
.7
1
-1
1.
08
-0
.3
1
-3
.1
4
-2
.4
6
-2
0.
69
to
th
er
0.
30
-1
.8
9
1.
20
3.
81
49
3.
86
25
9.
65
4.
07
0.
23
0.
14
0.
46
1.
24
0.
25
0.
99
15
.7
1
12
7.
02
0.
35
0.
02
0.
01
-1
.8
5
21
7.
19
55
0.
03
38
.8
8
26
3.
45
7.
58
19
82
.7
1
go
v
4.
04
23
.0
6
-2
0.
69
19
82
.7
1
14
9.
40
21
38
.5
3
en
t
12
14
.6
2
2.
02
40
.1
0
12
56
.7
3
ka
p
46
1.
61
54
.3
7
-8
5.
64
67
4.
37
53
.3
1
-1
17
.6
0
10
40
.4
2
ro
w
16
.7
9
5.
71
1.
03
24
.2
8
18
38
.2
9
45
9.
35
99
.3
6
19
9.
91
26
44
.7
3
TO
TA
L
55
.1
8
12
8.
37
23
.0
6
13
0.
21
57
27
.3
1
79
15
.4
0
59
.8
0
3.
55
1.
93
39
.1
1
12
4.
99
20
.8
2
96
.9
0
33
88
.2
9
72
07
.0
4
31
.3
4
2.
70
0.
68
3.
04
33
81
.2
5
14
80
.8
4
2.
02
4.
04
37
75
.8
5
51
0.
45
23
.0
6
-2
0.
69
19
82
.7
1
21
38
.5
3
12
56
.7
3
10
40
.4
2
26
44
.7
3
43
17
9.
65
2
0
0
4
 S
A
M
 f
o
r 
Is
ra
el
 i
n
 1
0
0
 M
il
li
o
n
 N
ew
 I
sr
ae
li
 S
h
ek
el
 
STAGE_W: An Applied General Equilibrium Model with Multiple Types of Water 
169 
Legend of accounts 
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